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Contents

It's Strange to Be Home ..... *Leo Gruliow* 163

American Attitudes Toward Russia ..... *Warren B. Walsh* 183

Social Politics — A Policy for America ..... *William G. Carleton* 191

Views and Reviews of the Soviet Problem ..... *Alfred A. Skerpan* 205

Final Judgment .... *A Story* ..... *Theodora Illenberger* 221

The Justice of the People ..... *Freeman Champney* 231

Henry James as a Social Critic ..... *Clinton Oliver* 243

The Magic Porridge Mill ..... *T. Swann Harding* 259

Freedom Takes Time ..... *Paul Bixler* 269

Academic Freedom Under Peron ..... *William L. Munger* 275

Toward a Liberal Program for Prosperity and Peace ..... *Lewis Corey* 291

Ideas for a New Party: A Symposium — III 305

We Note ..... *The Editors* 313

The Reader Writes 317

Contributors 319

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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IT'S STRANGE TO BE HOME

By LEO GRULIOW

THE RUSSIAN PLANE bumped to a halt at the airport in Alaska at three a.m. and I tumbled out, sleepy, stiff, numb, and weary. The airport lights looked good. The war was ended, I reminded myself. Home, I said jubilantly, I was coming home to America. The war was over.

I waved good-bye to the crew until the plane turned and taxied down the runway to the other end of the field, its tail lights blinking. Then I picked up my luggage and walked toward the golden windows of the airport office.

There was only one occupant. He was a young lieutenant. He looked up from his desk.

"I'm the passenger off the Russian plane that just came through from Siberia," I said. I held out my passport.

The lieutenant tilted back his chair and scanned the green pages. ". . . war relief administrator . . . valid for travel in the USSR and countries en route," he read.

"Glad to meet you," he said, returning the passport.

I was taken aback.

"What do I do now?" I asked. "Don't I go through customs or turn in my passport or something?"

"I don't know. We don't handle that here."

"But don't I have to—"

"Don't worry about it," he advised. "You can do it when you reach the States."

I frowned. "But the regulations—"

He surveyed me curiously.

"Been abroad a long time, haven't you?"

I nodded.

"Uh-huh, I thought so," he said.

He reached for the cigarette burning on the edge of his ash tray, and offered me one from a pack. "How did you get along with the Russkies?"

"Got along all right." I pocketed my passport.

"Things pretty tough over there, are they?"

"Pretty tough," I said. My lighter didn't work. I bent forward for a light from his cigarette.

He didn't advance the hand holding it. Instead, he lit a match and held it toward me.

"Thanks," I said. "You didn't have to waste a match, though."

He stared at me. "Here." He flipped the book of matches toward me. "The Russian pilots do that, too, when they're coming through here their first time. They lean over to get a light from your cigarette."

"They ration matches in Russia," I said. "Fifty a month."

He glanced at my luggage.

"Got a place to stay?"

I shook my head. "Is there a plane going out, to New York?"

"To the West Coast," he replied. "In the morning. You can put up for the night at BOQ. There'll be a jeep going over soon."

When the jeep came I threw my luggage on the back seat and climbed in alongside the driver. We slowed up at a sentry post and lurched on down the road.

Our headlights flashed across a sign reading, "Welcome to Alaska," and then on another: "Los Angeles City Limits."

"Bet that makes you feel like home," the driver said.

I grinned and offered him a cigarette and a light.

Then I threw away the match.

I lit my own cigarette with another match, and drew a deep puff.

* * *

Next morning, flying toward the States, the airline hostess collected the breakfast trays. "More coffee, sir?" she asked.

"If I may," I said.

She looked inquiringly at the passenger alongside me.

"I think I'll have some more, too," he decided.

"There's no sugar left," she warned us.

"Never mind, then. Skip it," he said.

While I waited for my coffee I contemplated the piece of paper on which I had been writing: ". . . electr. unrtiond, scnds. @ mls, pncl. fr the askg, ppr. & ink in BOQ dsk, xtra blnkts, cndy. @ PX, Am. mgzines, hstss . . ."

My fellow-passenger cleared his throat. "Can't get sugar anywhere," he said. "Lucky you can get cigarettes now."

I wrote: "cigs," and then: "mtchs." He gave a sidelong glance at what I was writing.

"Just some impressions," I told him. "Feels strange to be home—going home, I mean."

The hostess brought my coffee. She smiled a hostess smile and turned to the passengers behind us.

"Hairdo," I wrote.

"Been overseas?" my companion inquired.

"Russia." I sipped the hot coffee. "Relief work."

"You'll find America a changed country. Yessir, you'll be surprised how it's changed. So you've been to Russia! Well, tell me, we going to have to fight them?"

I stopped short. This was 1945, and it seemed a strange question. The Russians hadn't asked any like that.

"Fight them?" I repeated.

"You hear a lot of talk. Not that I think we ought to get into another war, you understand. But if we're going to fight them, then the sooner the better. While we're in shape. Get it over with."

I tried to remember the questions Russians had asked about America. They hadn't asked that one. How do Americans live? Why do you have lynchings? Who is Mr. Truman? Do Americans like the Russians? And once, in a village classroom, had the Germans invaded America?

This was a new one—are we going to fight? I thought it over.

"What would we fight about?" I asked.

"Might be almost anything, way they're acting. And they're a dictatorship, aren't they?"

"Lots of dictatorships in the world," I said.

"Yes, I guess there are." He was silent for a moment. "How does this communism work, anyway?" he went on. "Money doesn't mean anything over there, does it? Haven't they abolished it or something?"

"It doesn't buy much nowadays. But they didn't abolish it," I replied. I showed him a one-ruble bill.

"Souvenir," I said. "I have plenty of them. Keep it."

"Would you autograph it for me?"

His pen leaked. While he wiped it with a piece of paper I studied him. He was in his late forties. A businessman, perhaps.

"If we're going to fight them we ought to learn more about them, don't you think?" I said.

"That's what I've always said, ought to know them better. They're almost neighbors, you might say, being across the Bering Strait there. Only thing I have against them is—of course, some say they've changed since the war, but they're still godless, aren't they? And a dictatorship and all." I autographed the bill.

He examined the souvenir and waved it to dry the ink.

"Say, is it true, all those stories about vodka? Just what is vodka?"

"Like gin without juniper flavor. They love to get a foreigner around a banquet table. The foreigner comes off second best."

"That's the way with all these northern people. I suppose it's the weather has something to do with it. Take these Eskimos, or the Swedes. Same way." He leaned toward me confidentially and lowered his voice. "They say those Russian gals are pretty fast, don't bother with marriage, and stuff like that. Bet you got next to some of it, huh? Young man like you." He nudged my arm.

A few drops of coffee spilled.

He took the paper that he had wiped the pen with and rubbed the coffee stains from the leather arm rest.

* * *

We reached our American destination, on the West Coast, at night. I had no hotel reservation. The clerk said there might be a room later.

It became dull, waiting in the lobby, and I told the clerk I'd be back later. I went for a walk.

The city seemed blazing with light. It was my first American city after the blacked-out Russian towns and devastated villages. I walked down the street, stopping to look at department store windows and neon signs and movie marquees. After a while the glare hurt my eyes. I went into a drugstore and stood there, bewildered by the display of goods.

I had a sundae at the soda fountain, watched the girls drinking sodas, and read the menu suggestions pasted on the mirror behind the counter. Then I started back to the hotel.

On the way I was attracted by a restaurant serving after-theatre snacks. I ordered griddle cakes and coffee.

When I inquired at the hotel desk, the clerk had a room for me. A porter led the way. He set the luggage in my room, opened the window, turned on the light in the bathroom and stood waiting.

I did not know how much to tip him. The businessman had talked of inflation. I gave the porter thirty-five cents.

When he was gone I stood before the window and watched the city's lights. I wasn't sleepy. I decided to take another walk.

I saw the porter in the lobby. I wondered whether thirty-five cents was enough. In Russia he would have been a much older man. He would have nodded or shown some other sign of friendly recognition. The porter probably didn't notice me passing through the lobby.

* * *

I walked a long time. When I saw the barbershop I realized it was Saturday night. I was tired from walking. I fingered the back of my neck and concluded I needed a haircut.

The barber inspected my hair critically.

"Where'd you get that job?" he asked.

"At the Metropole, in Moscow."

"Moscow?"

"In Russia."

"What were you doing in Russia?"

I told him.

"That's a great country, Russia," he said. "I talked to a fellow once, he'd been there, he said nobody had to worry, they had no unemployment, no depressions, no guys getting rich off the other fellow like here. You wait and see, all these big guys, they're getting richer and richer, all the rest of us, when the depression comes, we'll be selling apples again."

The barber at the next seat tapped my shoulder.

"Don't mind him," he said. "He's crazy. He's a Red."

"Believe me, the Reds have the right idea," my barber replied. "You been to Russia, mister, you tell him. He's one of these guys now, they come out of the army filled up on a lot of bunk. Always telling me watch my step, the boss doesn't like it, I'll get in trouble. In Russia I could talk all I want and no boss to stop me."

"You really been in Russia, mister?" asked the second barber.

"You'd have a boss in Russia," I said.

"And plenty of trouble," added the second barber.

The electric clipper sent a cool prickling down the back of my neck. I relaxed and began to doze off. The barbers went on bickering.

I opened my eyes at the sound of a newsboy crying his papers at the door. One of the barbers motioned him inside, and he went from seat to seat, peddling the morning paper. I gave a dime to my barber and asked him to buy one for me.

He put my paper on his shelf. "Which section you want? First section?" he asked.

I read the news while he clipped my hair. The pages of the news section seemed endless. I dozed off again.

When he finished he whisked the apron off me.

I tipped him and started to walk off.

"You forgot your paper, mister," the barber said. I looked at the section under my arm. Then I saw him take the bulk of Sunday sections, classified and rotogravure and magazine and colored comics, from his shelf.

"Nearly forgot about Sunday papers," I said.

* * *

A GI was paying his check when I came up to the cashier's desk.

"That's $3.85," the cashier told him.

"What!" said the GI. "Did you say $3.85?"

The cashier nodded.

The GI turned to me. "What's yours, mister?"

I looked at my check.

"One dollar," I said. "I had a hair trim. It does seem steep."

"Now let's see—I had a haircut, singe, shampoo, shave, massage."

"Three eighty-five is right," the cashier said.

"Three eighty-five! Holy smoke!"

The GI paid his bill and left.

He was waiting for me, outside.

"Do you think that was right, mister?" he asked. "I don't want to be gypped."

"I don't know. I'm a stranger myself, been away a long time."

"I just landed from a troopship. When I left, a haircut was sixty cents."

"That's what it was when I left."

"Let's ask someone if this is a gyp town," he suggested. "Dollar a haircut! Holy smoke!"

We looked at price tags in a shop window. The prices seemed high.

A stranger came by. He looked in the window, too. The GI turned to him.

"Say, friend, how is this town on GIs? Is this one of those places where they rook them?"

The stranger peered at us.

"Not generally," he said. "What's the matter?"

The youth told him. The stranger questioned him carefully.

"I don't know, but it sounds right," he said finally. "Haircut, a dollar. That's what I pay. Shave, singe, massage, shampoo. It sounds about right."

The GI whistled.

"Sure," said the stranger. "While you been away, funny things been happening in America. I get $50 a week, do you know I can't find anywhere decent to live? Can't get any meat or soap. Can't buy a car. Where's it all gone? We're giving it away. To the Russians and the Yugoslavs. Giving it away!"

The GI listened.

"All those New Dealers in Washington, sending our meat and sugar and soap to the Russians," the stranger continued. "You can read it in the papers. And giving away our military secrets, and everything."

He talked on.

I said good-bye, don't let yourself get rooked again, and walked back to the hotel, thoughtful.

* * *

The plane for New York left the next day. A young girl had the seat next to mine. College age, I guessed. She was attractive, and when she crossed her legs her thigh showed. It embarrassed me. The ads embarrassed me. The airport newsstand had embarrassed me. I wondered whether there had been so much emphasis on sex when I had left America. Probably it took a little time to become used to it once more. I recalled how conscious I had been of the frequency with which the Russians had discussed food during the war, and how after a while I had become accustomed to it.

We watched the mountains swim past and we talked of planes and travel.

"Russia must have been interesting," she said. "I'd love to learn Russian and all sorts of languages, really learn them, I mean, and travel all over and see everything."

"America for me, for a long while anyway," I said. "We just don't know how lucky we are in America."

"But it's deadly. Everybody grabbing for something and not getting it. Everybody somehow—I don't know—neurotic. Afraid."

"Was it like that during the war?" I asked.

"No. Everybody was confident then. Sort of purposeful. Or were we? No, maybe we weren't. I worked in a defense plant for a while, and most of the girls there were out for what they could get, I suppose. But some of them had men in the service, and that made a difference. It became worse when the war ended. And the atom bomb. The way people talk about it. One day we ought to blow up everybody else. Next day we're going to be blown up ourselves. We're afraid. Aren't the Russians afraid?"

"Not the same way. 'We've had the atom bomb,' one of them said. 'Look at Stalingrad or Sevastopol. It took three months maybe, instead of three seconds, but it comes to the same thing. War is the same as before—it's still war. Only worse.' That's how this Russian talked about it." I reflected on her troubled words. "Perhaps America is afraid now because for the first time we really know we're vulnerable, too."

"Sometimes I wish we'd been bombed, just a little bit," she said. "Maybe it would all be different then. It must be nice to be sure of yourself and purposeful, like the Russians. Or are they?"

"Sometimes. Sometimes just harried and weary." After a while I added: "Russia is very big. A lot of human beings."

"I've often wondered what they're like. What are they like?"

I smiled. "In one sentence?"

"Well, of course—. But just tell me things you saw in Russia."

I shook my head. "It's hard to talk about it, somehow. It's like describing combat experience to a civilian. People understand what they've seen or experienced themselves."

"But we have to understand. Otherwise what good is it all? It makes me so mad."

* * *

I thought about it a long time. How to make real an alien life, a strange background, others' experiences? One could talk about vodka

or godlessness; about bosses and depressions; about UNRRA and the cost of haircuts; about fears and the atom bomb. It was no good. The colors were all wrong. They were the colors out of our own life.

I tried to remember the other pictures.

II

They were fresh in my mind.

The road to Bobruisk ran past the dynamited houses of Malo-Yaroslavets, through the shelled town of Modyno, and into Yuhknov. Yuhknov was burned to the ground. Bobruisk itself was hollow walls. Alongside the ruins were neat piles of bricks, sorted from the debris.

Or Orel: as you approached Orel the first thing you saw was the gaunt wreck of the railroad station. Broken plaster, bricks, and burned timbers littered the ground. Two smashed and rusting locomotives lay on their sides like tired elephants. The Nazis had set off charges under every third tie.

Or Mozhaisk: when I went to Mozhaisk, army girls were repaving the shell-pocked road. There were three posters. One showed a woman and child, and bore the line, "Have you adopted an orphan?" Another pointed an accusing finger, and below was the question, "What have you done toward rebuilding Mozhaisk?" The third poster was simply a list. It was headed, "Watch for these diseases—report them at once."

Or Stalino, in the Donets coal basin: from the air, the rows of roofless buildings resembled a honeycomb. I went down into the mines. Every one had been flooded or dynamited. In the orphanages there were children with deep furrows between the eyes, like typewriter ditto marks.

Or the village I walked through, near Leningrad: there were many black squares of rubble, with chimneys still erect on each square. A few brick walls stood, scratched with gunfire, and gaping where windows had been. At the end of the street was a common grave of perhaps a hundred bodies. "Now you've seen the village," my guide said. "Let us turn back."

That is how it was when the war ended. It was the same no matter where you travelled, throughout an area that had contained almost half the country's population.

For the Russians it had been a Pyrrhic victory. They had suffered more serious damage than any other combatant, including the defeated foe.

Housing? Six million dwellings were rubble heaps. The United States has a housing shortage, although our homes are intact and our production facilities greater than ever. Russia had a fifteen-year housing crisis; the war's destruction added 25,000,000 quite literally homeless (the word is *pogoreltsi,* "those who have been burned out"), and the Russians face the rebuilding task with a third of their lumber industry and half their cement industry destroyed.

Clothing? For five years no civilian clothing was produced. The possessions of 80,000,000 people were looted; much of what remained was burned up together with the homes. Then a third of Russia's textile industry was demolished.

Transportation? Forty thousand miles of railroad track, more than all Germany had, were ripped up.

Manpower? Seven million men died in battle. Perhaps as many again lost their lives to disease, hunger, and the Nazi death camps.

Food? Seventeen million head of horned cattle had been slaughtered or carried off to Germany. That was more than all Germany held. The tractors were smashed and drought lay on the land. It would be 1949 before the war-ravaged regions produced their normal food yield—which had been half the country's prewar production.

Industry? Almost half the nation's coal and iron capacity lay in twisted wreckage. It will be 1952 or 1953 or later, in Stalin's judgment, before industry is restored to prewar level.

These are the facts Russia must live with.

Across a war-torn region as large as the United States from the Atlantic to the Mississippi I saw women and children ferreting in the endless debris, salvaging nails and bricks and timbers for rebuilding.

They faced a heartbreaking ten-year job.

Yet they remarked, *"Ekh,* this isn't so bad," "This time it will be easier," "This time it will go more quickly."

They had been through it before.

* * *

That, in fact, is the biography of an entire generation—"they have been through it before."

They were born during the first World War. The World War was not over before civil war spread through the land, and the civil war was hardly begun before foreign armies intervened. When the eight years of

warfare came to an end, the fighting had taken more than 3,000,000 lives. An estimated 10,000,000 of the new generation were orphans. No one knows how many were *besprizorni*—homeless waifs who roamed in little wolfpacks, stealing and begging, ragged, dirty and hungry. Two million scrawny, swollen-bellied bodies marked a famine trail down the Volga. There is no record of how many succumbed to the typhus epidemics. Industrial production was down to one-seventh of the country's prewar output. To complete the picture, when peace came at last the nation was left shorn of fifteen times as much territory as Germany lost at Versailles. This territory held 35,000,000 population and half the country's industry.

This was not merely a war-wracked land. It was a backward country, which at best had produced only one pair of shoes a year for each 2,000 inhabitants. Its people knew no other administration or tradition than feudal despotism. Almost seventy per cent of them were illiterate.

A small but determined party of revolutionists had seized power. The new leaders were dedicated to a doctrine of the machine age: they set out to apply it in the land of the wooden plow. Theirs was a thesis of overproduction: with this thesis they prepared to govern the country of bast footgear, the land where famine came once every decade of recorded history. The revolutionaries' theory proclaimed the end of force and the state: they set forth this vision in a nation of 1,000 years of authoritarian rule, state church, secret police, Siberian exile, and uneducated peasantry.

Who will say how many or how strange were the consequences of this curious incongruity between the theory and the actuality it confronted? How much of the Soviet attitude toward the western nations, for instance, derives from Russian history and geography, how much from the theories of Marx and Lenin, and how much from what has happened within the lifetime of today's generation? To what extent can Soviet bureaucracy be attributed to the ways of old Russia, to the system of government control over the smallest details of life, or to the acute shortage of trained personnel? Generations hence, perhaps, men will still ponder the interaction of the doctrine and the reality upon one another. Here we are concerned with the effect upon the people.

* * *

In the New Economic Policy of 1924-28 the Russians enjoyed a brief respite from struggle. It was a respite of weariness and exhaustion rather than rest and comfort.

Then the revolutionaries set out to transform the land. They drew up a tremendous plan of national development. There were grave inadequacies of materials, equipment, and manpower for the ambitious program. It seemed fantastic to embark on such a sweeping project with only the meager means at the country's disposal. Nevertheless, despite the incredible handicaps, the Kremlin set out to make the country into a modern industrial power, to reorganize the unproductive strip farming into tractor-and-combine agriculture, and to educate the people for this new era.

Other countries had taken a century or more to effect such a transformation. The Russian people were called upon to accomplish it in five years. A people just recovered from world war, civil war, intervention, epidemics, famine, and industrial breakdown was plunged into a new and formidable national effort.

They called it the first Five-Year Plan.

It became a crusade against the country's backwardness. "Shock troops" "stormed" the industrial and agricultural "fronts." Men learned to do without sleep and many gave their lives to build factories at forced pace. The cities were swollen with millions of new workers, and one no longer spoke of "apartments," but of "rooms," and then "corners." There was blind and bitter opposition from the peasants, who slaughtered 32,000,000 head of cattle and 15,000,000 horses rather than surrender them to their new collective farms—almost twice as great a loss of livestock as the country was to suffer in World War II. The revolutionary dictatorship was ruthless and determined, however, and those who resisted the country's transformation were treated as enemies. Men went on working, on short rations, as fiercely as soldiers ever fought. This crusade against backwardness involved electricity and tractors rather than guns and bullets, but the deprivations and the strain might have been those of wartime.

* * *

What pressures goaded them? What urgencies spurred them to make up their hundred-year lag in five years and not in forty or fifty?

There were internal social and economic problems, and the revolutionary doctrine, and the fear that the peasantry, if allowed to grow rich and strong under private trade, would bar the way to changes; but the most potent factor was insecurity. Always the fear of new invasions stood beside them, urging them on. The memory was fresh in their minds:

during the civil war of 1917-21, all the great powers had invaded the Soviet land. Britain and her enemy Germany alike had sent troops into Russia. France sent warships. Democratic America put armed forces on Russian soil. Undemocratic Japan held half Siberia; her armies did not depart until 1922. The motives of these powers were of the most complex, but to Russians the overwhelming fact of a dozen foreign armies on Russian territory overshadowed subtler points.

An uneasy truce had followed the intervention. A ring of hostile states—the *cordon sanitaire*—was set up on the Russian border with the support of the great powers of Europe. The Soviets remained unrecognized by half the governments of the world. Russians had only to listen to the utterances of almost any foreign statesman or newspaper to feel the breath of hostility.

Under these circumstances they needed little if any prompting to see themselves the object of attack in future wars; and they knew another global war was coming, long before the rest of the world was fully alive to the danger.

Their leaders told them repeatedly, with all the force of the country's powerful propaganda machinery, that the five-year plan was not merely an effort to achieve a better life; it was a necessity for survival. Time and again Russia had been beaten for her backwardness, said the Kremlin—by the Mongols, the Swedes, the Teutons, the Poles, the French, the Japanese, the Germans, how many others? Another world holocaust was on its way. The Russians would be the victims if they did not hurry.

Prepare—prepare—prepare: it was like a tocsin that rang in their ears day after day.

* * *

They succeeded. They built the blast furnaces (and the munitions factories). They made the tractors, a half million of them (and the tanks, 30,000 a year by the time the war came). Their combines took record harvests from the fields at last (and they set aside grain reserves). They taught most of the population to read and write, and they trained 120,000 doctors (and field surgeons), hundreds of thousands of engineers (and thousands of aviators). They won the costly crusade upon backwardness —the crusade that was to prepare the way for a better life (and for the invasions they expected). In the end they were to multiply industrial production more than eighty times over from the low to which it had

fallen. Now when they paused to look back they were a changed people in a changed land.

They were still ill-clad, ill-housed, ill-fed and weary for the good things of life. They had paid for their great effort by great sacrifice. They were living under rationing—or rather, under a dual rationing-and-free-market economy which was to become familiar again after the next world war.

The second Five-Year Plan held forth the pledge of relaxation. The people were hopeful. The product of thousands of new factories began to trickle forth, promising a rich stream of consumer goods. Rationing was abolished. For the first time in history Russia produced one and three-quarters pair of shoes per capita annually, as well as automobiles and steel. Peasant girls began to learn about ballroom dancing and make-up. *Kultura* became a magic word; in the Soviet lexicon, "culture" means a vast span of things, from brushing one's teeth to driving locomotives, from working efficiently to attending the opera. The country soaked up books like sands absorbing water. The first Soviet musical comedy film was screened. The people had learned to use soap, and soap at last was to be had in the stores. The crowded cities began to nibble at the fringes of the housing problem. Russians learned that a can of corn has the food value of five eggs: they were learning this from the newly-introduced art of advertising. Ice cream parlors sprang up. Coffee, citrus fruits, and Soviet champagne appeared in city stores. Jazz bands became part of the thousands of clubs. Strange new songs appeared as the grimness of the uphill struggle receded—songs about "why should a young man not wear a tie and sigh at the moon?"

* * *

The dream of relaxation and prosperity was short-lived. Insecurity did not abate, but became the dominant element in the Soviet psychology, as Japan invaded neighboring Manchuria in the East and Adolf Hitler rearmed Germany in the West, screaming for war on the Soviets. Litvinoff sought allies and action among the democratic powers, and failed again and again to rouse them to a sense of their danger.

The great fear brought the great purges, with their terror and disruption. No one knows how many were executed, banished or dismissed, or how many of these were innocent. Economic plans were revised to shift emphasis back from consumer goods to heavy industry and arma-

ment. Life was easier than in the critical period of the first Five-Year Plan, but there was nevertheless conscious deprivation and strain. I recall the girl who stood in line ten hours to buy a pair of shoes, and returned empty-handed. I made some deprecating remark. She turned on me, eyes flashing. "I wear old shoes because Sasha"—her husband, a Red Army trainee—"has new boots. And," she added, "some day you will thank us for it." There was the youth who picked up the newspaper announcing that the chief of the secret police himself had been an "enemy of the people." "Whom can one trust now?" asked the youth. "Nobody, I suppose," he added, "except oneself."

The purges were followed by border warfare with Japan. The "frontier skirmishes" involved tanks, planes, artillery, and entire regiments. The two summers of fighting along the Manchurian border were little reported, and few foreigners pondered their significance. Only after testing Siberia's defenses did Japan turn to challenge America and Britain in lands which seemed easier and richer prey.

The whole world knows the remainder of the story: the Munich pact, ending the last Russian hopes of winning allies among the democracies; its successor, the Nazi-Soviet pact, which precipitated the war; then the occupation of half Poland and the Baltic and Bessarabia, and the futile war with Finland—efforts to push back the borders to the 1913 line, so that Leningrad and Odessa might be more than a scant twenty miles from enemy artillery, and Moscow might be 600 instead of 400 miles from a foe; and, finally, the invasion.

* * *

The period of intervention, the years of hostility by the outer world, and the decade of Litvinoff's failures had worn a deep groove in the Soviet mind. Most Russians were convinced that powerful groups within the democracies wished to see Russia weakened or destroyed.

For a moment in history this old suspicion was shaken by Prime Minister Churchill's welcome to his new-found ally and by President Roosevelt's Lend-Lease. But as the enemy pressed them harder and harder, Russians looked in vain for miracles from the West to help them, and in their bitter plight the bitter suspicion returned.

The amount of Lend-Lease was tremendous—it tipped the scales—but it was only a fraction of the cost of the war to the Russians. (We sent 10,000 freight cars, for instance; the Russians lost about 43 times that

number in the first year of the war.) And the Lend-Lease could not reach the Russians in appreciable quantities until after Stalingrad, when they felt they already had turned the tide without our assistance.

Mostly the Russians were counting lives. For three years they fought the huge German forces almost single-handed, with a terrible toll in human life. "Second front" propaganda had its embittering effect, but the Russians did not have to be hopped up on propaganda to feel as they did. It was enough to consider their casualties.

Many of the patients in the hospitals wore Russian War Relief pajamas, were bandaged with American Red Cross dressings, and ate Lend-Lease food. The patients thanked me warmly for America's help. But always there was the thought, sometimes expressed, sometimes left unspoken, that if an early landing had been made in France these men might still be whole and their homes and villages saved. It was hopeless to explain the shipping problems, America's unpreparedness, the demands of the war in the Pacific, the arguments over whether to attack in the Balkans or France, or anything else. These men could see only the agony they were living through while America and Britain prepared. We were trading our supplies for Russian lives, and Russian towns for our time. The Russians had no choice, and they writhed in their torment. They could not understand that America and Britain, the rich countries sending them warm pajamas and medicines and food and armaments, might also have little choice.

* * *

The war represented a severe national test, but it was also a triumph, all the greater for the hardship it cost. Pride grew and swelled as the Russians swept the Nazi armies back across Europe. When the Soviet flag was raised over Berlin and the war ended in victory, the pride was all-consuming.

They had won out. They, the scorned, the snubbed, the backward, the people who had watched the foreign tourist in his fine clothes, *they* had triumphed.

They looked about at the rubble and destruction. This time it would be easier. This time it would go more quickly. This time no epidemics, no famine, no bands of homeless waifs. This time reparations, prisoner-of-war labor, recognition by the world.

With all that, they were worse off than ever for housing, clothing, and the comforts of life. The trail of devastation stretched across the land once more.

* * *

These are a new people, with a new psychology. They are neither the ardent revolutionaries nor the superstitious peasantry of their fathers' Russia. Where the early revolutionaries set out on an uncharted path, the new generation has "arrived"—and is consequently conservative, in the literal sense of the word. Where the peasant fathers lined up in two rows, fought until dark and then greeted the blood on the snow as an omen of a rich crop, the new generation drives combine harvesters and places its faith in agricultural laboratories. The lives have been different. The human product is not the same.

The new generation is nationalistic, for instance. I do not refer to the superficial resurgence of Great Russian patriotism during the war nor to the encouragement of pan-Slavic sympathies as a convenient instrument of postwar policy, but to the strong group feeling of many nationalities newly welded into a single nation by a community of experience. Few countries have blended numerous diverse peoples into a single united nation. America is the only large country of this pattern. But while America today is becoming international-minded as never before, the Soviet people are nationalistic as never before.

This national consciousness grew up before the war and was nurtured by propaganda, but the war brought it to full flower. Russian peasants who used to say "they" have learned to say "we."

The most pronounced symptom of the new national awareness is the great, overwhelming pride. One encounters this pride among the young people everywhere. One finds it in unexpected places, among the ruins and amid hardship. These people, who have paid such a high price for what they have built and defended, are acutely conscious of their achievements—in the fields of social and cultural progress, for instance, in education, in industry, in helping win the war. This feeling has been cultivated intensively through press, radio, schools, and films. Lack of contact with the outside world may warp the critical judgment of the young Russians; but neither propaganda nor isolation could create this pervasive pride without the real accomplishments of the people.

The attitude of the outside world helped to create this pride, as it has helped to create the nationalism. Theirs is the touchy pride of people who have been scorned. There was the young woman who bitterly resented a comparison between Russia and the America of a hundred years ago, because she saw in it a reflection on her country's backwardness. They are boastful with the raw confidence of the newly-successful. There was the young man who could not understand why the Germans did not give in long before the end—did they not realize they were beaten as soon as they attacked Russia? They resent pity fiercely. There was the mayor whom I asked to write an appeal to Americans for Russian War Relief. The need of his community was great and he knew Americans would respond generously to an appeal. "No," he said stiffly. "We will say thanks for what you send. But we do not beg."

Russians have witnessed more of the outer world since the end of the war than at any other time; and there is a widespread belief in the United States that the sight of relative well-being in occupied countries has shaken Russians' faith in their government. I doubt this. I have talked to Soviet troops returned from occupation duty and my chief impression was that they looked upon the comparative riches of foreign lands with resentment uppermost over envy. Indoctrination and the enemy's own deeds in Russian territory had prepared them. When they saw the comforts of Germany and of the countries which the Germans had ruled, the dominant emotion was bitterness that such people should have enjoyed such riches. As for the merits of their own system, they said simply, did we not win?

That, to Russians, is the answer to a great many questions. Success cancels many a sin. These are people who accept dictatorship, who have known no other form of government, and who, when they do question it, often find it justified by the difficulties through which it took them.

Nationalism, pride, acceptance of dictatorship—these are Soviet attitudes which the war has strengthened. A fourth—insecurity—remains in spite of the war.

It is many a generation since Americans knew national insecurity of the kind that the Russians have felt almost constantly in our time. We have hated war and resented its intrusion upon our lives, but within our memory or that of our fathers we have not feared it. Our land has not been devastated by invaders. Our history is one of victories, and until now

we have enjoyed the calm and casual assumption that we will have peace or relatively easy triumph. Only today, when we suddenly find ourselves exposed to the danger of assault by the atomic bomb, have we begun to sense, on the fringe of our awareness, vague twinges of the kind of insecurity the Soviet people have lived with for a generation.

' ' '

By great effort they had repaired the havoc of one world war and caught up with the machine age. Now much of their machine-age creation has been wiped out; and they face the task of repairing the havoc of a second world war while they catch up with the atomic age.

If a single word could characterize their lives, the word is the one they use so often, "struggle."

Those of them born in 1914 had known rationing for some twenty years of their thirty-three, and war for thirteen. In their short lifetime they have witnessed war and revolution; then a brief pause to pick up the bricks and catch their breath; then a five-year national effort as hard as war; then fear, purges, preparation for another war; the fiercest fighting in the world's fiercest conflict; and now, picking up the bricks again.

III

When I spoke to the girl in the plane, flying across America on my way home, I had not sorted out these things in my mind nor could I quote the statistics offhand. I just talked.

I began to speak slowly, almost reluctantly. After a while the words came of themselves. They poured out as if a log jam had broken. I was carried along.

I talked a long time.

When I fell silent I became aware that I had been speaking very rapidly, hardly pausing for breath. I was talked out.

We were coming down the other side of the mountain ranges. The girl stared reflectively at the changing landscape.

"I wonder whether we'll ever really understand one another," she said at last.

"I don't know," I replied. "Perhaps in time. If they attain the same casual sense of well being and national security that we have. Now—now the colors are different."

"Yes," she said. "I see what you mean."

She had a magazine in her lap. Its back cover, an automobile ad, was uppermost. My eye fell on it.

"Autos, for instance," I went on. "The Russians don't think of an auto as a personal convenience or something to tinker with. It's an instrument. It might be a machine to help them rebuild, or a weapon of war. To be able to drive or repair an auto is a mark of *kultura*. There was a headline in one of the Russian papers—'Struggle to improve the Soviet auto!' A car is a triumph of their creation. It's all sorts of things to them, but not always the same things that it represents to us. Our experiences have been different."

"Umm," she said. We were silent for a while.

I pointed to the picture of the automobile.

"Is that the new model?" I asked.

"Yes. It isn't changed much, is it?" We inspected the picture. "Isn't it awful, this automobile mess?" she went on. "I wish they'd do something about it. I've had an order in for six months, and the dealer tells me I can't expect delivery for another year."

"Gosh," I said. "I hadn't thought about it. I'll need a car. I'd better put in an order fast, when I reach New York. You think I might have to wait a year? That would be terrible."

The airline hostess came by to check our belt fastenings. Only after she had passed did the significance of my words dawn on me.

"I've come home again!" I said.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIA

by WARREN B. WALSH

THE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS are distrustful and apprehensive of the Soviet Union. Whether or not these attitudes are justified is a question beyond the scope of this paper, which is concerned only with reporting American opinions on Russia as revealed by numerous public opinion polls and not with judging them except in one particular. The exception involves the relation of attitudes to information or the lack of it.

Fear and suspicion of Russia are not new in the United States. Such feelings long antedate the Bolshevik regime. We did not like the tsarist autocracy and we often described it with the same adjectives we now employ in talking about the Soviet government. The February Revolution of 1917 was hailed in this country as a triumph of democracy and we hastened to give official recognition and support to the new regime. The Bolshevik Revolution, on the contrary, dismayed us deeply, mostly because we thought that the Bolsheviks were German agents or, at least, were playing our enemy's game. The highly publicized efforts of the Bolsheviks to foment world revolution, as well as the excesses of the upheavals in Russia, greatly increased our fears and our hostilities. These attitudes have persisted. Even during the years of our recent wartime association, one of every three Americans consistently mistrusted Russia.

How much of this was due to Russian actions and how much to fear of communism in general and of the Communist Party USA in particular is impossible to say, but the two have been closely related. We did not (and do not) like communism or the party and we partially identified them with Russia. Eight years ago a little more than half of the American people believed that American Communists either took their orders directly from Moscow or reached their decisions in co-operation with the masters of the Kremlin. Last year a little less than half of us said that American Communists were loyal to Russia rather than to the United

States. Aside from this point we have never professed to know much about the Communist Party USA.

Almost two-thirds of us (in 1939) had no idea as to the size of the party and those who thought they knew grossly overestimated it. The membership figure officially given by Moscow at that time was 90,000. The median answer of those Americans who gave an estimate was 300,000. This may be a measure of apprehension or it may reflect a failure to realize how much can be accomplished by even a tiny group of disciplined devotees. At any rate, many or few, we didn't like the Communists, and we consistently regarded them as our prime national menace. When war threatened over the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, we changed our minds momentarily and by a scant five million elected the Nazis to the seat of dishonor. But within nine months, more than twice as many were worried about Communists and communism as about Nazis and nazism.

The record of German aggression slowly and partially changed our perspective. Before either we or the Russians got into the war, sixty-four million American adults (71 per cent) approved a suggestion that the Communist Party USA be outlawed, and almost thirty-nine millions favored such drastic steps as deportation or even execution of Communists. About a third of the latter changed their minds as war engulfed the USSR and swept closer to the United States but we were by no means ready to accept the Communists as friends. Forty-eight millions advocated "keeping track of Communists, preventing them from organizing and agitating, and generally curbing their activities." Even after we were both involved in fighting the Germans, and in spite of the change in party line after June 22, 1941 which enrolled the Communists on our side, popular suspicions of them continued. As late as November, 1943 we were slightly more suspicious and worried about Communist groups than about German and Nazi groups in this country. These feelings affected our attitudes toward the USSR which we persisted in regarding as thoroughly communist.

For some time the majority of Americans felt that nazism, as typified by Germany, was less bad than communism as typified by Russia. Germany in July, 1939 earned a place on our list of favorite nations but Russia did not. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact we appeared to reach the conclusion that we liked and trusted Russia less than Germany although we hadn't

much use for either partner. Our sympathies, however, swung sharply in favor of Russia after Germany invaded the USSR. When asked which side we wanted to see victorious we picked Russia three to one, although some twenty-two million people said they didn't have a preference. The Red Army was much more popular with us than the Soviet government. Roughly one of three thought that the governments of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were "equally bad," and five out of a hundred thought that the Russian government was by far the worse. On the other hand, eight out of a hundred said that the Russian was by far the better; and another one of the three said that it was slightly better "although there was not much to choose between the two."

The events of December, 1941, forced us into a *de facto* partnership with the Soviet Union. Gradually and with considerable reluctance the majority of us came to accept this. By the middle of 1943, nearly seventy-three million Americans were in favor of an equal partnership with Russia in war and peace. Not all who took this attitude were happy about it. A quarter of us expected that Russia would make a separate peace; and, a little later, two out of three said that any international police force ought to be as large as or larger than the Red Army. Opinions on the desirability of a permanent American-Russian military alliance were about equally divided.

There was clearly a hard core of mistrust. Various public opinion polls gave indications of this, but the clearest evidence is in the twenty surveys conducted between March, 1942 and the end of 1945 on the question "Do you think Russia can be trusted to co-operate with us after the war?" The number of Americans who did not anticipate Russian co-operation went as high as thirty-six million (40 per cent) and never fell below twenty-three million. The average was thirty million—exactly one of three. A tabular view of the findings of these surveys is given in percentages in the table on the next page.

The outburst of hopefulness in March and August, 1945, when the recordbreaking fifty million answered "Yes" presumably reflects our joy over victory. We were optimistic in 1945, or at least many of us were. At the beginning of that year, forty-three million Americans expected that we would get along better with Russia in the future than we had in the past. The difficulties and realities of peacemaking brought quick disillusionment. Within six months after V-J Day, forty-seven millions said

"No" when asked if they thought Russia would co-operate with us in world affairs. This was eleven million more than at any time in the preceding four years. Our opinions fluctuated during the rest of the year. In May, the number of those who thought that Russia would not co-operate had dropped to about thirty-four millions, but by October it had climbed to almost forty-eight millions with the "trust" figure standing at the record low of just under twenty-nine millions. At the beginning of 1947 those with opinions were almost evenly divided: 43 per cent thought that the Soviets would co-operate in world affairs; 40 per cent thought not.

"Do you think Russia can be trusted to co-operate with us when the war is over?"

Date	*Yes*	*No*	*Don't Know*
3/42	39	39	22
6/42	41	32	27
7/42	50	30	20
10/42	38	35	27
1/43	45	27	28
2/43	46	29	25
4/43	44	34	22
5/43	45	31	24
10/43	36	38	26
11/43	47	27	26
12/43	51	27	22
1/44	51	31	18
2/44	41	35	24
7/44	47	36	17
10/44	47	35	18
3/45	55	31	14
6/45	45	38	17
8/45	54	30	16
10/45	44	40	16

When the poll questions envisioned a more concrete situation than the somewhat vague "co-operation," we consistently evinced more distrust. Throughout 1943 and 1944, for example, sixty out of a hundred thought that Russia would want more territory after the war than she had before it. Fifty out of the hundred were of the opinion that she ought not to get it. The question of whether the USSR should and would join us against Japan gives further illustration to this point.

The polls reported in the spring of 1945 that 85 per cent of the people thought that Russia "owed it to the United States to continue fighting

and help us beat Japan," but only 64 per cent expected that Russia would. Did this group include the 49 per cent who favored a permanent American-Russian defensive, military alliance? The polls do not have the answer to that question, but they do show the permanent core of distrust. Thirty-seven per cent were opposed to such an alliance in September, 1943; 36 per cent, in April of 1945. By July, 77 per cent wanted Russia to help us fight the Japanese, but 39 per cent said they didn't expect Russia to do so. Whether this 39 per cent were basically distrustful or merely impatient it is impossible to say. It is a temptation to guess that they were the one-third who had consistently disliked and distrusted Russia no matter what the Soviets did or didn't do.

Was Russia "peace-loving" or "aggressive"? Many of us didn't know what to say, but those with opinions were about equally divided. Most people weren't very sure of their facts, but when the issue was specific and concrete, they knew how they felt. Better than two to one we disapproved of any loan to Russia, and in answer to the question as to what nation was most likely to start the next war, the name of Russia led all the rest.

Our fears and suspicions continued to grow during 1946. Over half of us labeled Russia as untrustworthy or dangerous and felt that she ought to be watched closely. Almost eighty-four million (in April) shared a general disapproval of Russian policies and forty-five million wanted our government to take a firm line with the Kremlin. Two different polls in midsummer reported that over fifty million Americans believed that Russia "was building herself up to be the ruling power of the world" and that she "was trying to get more than her fair share of raw materials." Nearly as many persons feared that Russia was out to spread communism. The number of those who wanted a firm policy increased by half over the figure for the preceding April. The impression that the Soviets were aiming at world domination gained ground slightly and so did the groups who advocated firmness toward the USSR. All in all, some fifty-five million Americans reported that they felt less friendly to Russia than they had the year before. This is a surprisingly low figure in view of the fact that seventy million believed that Russian spies were at work here. Were there fifteen million to whom espionage made no difference?

A considerable minority thought the situation so serious that we ought to consider going to war against Russia, but the overwhelming majority disagreed. We didn't trust the Russians. We thought they were

spying on us. We suspected them of seeking world domination and of trying to spread communism. But we did not want to think of war. This seemed the sum of our attitudes through 1946. On what grounds did we base these opinions? They must have been based upon intuition or prejudice or handed-down attitudes because they certainly were not based upon factual information. Evidence in support of this contention is ample.

The Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University conducted a national survey of Americans' information on Russia in the fall of 1944. Five questions, none involving technicalities, were asked of a representative sampling of the American people. The points covered were: the existence or absence of private property in the USSR; the existence or absence of differential wages and salaries; the size of the Communist Party USSR in comparison to the total population; the productiveness of Soviet war industry; and the avowed purposes of the Soviet government. The first two questions and the last were designed to discover whether or not the respondent knew that significant changes had taken place in Russia since the Revolution. The answers indicated that the majority still thought of the USSR as a stereotyped communist state. The third question involved a general knowledge of the dictatorial nature of the Soviet regime and the fourth was planned to discover whether or not the respondent was aware of Soviet industrial developments and capacity. The questions suggested alternative answers; e.g., "Do you think that all people in Russia are paid about the same amount of money for their work or are there wide differences in the amounts people are paid?"

Less than 3 per cent of the respondents could answer all five questions correctly, and 26 per cent were unable to answer any of them. Ten per cent—nine million by extrapolation—answered correctly at least four of the questions. A year later the *"Fortune* Survey" reported the answers to four "information" questions, two on foreign policies and two on Soviet internal matters. Only 12 per cent were able to give more than two correct answers.

Additional confirming evidence was uncovered by a poll made in April, 1945 when it was discovered that thirty-five million Americans did not know whether the Russian government was a monarchy, a democratic republic, a dictatorship or something else. Another ten million, who thought they knew, gave incorrect answers so that exactly half the Amer-

ican adults were ignorant of the form of government in Russia. Moreover, twenty-six million didn't know whether or not there had been any basic changes in the Soviet government between 1940 and the date of the survey; thirty-one million, however, were sure that it had changed fundamentally. Approximately sixty-three per cent, in other words, were uninformed or ill-informed on this basic point.

Another sort of corroboration appears from a tabulation of the "Don't Know" answers to ten poll questions on Russia. The questions were chosen at random from reports of several polling agencies. The average percentage of "Don't Know" replies was twenty-three. The average percentage of "Don't Knows" on ten miscellaneous, non-Russian items was nine.

A sizeable minority of Americans consistently have no opinions about Russia, or at least have none which they care to express. If one could be sure that this reticence was due to a realization by the respondent that he didn't know enough to formulate an intelligent opinion, this might be encouraging. But it is more likely to be due to indifference than to a sense of personal limitation. And what about the larger group who, despite inadequate and inaccurate information, do have opinions on the matter? One might dismiss them lightly by paraphrasing the old saw: the trouble is not that they don't know about Russia, but that they know so many things which aren't so. The matter, however, is too serious for such a dismissal.

The most menacing aspect is that we, as a people, are at the mercy of anyone who claims to know about Russia. We have no adequate standards of judgment by which to assess the statements which constantly assail us. We have no adequate frames of reference by which to evaluate the stimuli to which we are continually subjected from press, platform, pulpit, and radio. Moreover, many of us are curious about Russia and eager to learn what it all means. But it is not easy to learn about Russia. Soviet secrecy, the deliberate distortions of adulators and attackers, and a lack of qualified specialists create a highly effective barrier to learning. Unfortunately, there is no barrier to false and distorted information. Publishers vigorously ballyhoo a steady progression of books and articles which "tell the inside story" or "reveal the truth about Russia." These "revelations" rarely agree with each other, and the contentions of one "expert" are vigorously con-

tradicted by his rivals. The would-be learner is baffled. What is he to think? Whom can he believe?

The combination of curiosity and a lack of standards by which to judge the items offered to satisfy that curiosity produces a high degree of suggestibility. The ordinary citizen is likely either to accept one version to the exclusion of all others, or to give up in disgust any attempt to reach his own conclusions. Baffled by "the enigma of Russia," he is apt to abandon any effort to resolve it for himself and to fall back upon the easy way of accepting without discernment the interpretations offered by his favorite "authority." He becomes, in the vernacular, a sucker for any smooth promoter; the easy prey of propagandists and pressure groups, both Communist and anti-Communist. He is subject to hysteria and to panic, and to being stampeded into actions which serve particular rather than general interests. It is not at all impossible that the ignorant and unwary will find themselves committed to the support of causes whose real aims run counter to basic American ideals and interests.

Notes on Sources

Valuable summaries of pre-Soviet American-Russian relations may be found in:

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SOCIAL POLITICS—A POLICY FOR AMERICA

by WILLIAM G. CARLETON

THERE IS A TENDENCY among Americans today to overclarify international relations and to think of them in terms of the stereotypes of communism and anticommunism. The situation is in reality not nearly that simple. There are in fact four politically articulate areas in the world today which must be considered in the interplay of world politics.

First, there is the capitalist area of the Western Hemisphere, with the United States by all odds the greatest capitalist country in this area and in the world. Second, there is the communist area of the Soviet Union and her satellites on the Soviet borders. Third, there is Western Europe, which is moving toward some form of socialism, but whether it be moderate socialism or extreme socialism (communism) is still a question, though the odds seem to be with moderate socialism. Fourth, there are the vast areas of Asia in revolt against political and economic imperialism, and in this revolt against imperialism is necessarily implied some form of socialism, but just what form is still in doubt.

In any contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, Asia and Western Europe hold the balance of power. If the contest were a simple one of communism versus anticommunism, the United States would have a tremendous advantage, but it is not that clear-cut. In some ways the lineup is Europe and Asia against capitalist America, for both Europe and Asia are passing through fundamental socialist revolution.

Asia is in revolt against political and economic imperialism and in that revolt there inheres a large measure of socialism. The peoples of Asia have no native middle class or capitalist class sufficient to finance modern heavy industries, and if they are going to have those industries they must either succumb to foreign finance, with consequent siphoning-off of profits, or they must build the industries themselves by their own collective action. They are determined to have those heavy industries, to come into the modern age, and more and more they are deciding to use collec-

tive action. (True, they want in part to use Western engineers, technicians, and materials, but when the industries are built they are determined that they, the native peoples, will be in control and not foreign capitalists.) In short, Asia seems ready to move from feudalism to socialism, skipping the intervening capitalist stage. Sun Yat-sen, Nehru, and Mao Tse-tung, while differing in degree, temper, and method, all represent this trend to socialism.

In Europe, even before 1914 the cartelization of society was driving out small businessmen. Since that time the destruction of the old middle class has come with revolutionary swiftness because of World War I, confiscatory taxation, inflation, world depression, World War II, and its aftermath. The task of reconstructing Europe today is beyond the ability of private capital to perform. Even if the communist and socialist movements as organized movements were to be destroyed overnight, the process of socialization would continue. Socialism would come without the socialists because the old system has broken down and is in collapse and because only government capital and collective action can restore a functioning economic life. But the socialist and communist movements will, of course, not abate. Conditions and circumstances favor them. The masses in Europe and Asia are determined not to return to the old order of things even if such a return were possible.

Our intelligent conservatives in this country are compelled to acknowledge the sweep of socialist forces in the world. But they have a way of picturing this trend as a temporary aberration, as a mere passing phase, as a kind of fad. Nothing could be more self-deceptive than this. Even in European countries which do not claim to have gone socialist there is in fact so much socialism in their economic life today that it would be impossible for them to restore nineteenth-century capitalism. A revolution—a permanent revolution—has already taken place. Such revolutions do not stop suddenly and reverse themselves. Just as in the sixteenth century the rising capitalism could never have been diverted back into guild system channels, so today the rising socialism can never be diverted back into capitalist channels.

There is, of course, socialism and socialism—the tentative socialism of Sun Yat-sen and Nehru; the moderate socialism of Attlee, Laski, and Blum; the extreme socialism of the Comintern. It is as important for Americans to know the distinctions as to know the general trend.

II

Today, in the face of this socialist revolution, the wisest power politics consists in playing *wise* social politics within countries. If the people of a country are friendly to us we need not fear that that country will become exclusively pro-Russian and anti-American; if the peoples of enough countries are friendly to us we need not fear the upsetting of the balance of power against us.

America does not have to go to the left itself in order to support leftist movements in Europe and Asia. All leading countries that play the game of world politics must have some agnosticism in their foreign policy.

We can never find groups in Europe and Asia that represent exactly the American way of life. We shall have to support elements either farther to the right of us or farther to the left of us. To call "democratic" the elements we are now supporting in some areas of the world is downright grotesque. Since we cannot find parties of any size in Europe and Asia that represent our conception of the middle way, then why not support parties of the left, if by so doing we can win the friendship of the masses, identify ourselves with the forces of the future, and prevent a third world war?

It is not enough in this middle of the twentieth century to proclaim the self-determination of nations. It is not enough to stand for free speech, free press, universal suffrage, the rights of opposition parties, and free elections. It is simply not enough to affirm nineteenth-century liberalism. Even the Atlantic Charter proclaimed freedom from want as one of the essential freedoms of man.

We must show the peoples of Europe and Asia that we are genuinely concerned with the things that are today of primary concern to them—mass education, the ability to read and write, the conquest of disease, medical services, land, bread, houses, jobs, freedom from landlord extortion, a living wage, social security, sustained prosperity, enjoyment of the high standard of living people in this machine age have a right to expect.

In backward Asiatic countries like China and Korea communist parties have arisen. These parties establish clinics to cure the people of tuberculosis and dysentery, schools to teach the people to read and write, citizen armies to teach the people hygiene and the methods of guerrilla warfare. These parties promise land, the abolition of squeeze, the end of landlord and priestly extortion, modern heavy industries, relief from

grinding oriental poverty. We enter these countries and proclaim ourselves the friends of democracy and freedom but our program of social and economic betterment is vague, inadequate, and often actually nonexistent. The masses wonder, and their wonder is turned to cynicism and even to hate when they see us—in the name of democracy—backing the landlords, the bosses, the army castes, and the Buddhist priests.

This is not to say that we cannot compete with communism. On the contrary, we have inestimable advantages over communism if we care to use them. For we can effectively stand not only for social and economic change but also for the basic human freedoms. The combination of fundamental economic change and democratic rights is an unbeatable one if once we learn how to use it in the decisive game of world social politics.

III

For the United States to pursue a policy of wise social politics in the turbulent world of the mid-twentieth century will admittedly be difficult. It will require vast knowledge, understanding, patience, and an immense sense of the vicarious. Indeed, so difficult is it, that the impulse of Americans when for the first time they see the communist challenge in all of its global proportions is to side-step it or to indulge in hysteria and witch-hunting or to collide with it head-on in a third world war or to resort to Caesarism and with the aid of the atomic bomb boldly to erect an American empire. Hence the popularity of Henry Luce's American Century. Hence the vogue of Bill Bullitt and James Burnham. Hence the oversimplification and distortion of Arnold Toynbee and all the glib talk about the historical inevitability of a universal empire to end "a time of troubles."

When the newness of our leadership wears away, when we once get accustomed to the actual world situation as it is, when we are brought squarely face to face with realities, we may see how necessary it is that we play wise social politics in the world of today. And that means a concretely constructive program of co-operation with effective political groups in Europe and Asia. Let us admit that our objective is to prevent the triumph of totalitarian communism and the upsetting of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by Russia. How can this best be done? With what groups should we co-operate? To whom should we give our support?

There are Americans who would ally us with the right. What is simpler? The right hates communism, we want to stop communism, therefore let us support the right, these people argue. In Asia they would ally us with the forces of feudalism—the war lords, the great land owners, the money lenders, the Buddhist priests, the old-fashioned imperialists. In Europe they would ally us with the tumble-down kings, the moth-eaten aristocrats, the conservative churches, the cartels, the monopolists. But if we want to check Russia and stop communism we had better steer clear of these elements. These forces represent the dead or decadent forces of the past; they are not going to win; they will discredit any people associated with them. They were the fascists and the collaborationists of the late war. An alliance with them will alienate the masses of Europe and Asia and if persisted in will throw European and Asiatic socialists and social-democrats into the arms of the communists. Even a revival of Toryism in Britain under Churchill and a veiled dictatorship by De Gaulle in France, backed lavishly by United States loans, would prove to be mere stopgaps because these regimes would fail to face squarely the basic need for socialization in Europe.

There are those who would go to the opposite extreme and court the communists. They maintain that as communism moves to Western Europe it will be less intransigent, more flexible, much influenced by the democratic culture in which it must work. There is a possibility that Western communism, freed from the necessity usually obtaining in backward areas of the world of having to create a dictatorship of the left in order to prevent a dictatorship of the right, will prove more resilient and co-operative. Indeed, some of the communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and France begin to sound like socialists and social-democrats. And we cannot close our eyes to the growing tendency in Italy and France of socialists and communists to co-operate. Nevertheless, we must be wary, for up to this time co-operation has meant communist domination, as even so friendly a critic of communism as Harold Laski has pointed out. The democratic freedoms have taken centuries to develop; they have really only been won in a portion of the world in the last one hundred years or so; if lost they will eventually return no doubt, but at great struggle and sacrifice. These democratic freedoms must be preserved perhaps at the terrible cost of condemning millions of people in the backward parts of the world to a few more years of feudal misery and even at the

great risk of keeping open the rift between communists and socialists, a rift which during the past twenty years has caused the world untold suffering and pain. However, we must avoid sectarianism; we must leave the door ajar to co-operation which is genuine co-operation and not domination and absorption. The European socialists show much less sectarianism and more resiliency than Americans—for example, the ringing editorial by Leon Blum in *Populaire* in which, commenting on the sudden promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, Blum declared that Americans must "abandon the dangerous habit of using the same terms to describe the Hitlerian regime and the Soviet regime."

Parties in European politics with which we might co-operate are the Christian Socialists, the Popular Republican Movement, and similar groups, which, while they tend toward socialism and move considerably more to the left than most Americans, represent democratic and libertarian ideologies. They were part of the resistance movement against Hitler. However, we cannot depend too much on them. They contain many of the remnants of the old prewar middle-class liberal parties; they are jerry-built; they have no deep roots or historical continuity; they are likely to dissolve in the face of a real crisis or when called upon to govern positively.

The groups we can best count on and to which we should give full support are the socialists. They recognize the need for socialist revolution in Britain and in Europe, but they also want passionately to retain the democratic freedoms. Indeed, they are steeped in democratic traditions, rose to power by democratic methods, and believe that any system that is not democratic is not really socialist. They have widespread mass support. They have their roots deep in the past and possess historical continuity. They are at last confounding the doubters, and in Britain they are producing a genuine socialist revolution and are also showing the world that they can in the face of national traditions infuse their socialist ideas into foreign policy, quit imperialism, and liquidate an empire. If British socialists succeed and if British and European socialists get more help from the United States, they will show even the communists that they *can* bring a revolution and that they can bring that revolution without destroying intellectual diversity, civil liberties, and democratic freedoms. If they succeed, they will win over to their side some of the rank and file of the communists who have been skeptical that the socialists can make a revo-

lution. For many communists do not want dictatorship merely for the sake of dictatorship; they have been won to dictatorship methods only because they believe that those methods alone will make a revolution.

About one thing we must be clear in our own minds: the socialists of Britain and of Europe, particularly of Europe, will never support a crusade to save American free enterprise. They will never support an American crusade against the Soviet Union, although they will welcome the checking of all aggression, including Soviet aggression, by the United Nations. The socialists are attracted to the socialism of the Soviet Union but repelled by its dictatorship. They are attracted to the democracy of the United States but repelled by its free-enterprise capitalism. They want democracy, but they also want socialism and feel that conditions in Europe demand it. They want above all to live in peace with both the United States and the Soviet Union.

It will become increasingly clear, then, that America cannot really rally all the noncommunist elements in a great crusade against communism because some of the noncommunist elements, indeed the strongest and most popular noncommunist elements, are still more afraid of the extreme right than of the extreme left. America will learn that the extreme left cannot be checked by the right nor by a combination of all the noncommunist elements—for these noncommunist groups simply will not work together to this end. America will learn that the extreme left can be checked best by the moderate left, backed by the United States.

IV

Just how can we give support to the socialist and social-democratic forces of Europe and Asia—the noncommunist forces with mass support?

First, we can appeal to such forces by championing measures which will steadily increase the international functions of the United Nations. Socialist and social-democratic forces throughout the world are international-minded and strong supporters of the UN. We should strive always to make a better record for internationalism in the UN than any other power, particularly the Soviet Union—to engage in a kind of contest in internationalism with the various nations of the world. In most ways the United States has shown a better record in the UN than the Soviet Union. Our record with respect to the international control of atomic energy has been a good one, incomparably better and more intelligent

than that of the Soviet Union, which has been parochial and obstructionist. Indeed, our program of an international agency to produce and control atomic energy inside the various countries represents not only a tremendous stride in international functionalism and power but also an example of international socialism, that is, the ownership by an international agency of what will probably become the world's most important source of industrial energy. Governments grow by the actual exercise of functions, not by the adoption of charters and constitutions. International government will be no exception. The American plan to manufacture and control atomic energy by an international agency of the United Nations Organization represents, if adopted, nothing less than the real beginnings of an international state.

Second, we can help socialist governments to hold their own against communist threats by seeing to it that we have no major depression in the United States. The socialist governments of Western Europe are linked economically to us. A depression in this country would spread to them and shatter their still weak economies just recovering from the war. Economic collapse in Western Europe would destroy middle-of-the-road elements there and precipitate a fierce conflict between the extreme left and the extreme right, a conflict which might well draw the Soviet Union and the United States into a third world war. Thus far we have not yet shown that we really understand the close connection between domestic policy and foreign policy. Indeed, there is in fact no way to draw the line between them. Economic prosperity in the United States will do more to ease international tensions, save the middle way, and prevent a third world war than anything we can conceivably do in what we think of as our "foreign" policy. It is right here in the field of our "domestic" economy that we have been most remiss in our international obligations. We have not taken sufficient measures to prevent an American depression. We took off too many war controls too soon. The devitalized and emasculated Employment Act of 1946 is all that is left of the brave sixty-million-job plan of several years ago. As yet we have done virtually nothing to modernize our tax structure, increase minimum wages to sixty-five cents, broaden social security payments, or work out a more up-to-date approach to the whole question of the division of income between the various economic groups. The fierce partisan division over "domestic" questions gives the lie to our nonpartisan approach to "foreign" questions,

because the whole structure of our "foreign" policy will be shaken to its very foundations if we in America suffer a major depression.

Third, let us boldly proclaim to the world that we are behind the socialist groups in Europe and Asia as distinguished from the communist groups. The mere affirmation of our point of view will help us enormously, for it will show Europe and Asia that we really do understand the world situation, that we are not just interested in a crusade to destroy the Soviet Union, that we do not intend to throw our enormous weight on the side of an impossible *status quo*. The mere consciousness on the part of Europe and Asia that Americans *do* comprehend the situation would give liberals and socialists on those continents an enormous lift. It would dispel their hostility, their coolness, their doubts where we are concerned; show them that instead of an impossible choice between America and the Soviet Union they have, after all, a real choice, and that choice America.

Fourth, we should implement our backing of socialist groups by lending socialist governments more support, making them loans not only for reconstruction and for the purpose of reviving the international economy but also to carry out their programs of socialization. Indeed, in the present condition of Europe, socialization and reconstruction and the revival of the international economy are inseparable. Instead of insisting that the money should not be spent for socialization, we should actually encourage its being spent for that purpose. We should help bring the basic changes to Europe which almost all Europeans agree are inevitable. Let us help the socialists prove to the communists that the socialists *can* make a revolution, a revolution which saves and even expands the basic human and democratic freedoms. And any loans made to the Kuomintang in China should provide that the money be spent for agrarian reform, social amelioration, and national reconstruction and not to fight the communists, and we should ruthlessly enforce these provisions. The best way to check communism in China is to insure agrarian reform.

Fifth, let us work out a social-democratic system in Japan. The middle-of-the-road socialist way between feudal-imperialist-monopoly capitalism on the one hand and communism on the other will be much more difficult in Asia than in Europe. There are few democratic traditions in Asia. Yet in Japan we have a very rare opportunity to create that middle way and point to it as the example for the rest of Asia to follow. In Japan we have almost a free hand and as an occupying power we can work

fundamental change without being accused of interfering with the country's domestic affairs. After all, that is what we are there to do, and the Japanese and the world expect us to do it.

In Japan, it will not be enough to encourage civil liberties, participation in local and national government, mass suffrage, and opposition parties. It will be necessary to take the great business monopolies, concentrated in the hands of the Zaibatsu, and nationalize them. To break them up is contrary to the trends in all countries with advanced technologies. To attempt to force the Japanese to have a system of small competitive units in the mass-production and modern-technology industries at the very time those industries in every other country are concentrated into great syndicates and cartels, either private or governmental, makes no sense. If, during the time of our occupation, we succeed in fragmentizing the great combinations we may be sure that when our occupation is ended they will be put back together again by the very oligarchs it is our purpose to destroy. However, they will not fall back into the hands of the old clans if we nationalize them, build labor unions, develop democratic sentiment. If we do these things, the people will continue through their democratic government to run the key industries after we Americans depart.

Instead of encouraging the bogus "Liberal" Party and the equally bogus "Progressive" Party in Japan, we should give more encouragement to the Social-Democratic Party. That party made a fairly good showing in the national election. It has in it the elements which would like to see Japan steer between reaction and communism. There is no denying that it contains a conservative wing which is almost indistinguishable from the "Liberals" and the "Progressives," and it is also true that it as yet boasts no leaders as dynamic as Tokuda, Shiga, and Nozaka, the leaders of the small Japanese Communist Party. Nevertheless, the Social-Democratic Party of Japan contains the elements necessary for erecting a social-democratic structure on a popular base.

Up to now we have done precious little to make Japan the model of the social-democratic way, the hope of a middle way in Asia. It is doubtful if even political democracy in Japan is more than merely formal. There are indications that instead of bringing a democratic and a socialist revolution to Japan we are more concerned with building up Japan as an ally against the Soviet Union. In other words, we seem to be more interested in

making Japan the base for another war rather than the base for democracy in Asia.

Sixth, we should insist upon a German peace treaty which makes it possible for the socialist and social-democratic elements to come to power in Germany. This means a federalized Germany and provisions to prevent forced party mergers and to insure full freedom to all parties, except the outlawed Nazis. Even more now that eastern Germany is truncated, the future of a free Germany will be decided in western industrial Germany. In the west the Social-Democratic Party of Kurt Schumacher is strong and growing stronger. If the United States and Britain play their diplomatic cards wisely, Germany will go socialist and not communist. The British have begun the socialization of key industries in the British zone of occupation and we Americans should follow a similar policy in our zone.

V

For America to stand as a champion of social-democracy and socialism in Europe and Asia is difficult. What are the difficulties?

For one thing, such a policy means that mentally the American people will have to put themselves in the places of the Europeans and Asiatics and visualize conditions in those old continents as Europeans and Asiatics actualize them. It means that Americans will have to think in European terms for Europe and in Asiatic terms for Asia. It means abandoning the idea of duplicating American institutions in Europe and Asia, in order to prepare the way for the victory of institutions, the nearest to ours, which conditions and circumstances there will permit. All of this will require a flexibility, a resiliency, and a discrimination rare even in a highly sophisticated people accustomed to world leadership, and we Americans are still a politically adolescent people not yet accustomed to the complexities of world leadership. One of the most difficult things in life is for a people who have made a success at one set of adjustments to a given set of conditions to develop another set of adjustments to another set of conditions, particularly when those conditions are not present in their own lives but thousands of miles away. Indeed, the great historical tragedies in empire and in foreign policy have involved just this.

For another thing, as is rather to be expected of a new people who have made a great and an early success, we hold to our institutional mores with a special tenacity and intolerance. We have become doctrinaire. We have

made a fetish of free-enterprise capitalism. Many among us, powerful and articulate, even deny that democracy can exist except as capitalist democracy; they deny the very possibility of socialist democracy. These people would insist that out of the very nature of things we could not champion democracy abroad without also championing capitalism.

For still another thing, America at home is in the grip of a conservative reaction. There are millions of Americans who could be won to the idea that to check communism America must espouse in Europe and Asia the cause of socialism and social-democracy, but these people are not now in power and their influence is now at a minimum. It will be particularly difficult for a conservative administration in a period of conservatism to back a leftist cause in Europe and Asia, even to check a more extreme left.

Most important, it is doubtful if Americans are willing to pay the cost of so constructive a foreign policy in terms of current taxes, current lowered consumption, and current frozen price levels. For during the present stage of American reconversion, America would have to tighten its own economic belt in order to undertake and sustain so ambitious a program. We recently haggled over our financial part in the $450 million necessary to maintain the International Refugee Organization and over the $350 million relief fund, the American successor to UNRRA, to feed the hungry of Europe. The Greek and Turkish loans involve figures only in the hundreds of millions. But if we are going to see the British, the French, the Italians, the Germans, and the Chinese over their difficulties and well on their way to social-democracy we shall have to think not in terms of hundreds of millions but in terms of billions. In the present stage of our reconversion, such loans would be inflationary; they would take out of the country much more goods than they would bring in. They would delay our own return to normal consumption. They would be possible only if we maintained domestic economic controls, for otherwise the rise in living costs would be unbearable. Any administration which attempted such a policy without controls would be buried in an avalanche of outraged public opinion. And we have already decided to take off most of the controls! The fight over the retention of OPA in the summer of 1946 probably was the decisive fight over current American foreign policy. Here was where domestic and foreign policy squarely joined and merged. When the fight to retain OPA and other controls was lost, the fight for an immediately constructive foreign policy on the large scale the situation

demands probably also was lost. At this stage of our own reconversion and economic reconstruction, only the restoration of economic controls will permit a really decisive American foreign policy. Economic sacrifices now will pay enormous economic dividends later; controlled inflation now will prevent disastrous deflation later. For when once we get back to full peacetime production we shall desperately need to sell to a restored world capable of buying our goods. Restoration of a going international economy depends upon enormous American loans abroad. Indeed, if Europe is to escape complete economic collapse within the next eighteen months we must act now.

Should all these difficulties for an American foreign policy which supported socialist and social-democratic elements in Europe and Asia be resolved, still a word of caution is necessary. The making of loans to governments in order to allow those governments to bring basic changes favorable to their peoples involves some intervention in the politics of those countries. Certain elements will raise the cry that Americans are meddling; that Americans are dictating; that Americans are imperialistic. Let us understand that such criticisms are a part of the risks we run in playing social politics, even wise and liberal social politics.

VI

In spite of the difficulties in the way of the United States pursuing a constructive policy of aid to socialist and social-democratic governments, we may actually be much nearer to the adoption of that kind of policy than we suppose. The next year or two may see us driven to such a position by the inexorable logic of events.

What events? Growing tension with Russia? No, for the real crisis with Russia, if wise social politics do not prevent that crisis altogether, is still in the future. (We have been taking too dreary a view of immediate American-Russian relations. Russia is in no position to wage a war and desperately needs peace. The Soviet Union and the United States have been jockeying for world position and for the delimitation of their spheres of influence, and there has been a diplomatic war of nerves over the peace treaties.)

What events, then? What events probably will force us into a policy of wise social politics? They are these: the events which every day give increasing evidence of the impending economic collapse which faces

Europe. We cannot long avoid big and bold measures if complete and utter ruin is not to engulf us. All measures up to this time have been less than half measures. The United States must undertake economic rehabilitation in Europe in as decisive and as imaginative a way as Lend-Lease was in its time. When at last we are driven into lending and administering the vast sums involved, we shall learn—perhaps the hard way—that the forces of the right do not come to grips with European economic realities when they try to operate in a framework of "free enterprise" and that it is the leftists, particularly the moderate leftists, who can give us Americans the most returns for our money. For in the present state of Europe, only socialization of key industries can restore a workable economic life.

Nor should the Soviet Union be precluded from these American loans. But the United States should insist upon a *quid pro quo,* should insist that the Soviet make its contribution to the general pacification of Europe. The Soviet should be induced to scale down its demands for German reparations. This will aid German recovery; German recovery will aid general European recovery; and general European recovery will lessen the chances of the spread of communism and of war.

Sheer economic pressure, then, may stay the tendency, strong among Republican Congressmen, to steer us back to isolation by way of the fiscal economy road. It may force us out of our Cassandra mood and the inertia bred by "the decline of the West" and "mind at the end of its tether" and into some bold and constructive measures. It may compel us to adopt a foreign policy of wise social politics which will cut the ground from under both communists and crypto-fascists, give America a renewed strength based on popular respect and affection, help build a viable economic system adapted to the stern economic realities in Europe, restore a functioning international economy, strengthen the United Nations Organization, prevent a third world war, and aid in the historic process of reconciling socialism and democracy.

VIEWS AND REVIEWS OF THE SOVIET PROBLEM

By ALFRED A. SKERPAN

THE TWO MAJOR CONCERNS of all politically conscious individuals since August, 1945 have been the atom bomb and the USSR. It has become increasingly clear that the problem is actually one. For the introduction of the bomb, decades before it was expected, brought the hostile economic systems of Soviet communism and American capitalism immediately face to face and at once made their political counterparts, the two most nearly self-sufficient states, competitors for influence and strategic position throughout the remainder of the world.

The direct results for the American progressive have been the most exacting intellectual tasks that have ever confronted him. Generally, he must reassess the values he would prefer to live by, and he must re-evaluate the merits of all contemporary socio-economic systems. Particularly, he must at once reach a final decision regarding the true nature and objectives of the Soviet government. And it appears that for the politically active individual the decision must be made in simple either-or terms. Either Lenin was correct in his estimate of the Soviet Union's position vis-a-vis the capitalist world, or he was in error. In categorical terms he stated:

> We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. Meanwhile a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.

Most of the books under review here either accept or reject this argument, and therefore can be useful in determining the nature of one's political activity in the atomic age.

II

When the Comintern embarked on its "popular front" course in 1935, there developed among liberals a widespread acceptance of the thesis that this actually represented another stage in the decline in Soviet interest in

world revolution. A few authorities, including political enemies of the Soviet regime, remained adamant in their position that this was only a tactic. In the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, August 1939 to June 1941, there was a considerable shift to this point of view, but afterward opinion shifted again, assisted this time by a series of concessions and changes in the Soviet domestic scene: the restoration of Russian Orthodoxy to favor, the dropping of the "International" as the national anthem, the dissolution of the Comintern, et cetera.

Three books that are in part a reflection of this phase of opinion are Timasheff's *The Great Retreat,* Schuman's *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad,* and Sayer's and Kahn's *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia.*[1] At bottom they have but one thing in common, the assumption that after the initial stages of the Bolshevik Revolution, world revolution gradually faded from the scene as the Soviet government embarked on a course of internal development. Timasheff adopts the extreme view. He sees a "withering away of the faith" and, in a fourth phase of development—the "Great Retreat," which he says began with a secret "Great Decision" in 1934—the rise of new social groupings. These signify the end of the original Communist program and "the return of Russia to a situation which would have obtained if no revolution had occurred." It is also his notion, quite untenable, that the achievements of the Soviet regime are due more to the Russian people than to the Communist party. This interpretation Timasheff attempts to prove by a series of charts and tables, which depict the growth in public services and industry from the last two decades of the nineteenth century. These indicate a steady acceleration in social and economic development from the prerevolutionary period, and do support the opinion held by most objective students of Russian history that the foundations for growth were firmly laid well before the outbreak of World War I. Whether this supports also the related opinion that the degree of social achievement in Russia would have been roughly the same

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[1] *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia.* By Nicholas S. Timasheff. E. P. Dutton, 1946. 470 pp. $5.

Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad. By Frederick L. Schuman. Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. 685 pp. $5.

The Great Conspiracy Against Russia. By Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn. Boni & Gaer, 1946. 154 pp. $1.

today had there been no Bolshevik Revolution is a good deal more problematical. The relative human costs would certainly have been far less.

Timasheff shares with Schuman the belief that the Comintern no longer exists and that in any case the Russian people would not support aggressions undertaken to spread the Communist ideology. That the Comintern is dead can hardly be proved on the basis of a de-emphasis of world revolution during an extended crisis, and on the basis of a decree of dissolution. We will see below that it would be absurd to accept this against other arguments and other facts. As for aggression in behalf of ideology, this at best is a limited approach to the problems of world revolution and the methods by which it may be effected.

The particular virtues of Schuman's book lie in his familiarity with the course of the internal politics of the Communist Party from the time of its first appearance. There are many excellent sections, such as those on Marxism and its misconceptions and errors, Lenin's contributions to Marxist theory, the mechanics of party and governmental organization, and the diplomatic origins of World War II. The weaknesses of the study, and they are vital ones, are the preoccupation with political developments and the failure to relate them adequately to the social and economic problems, the absence of a consistently objective attitude, which ultimately reduces the book to apologetics for Stalinism, and, most important, the serious lack of historical perspective.

It is through the mishandling of historical events, in fact, that a basis is provided for the strong pro-Soviet tone. One distortion is represented by his conclusion that the "historic shape" of Soviet power was originally created to beat back "the deadly assault organized against it in London, Paris, Tokyo, Washington, and Warsaw." Another, the result of ascribing the civil war to intervention, is that the "injuries inflicted upon Russia by the Western democracies between 1918 and 1921 not only exposed innocent millions to hideous suffering but disfigured the whole face of world politics for decades to come." The latter opinion is shared by Sayers and Kahn. Acceptance of these theses automatically absolves the Bolsheviks of responsibility for the evils that resulted from their seizure and retention of power, and makes the positive achievements of the regime all the more admirable. Further, from this view, especially when the issue of world revolution is soft-pedalled, the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs

becomes that of an abused and misunderstood innocent interested only in self-preservation. These interpretations therefore require comment.

The present totalitarian structure of Soviet politics and economics dates in fact from the periods of the NEP and the First Five-Year Plan. This is not to deny that several institutions, such as the political police, the Red Army, collectivization, first appeared in the critical years of civil war. These, however, like party dictatorship and economic planning, sprang at least as much from the nature of Bolshevism, and from Lenin's determination that his party would hold real power at all costs, as they did from the emergency of 1918-1921. This conclusion is inescapable when one reads critically even Schuman's information and his extensive quotations from Lenin's writings. More remarkable, and completely invalid, is his attempt to make the Comintern and its program of world revolution also a defense mechanism against intervention. His own facts contradict him: the idea of the Third International (like that of the conversion of the war into a civil war) appeared in Lenin's works in 1914, was developed at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences of 1915 and 1916, formed one of his April Theses in 1917, and was finally given blood and bone when, six weeks after the seizure of power and before the beginnings of civil war and intervention, two million rubles were allocated for the purpose of promoting revolution in foreign lands. World revolution, like the view of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a power based on violence, was an integral part of Lenin's political and economic thought before he attained power.

Schuman's opinion that intervention was a "deadly assault" and that it was responsible for all evils, then and after, is a contradiction of the facts. One need only examine those social, economic, and political causes of the civil war—apart from intervention—which he hardly considers, to see the weakness of the case. Lenin himself realized that civil war would result from the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January, 1918, yet the significance of this act for dictatorship and war is completely lost on Schuman. To accept his views, one must also ignore the important role of Germany in 1918, the military situation, and the Bolshevik program, and one must accept the contradictory idea that Bolshevik power was historically inevitable, right, and necessary, and that the other powers, and the other Russian parties, had a moral obligation to accept it. The Schuman argument is unacceptable particularly because in Lenin's writ-

ings, as well as in Stalin's, intervention appeared only as an aspect of the "inevitable" struggle between the proletarian and bourgeois sectors of the world.

Schuman is not consistent in his interpretation of the Comintern as an instrument of defense. If the thesis is valid, it is most remarkable that he sees the Comintern entering a period of decline during the Five-Year Plans which, he tells us, were inspired in part by a "lively apprehension" of foreign attack. The truth is that Schuman makes the very common mistake of reading "socialism in one country" as abandonment of world revolution. This was never the view of Stalin, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or, for that matter, of the Comintern.

It has not been the intent of the reviewer to suggest that *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia* is of the same intellectual calibre as the works by Timasheff and Schuman. However, some attention should be given it since Schuman himself, Senator Pepper, Henry Wallace, and Joseph E. Davies have recommended it in generous terms, while *The New Masses* has expressed the opinion that the book must be got to millions and immediately. Perhaps the double-column pulp edition at one dollar is an attempt to achieve this. Sayers and Kahn give a reasonably balanced presentation of the nature of Allied intervention in Russia from 1918 to 1920, but their summation of its consequences, already indicated above, is rhetorical exaggeration and hardly correct. Apart from this, several gross errors of fact are introduced. It is not true that the Russian army had been cut to pieces by the Germans by midsummer of 1917. And it is not true that the Bolsheviks were driven to seek peace with Germany, after their seizure of power, because they were isolated by Allied hostility and were unable to face the German army alone. Peace was part of the program that had assisted them into power and Lenin was determined to achieve it at all costs.

Other, equally grievous, errors lead one to believe that the authors have taken as gospel the official histories of the Communist Party, which have a tendency to revise historical facts to suit the purposes of the Central Committee. Soviet support of world revolutionary activities is not discussed in the book, and the Comintern is brought up only in connection with its dissolution. The chief merit of the book is that it discloses the fear of Communism and the plotting of certain statesmen and inter-

national oilmen, but in general, down to 1933, the thesis of "a great conspiracy" is not substantiated.

III

One will not find in the above books any adequate treatment of the negative aspects of Soviet life. Schuman, partly because his bias interferes, fails to come to honest grips with such problems as forced labor, and the contradictions and lacunae of Soviet population statistics. While Timasheff has carefully investigated the costs of the Five-Year Plans in terms of population losses, and makes an honest attack on such matters as social change, the nature of his theme prevents him from dealing effectively with political and social realities.

As a partial corrective to the impressions gained from the reading of such studies, and as an aid to the evaluation of socialist society under the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the reading of books like Victor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom,* another in the series of denunciations of the USSR by former citizens, and the anonymous *The Dark Side of the Moon,*[2] can be, with proper critical safeguards, very useful. Neither volume appears under the most favorable auspices, but both present information and versions of the nature of Soviet existence that could be gained in other ways only with great difficulty.

Kravchenko left his post in Washington and denounced his government at a time—April, 1944—when it was still bearing the major burden of armed resistance to Nazi Germany, then the greatest menace to the freedom he sought. As the break was plotted months before Kravchenko ever reached America, he must be a master of dissimulation to have concealed his purposes and to have persuaded a series of astute examiners, as he claims, that he was politically reliable. Furthermore, the book, written with great imagination and gusto, is in many respects more a fictionalized autobiography than a serious attempt at sober truth. Also, Kravchenko's explanations and interpretations of important episodes in Soviet history have a familiar ring and often sound suspiciously like the arguments of American Trotskyites. His dismissal of the trial confessions of

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[2] *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official.* By Victor Kravchenko. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 496 pp. $3.50.
The Dark Side of the Moon. With a preface by T. S. Eliot. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 299 pp. $2.75.

Old Bolsheviks as obviously a frameup is much too pat. Objective examination of the evidence does indicate a considerable measure of truth in the confessions, although also many improbabilities.

Although Kravchenko must be treated with considerable reserve, most sections in the book are most probably true in the basic sense, and these provide insights into the Soviet frame of mind and buttress information we already possess from other sources. There are descriptions of the famines and the attendant miseries in the Ukraine, in 1931-33, the atmosphere of the bureaucracy during the purge, and the popular mood during the war with Germany. We learn of the valuable aid given Germany in the course of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and of the nature of the new privileged groups in society. The accounts and descriptions of forced labor and penal, or concentration, camps in particular help to amplify available data.

The stigma of anonymity of *The Dark Side of the Moon* is lifted somewhat by the sponsorship of the poet T. S. Eliot. Yet a strike remains against it, while many would call two more because of the book's Polish origins. The attitude of the average Polish writer toward Russia and the Soviet Union has rarely been distinguished by forbearance and moderation, and one could not expect that, given the theme of *The Dark Side of the Moon,* the author would suppress her patriotic feelings and her sense of outrage. Still, it would be folly to reject the information it contains on any of these grounds. As it is, the book inspires more confidence than does Kravchenko.

The title is drawn from Arthur Koestler's characterization, in *The Yogi and the Commissar,* of the remoteness of Soviet realities, particularly those of Siberia and Central Asia, from the gaze of western observers. The deportation of tens of thousands of Polish soldiers and civilians by the NKVD, between 1939 and 1941, to the eastern parts of the Union, and later the exodus of great masses of these to the outside world, would represent the rare thing, a round trip excursion to the Soviet nether world. A small part of the testimony of these people, concerning their experiences, represents the heart of the book. These documents on life in Soviet penal camps and prisons and under the free exile system are unquestionably authentic. Together with Kravchenko's reports, and supporting them, *The Dark Side of the Moon* presents a dismal picture of political and social conditions in the Soviet Union.

IV

Timasheff and Schuman deal with the Third International as an institution undergoing steady disintegration from the middle of the '20's. Sayers and Kahn, as we have indicated, only note its official demise. The fact that four years passed between the calling of the Fifth Congress and the Sixth, in 1928, that seven more years passed between the Sixth and Seventh Congress, and that the Comintern was officially dissolved in May, 1943, all this apparently lends support to the thesis of declining interest in the organization for world revolution. However, in view of repeated instructions to world Communists that both a legal and an illegal party apparatus had to be maintained, it would appear foolish to accept the disappearance of the Comintern as final. There are other cogent reasons for the adoption of this position; these are provided in three very informative volumes on aspects of the Third International.[3]

Blueprint for World Conquest contains in their entirety the basic documents on the organization and aims of the Comintern: the Theses and Statutes of the Communist International, adopted by the Second World Congress, in 1920; and the Constitution, Rules, and Program adopted by the Sixth Congress, in 1928. There is no question as to their authenticity. They are from official sources, they are of a piece with the writings of Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, *et al,* and they represent theory, polemic, and successful experience transformed into the principles and rules for the attainment of the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the world.

Between the Second and the Sixth Congresses arose the great controversy between Stalin and Trotsky over the issues of "socialism in one country" and "permanent revolution." In his illuminating introduction, Chamberlin quotes Stalin, from the 1933 edition of his *Leninism,* to show that "socialism in one country" actually signified a "means for hastening the proletarian victory in every other land." As he also stresses, the differences between Trotsky and Stalin were never differences over aims but only over the methods of attaining them. With this point in mind, deeper

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[3]*Blueprint for World Conquest: The Official Communist Plan.* With an Introduction by William Henry Chamberlin. Human Events, 1946. 264 pp. $3.50.
Pattern for World Revolution. By Ypsilon. Ziff-Davis, 1947. 497 pp. $3.50.
This is My Story. Louis Francis Budenz. Whittlesey House, 1947. 397 pp. $3.

significance may be attached to the declaration of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern that a strengthened USSR "becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution." This declaration is preceded in the program by a detailed statement of Lenin's theory of imperialism in the epoch of declining capitalism and increasingly destructive wars. The downfall of the world system of capitalism is said to be inevitable, and the dictatorship of the world proletariat is viewed as essential and vital for the transition to a socialist economy.

All programs, statutes, and theses are of course meaningless if there was actually a decreasing interest in world revolution. However, the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin have continued to be studied intensively in the Soviet Union and among the Communists throughout the world. Ideologically, then, the notion of world revolution remains of immediate significance so long as the theory of imperialism and capitalist crisis continues to be taught and believed. We are still faced, nevertheless, with evidence of the decreasing activity of Comintern headquarters in Moscow after 1928, though with no great decline in Communist activity, along the lines of Comintern instructions, throughout the world. One theory for this is given, and another is suggested, by *Pattern for World Revolution,* by Ypsilon, a pseudonym for two German Communists, formerly connected with the Third International. The book is in the nature of a history of the International from 1917 to the present, with an original interpretation of the changes.

Ypsilon states that by 1932 the professional revolutionary in the Comintern had given way to the revolutionary bureaucrat, whose morality was determined by the Soviet Union's political requirements and by the surveillance of the GPU. This signifies to Ypsilon, ultimately, the transformation of socialism in the USSR into a collective state capitalism, and the foundation of a "Stalintern," on the wreckage of the Comintern, governed solely by the nationalistic interests of the USSR. Ypsilon's view of the meaning of the "Stalintern" is disclosed in his interpretation of Bukharin's speech at his trial in 1938. Bukharin himself stated that the oppositionist view, that "socialism in one country" would destroy itself, was actually counterrevolutionary and had no validity in the "new world surrounding us." According to Ypsilon, what Bukharin was really saying was that the Soviet Union will not move westward through revolutionary

eruptions, but through armed clashes between the collective state capitalism of the USSR and the new state capitalisms in the west.

The sympathies of Ypsilon for Trotsky, Bukharin, and Zinoviev, indicate that these ingenious theories represent only sectarian differences. It certainly is not true, as Ypsilon says it is, that the Stalinist version of world revolution is contrary to the teachings of Lenin. Further, it is important to point out that Ypsilon reveals that from 1929 to 1933 the Comintern spent approximately one million dollars a year in western Europe. It would appear more proper to say, then, that what we had in the years from 1929 to 1938 was not the decline of the Comintern, but a certain degree of strategic de-emphasis of it, attended by an internal crisis mirroring that in the Soviet Union, during which took place the extension of rigid discipline and Stalinist dictatorship from the party within the USSR to the Comintern as a whole.

The last part of *Pattern for World Revolution* contains excellent sections on the operation of the "Stalintern" and its extension to Soviet-occupied Europe and beyond, the manner of its control, its inherent moral nihilism, and on the reasons why the death of Stalin could very well result in a Soviet collapse. Persuasive as the arguments for it are, the last is wishful thinking and even Ypsilon avoids drawing any final conclusions. From our point of view, the most significant fact developed is that the men who dissolved the Comintern are now in power in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Central Europe, and Italy, and lead the potent Communist Party of France.

The confessions of Budenz in *This is My Story* serve as a supplement to the documents of the Third International and the interpretations of Ypsilon. The latter speaks of American Communists as devoid of political substance. There is one confirmation of this, the case of Budenz himself, formerly editor of *The Daily Worker*. He made his final break from the party only in June, 1945, sixteen months after his decision to return to the Catholic Church "at all costs," and shortly after his final lesson in the true nature of the party, the abandonment of Browder's post-Teheran "revisionist" policy. What were the "costs"? He notes that he told his wife then "that a return to the Church involved a complete break with the Communist organization."

This is My Story reveals that Budenz, however confused he may have been intellectually, was a very satisfactory Communist from the party's

view. He collaborated with Comintern agents, supplied the Soviet secret service with the information it wanted, helped in tracing a Trotskyite network, and played a small role, unconsciously, in the development of the NKVD plot on Trotsky's life. He was an active participant, he indicates, in the Communist campaign to cripple Lend-Lease and stop aid to England in order to bring an end to "the imperialist war." It is in conjunction with the disclosures of his own activities that Budenz reveals the extent of the linkage between the Soviet Union and the American Communist Party.

A curious fact arises in connection with the relationship between the party and the Comintern. Though this is shown to be a real thing, it took the party several weeks in 1945 to learn of the new "line," running counter to that followed after Teheran. Even then it was discovered only through a story in the *New York World Telegram,* in May, 1945. This reported the article by Jacques Duclos in France which attacked Browder.

V

We have already noted that a final acceptance of the Comintern dissolution is not really possible. The statements by Kravchenko and Igor Gouzenko, in Canada, are good reasons, while Budenz gives additional ones. Eisler, the Comintern agent, explained the dissolution to American Party members in such a manner that they recognized this to be a "formal affair." In addition he carried on his activities as if this were indeed so. This touches again on the general question of the peace intentions of the Soviet Union. The book by Budenz as well as General Deane's *The Strange Alliance* and former Ambassador Ciechanowski's *Defeat in Victory*[4] provide considerable insight into this matter.

Within the ranks of the American Communists, it appears, there have always been those who have seen war as inevitable between the United States and the Soviet Union. Budenz discloses that Robert Minor in 1929 and Foster in June, 1945 expressed this attitude very clearly. Browder resisted Foster's attack on his "revisionism" on the ground that his (Foster's, and Duclos') position took war for granted. In view of continued study of Marxist-Leninist writings, it should not be surprising

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[4]*The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia.* By John R. Deane. Viking Press, 1947. 344 pp. $3.75.
Defeat in Victory. By Jan Ciechanowski. Doubleday, 1947. 397 pp. $3.50.

that most American Communists are convinced that the relations between the two powers will always be marked by friction, if not crisis and war. Generally speaking this is the conclusion of Deane's *The Strange Alliance.*

The book is by far the most valuable account that has yet appeared on the actual course of American co-operation with Russia during the war. As former head of the United States Military Mission in Moscow, he is able to provide a great deal of first hand information on a variety of matters, such as Lend-Lease operations and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. Valuable as all this is, particular interest attaches to the nature of his relations with top-ranking and influential Soviet leaders and the conclusions he draws from them. He arrived in Moscow, as he reports, with powers to approach the Russians frankly and generously, and he expected a similar response in return. What actually happened was quite different.

The course of relations became marked with suspicion, procrastination, petty annoyances, and distrust. Part of this was due to irritations over the delay in the opening of the Second Front, but difficulties continued after the invasion of the continent, with the partial motivation now being apprehension over the possibilities of a separate peace. Always, it seems, the difficulties attended even those projects and operations which were to the direct benefit of the Soviet forces. The picture was not totally negative and there were several common ventures that, once organized, proceeded quite smoothly.

Deane's conclusions, in regard to the obstacles placed in the way of co-operation, were that there was always a suspicion of foreigners, and that there was a great desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to secure the military victory in their own zones with the least possible help. The motive here, Deane says, was essentially political: to obtain paramount influence in the liberated areas. His over-all conclusion is that the Russians saw the war with Germany and Japan as only a part of the struggle between Communism and Capitalism. They seemed to feel that the West had similar long-range objectives.

Like *The Strange Alliance,* Ciechanowski's *Defeat in Victory* reflects a belief in the futility of attempting to reach a full understanding with a government ostensibly concerned with security but actually influenced by a totally different system of thought. His story is that of Polish-Soviet relations as observed from Washington, where Ciechanowski represented

the Polish government in exile from 1941 to July 5, 1945, when Secretary of State Byrnes announced the recognition of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

It would be too much to expect a completely objective statement of the story he covers. Ciechanowski's contempt for Russians, his suspicions of Communist activities, his skepticism concerning the end of the Comintern, and his neofascist background, all make this highly unlikely. What can be expected, and what is provided, is a full, reasonably fair history from the official Polish point of view. Approaching the book in this manner, and judging the documentary evidence, one can see greater justification for Polish attitudes, generally condemned during the war, over episodes like the Katyn massacre. Though newspapers have reported German confessions to the murder of the eleven thousand Polish officers, there remains the mystery of the disappearance of thousands of Polish officers who were known to have fallen into Soviet hands in 1939, and for whose release Sikorski had treated with Stalin until his death in July, 1943.

The Polish government in London, and its representatives in Washington, as appears in *Defeat in Victory,* came to put great hope in the growth of America's role in world affairs and the corresponding increase in the problems of her security. Instead of greater resolution and purpose, these Poles witnessed what they were convinced was a policy of appeasement of the Soviet Union. Ciechanowski states that from conversations he had with Washington officials in June, 1945, it appeared that to them the alternatives were a yielding to Soviet demands or war. The second, these officials believed, was beyond the powers of the United States.

VI

It was stated at the beginning of the article that it was necessary to reach an immediate decision as to the correctness of Lenin's view on the position of the Soviet Union in a world that remained part imperialist. Enough data have been introduced to indicate that this view of Lenin's probably continues to affect the political judgment of the Politburo in the USSR. Ex-Ambassador Bullitt's *The Great Globe Itself,* and James Burnham's *The Struggle for the World*[5] represent a much more categorical

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[5]*The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs.* By William C. Bullitt. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 310 pp. $2.75.
The Struggle for the World. By James Burnham. John Day, 1947. 248 pp. $3.

approach to these questions. In their minds the situation is absolutely clear, and the problem is only the proper method of meeting and overcoming the danger of Soviet world hegemony. The solution is for them simple enough. It is the immediate inauguration of an American system of power politics to offset that of the USSR.

The Great Globe Itself is in the nature of a tract. Despite Bullitt's convictions as to the seriousness of the Soviet menace, the problems and solutions for him are something seen through a glass, darkly. The starting points are clear enough: the atom bomb and quotations from Lenin, including the oft-cited remark that, "It is necessary . . . to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of truth." That this is torn from context, and was not used as an over-all guide to tactics, is perhaps inconsequential; Lenin did advocate legal and illegal means for the promotion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The remarkable thing is that Bullitt uses this to characterize Soviet politics, yet insists that in 1941 Roosevelt's proper course toward the Soviet Union was to obtain promises and guarantees of nonexpansion in return for Lend-Lease aid.

Bullitt's arguments are sometimes hard to follow, laden as they are with redundancies, repetitions, clichés, errors of fact and judgment, and frequent incoherence. They are, in addition, burdened with a rather pointless survey of Russian and world history and a confused resumé of the cultural heritage of man and its decay. At bottom, however, the thesis is as follows: The atom bomb presents civilization with the problem of survival, and thus it is necessary to put an end to threats to peace. The main threat now lies in the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union, governed as it is not by vital interests but by the Communist ideology. On the other hand, America's vital interests are the interests of mankind. Therefore, while we should not attack the USSR, we should realize that an appeasement policy will lead to war and we should not hesitate to use the bomb to stop "new crimes of Soviet imperialism." Also, there should be created within the UN a Defense League of Democratic States, backed by American wealth and the atom bomb, and this should be maintained until the Soviet Union evolves into a democracy and gives up the Communist dictatorship and the dream of world conquest.

The major weakness in the argument is, of course, the totally unwarranted assumption that America's interest is the interest of the world. It would be difficult to persuade any nation of any significance to adopt

this view without serious reservations. As it is, the very strength of the Communist parties throughout the world indicates that there are millions who hold quite contrary opinions as to the true nature of their destiny. Proper leadership for America involves a much more searching examination of the needs for all the world's peoples and a much wiser strategy than "enlightened" imperialism. If one does accept Bullitt's conviction as to the nature of the Soviet threat, then perhaps the program has merit, but the method, the approach, and the language of his book are hardly such as to win adherents for it.

Burnham for one does share Bullitt's conviction as to the Soviet menace, but he is less inhibited in presenting his answer to it and in appealing for an acceptance of a program of power politics. Also, in contrast to *The Great Globe Itself,* Burnham's *The Struggle for the World* is a model of exposition. However, as masterful as it is, in the last analysis the ideas, the lines of argument, the recommendations and even some of the weaknesses are similar to those of Bullitt. Burnham is at his best in his analysis of theory and of its possible influences on the course of Soviet diplomacy. He does not, however, give any alternate interpretations of that diplomacy or dwell on its possible defensive nature. Rather significant weaknesses are that he has little sympathy for, or understanding of, the tolerance shown toward the Soviet Union by others, and that he swallows whole all the anti-Soviet writings that have appeared without assessing the special pleading that so many of these contain. Further, the weaknesses of method that marred *The Managerial Revolution* are in evidence here also, and no one can argue that the thesis in general is scientifically and soberly presented.

The primary position adopted by Burnham, roughly as presented by him, is that the discovery of the atom bomb requires the creation of a monopoly of such weapons if western civilization is to continue to exist. Such a monopoly requires a world empire for its control, and the only powers capable of building such an empire are the Soviet Union and the United States. Faced with an immediate choice between the two it is, of course, simple enough for most Americans to choose the latter, but Burnham attempts to demonstrate that this is necessary for the world because of the nature, intent, and consequences of Communism. This demonstration takes up one third of the book and is presented in five chapters ex-

plaining Communism in theory and practice, the various activities of Communism in world affairs, and the weaknesses and strength of the Soviet Union. His significant conclusions are that "Communist ideology and communist practice alike entail the destruction of these ideals of the supreme worth of the human person, of personal freedom and dignity," and that "communism may be summarily defined as a world-wide conspiratorial movement for the conquest of a monopoly of power in the era of capitalist decline."

These conclusions lead Burnham to call for an all-out effort to frustrate the formation of a Communist empire. This effort for him includes the use of American wealth and production to win over other countries to the American side, and also includes an atom bomb kept continually at alert. The thesis giving one greatest pause is that which suggests that only an American collectivism can execute the general policy that Burnham feels is necessary to secure an American-dominated world empire. And this collectivism, as Burnham himself admits, is only too obviously akin to fascism. He does not feel that his recommendations will be followed. Rather, he suspects that due to the immaturity of Americans and their leaders, there will be not a policy of power politics but a course of vacillation resulting ultimately in an atomic war, and at a time determined by the USSR. This in turn signifies the likelihood of a Soviet victory, but a victory accompanied by the peace of the desert.

The source of greatest consolation for readers are the reservations that have been indicated concerning Burnham's method. Also, he has been wrong before, as his earlier predictions and his tour through various radical ideologies bear witness. Further, as our foremost political eschatologist, Burnham has a penchant for defining the ultimate in human relations, and no man has yet been able to predict with any reasonable accuracy the future course of society.[6]

Thus, the liberal is still left with the problem of determining his own course of political action. However, it should be stressed that if there are weaknesses in Burnham's arguments and method, there are weaknesses also in the arguments and method of spokesmen for the Soviet regime and in those of such half-informed liberals as Henry Wallace.

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[6]*Editor's Note:* See "James Burnham Rides Again," in *We Note . . .* section.

A STORY

FINAL JUDGMENT

by THEODORA ILLENBERGER

THE SUN, shut out of the guarded room, beat against the slats of the Venetian blinds with sullen persistence. The air, weighted with heat, did not move. Even here in the half-darkness, Ruth was conscious of the coppery sky pressing against the parched earth.

She was thirsty, but the beads of coolness on the glass of iced tea had slid into a tired, still pool on the coaster. It was heresy, perhaps, but she couldn't see any advantage in resting after luncheon. It neither eliminated the heat nor made it more bearable. It merely encouraged the laziness that was back of all the evils she was fighting.

They'd been wrong, those New York friends of hers, when they said she couldn't stand the South, that she'd give in to the inertia, to the prejudice. She had an impulse to write Madge, to answer the challenge Madge had flung at her.

"I wonder, Ruth," she'd said, "how long you'll keep those lovely, liberal thoughts after you cross the Mason-Dixon line?" And what else was it? "You'll get a couple of servants and forget you're human." That was jealousy, though. Servants made so much possible. They released her for more important work. Madge was wrong. If anything, she was a more effective person than she had been before.

She'd give Madge chapter and verse. She'd write how . . . . She restrained herself. Personal letters were written in the afternoon. After Bessie's funeral, she'd write. Nothing was ever gained by haste.

She thought with satisfaction of the even rhythm of her days, of the hours spent at her desk with its pamphlets and its neatly stacked piles of weeklies from New York, the typewriter for her letters of protest or acclamation. Even Bessie's funeral wouldn't interfere too seriously with her plans. It gave, in fact, a point and meaning to those plans, an opportunity to prove that she meant what she had always said.

She consulted the clock on her desk. There were a half dozen things to attend to before she left the house, and it was getting late. She worked

the thin cotton of her dress loose from her body in sudden, irritated discomfort, stretched her legs against the hot covering of the couch.

Abruptly she swung herself up. Just that one quick movement made her feel more alive. She strode to the door and opened it. A new and hotter wave of air enveloped her, forced her to breathe shallowly against its suffocation. In the darkened room, relaxed against the cushions, she had looked young and rather pretty, but in the harsher light the lines around her eyes and mouth stood out plainly, added age and strain to her face.

As she hurried through the hall to the kitchen, she noticed the thin film of dust gathered along the edges of the floor. Bessie's dying just when she did had upset the housekeeping, but it was still better than anything she had had in New York. The tables gleamed with wax, the doorknobs were brightly shined. She tucked a smile on her face for a moment.

At the kitchen door she drew up abruptly. Ella May was sitting limply at the table, her head bowed over her hands. In front of her, the vegetables, so carefully crisped in the refrigerator, were wilting and untouched. She didn't move when Ruth walked further into the room.

Ruth waited a minute, but the girl still gave no sign. She went to the other side of the room where the menus and work schedules for the week were hung side by side with a pencil dangling near for Ella May to check off the items as they were finished.

She consulted her watch elaborately and looked at the schedule for that day. "Isn't it time the aspic was being put in the refrigerator?"

Ella May looked up reluctantly. "I was startin' it."

Ruth reached over and poked at the limp vegetables with a distasteful forefinger. "But they'll have to be crisped again." With an effort she kept her voice low and gentle. "That's why I type those schedules. If you get behind in one thing, the whole day's work is thrown out of line. You realize that?"

"But today . . . ." the girl mumbled.

She laughed briefly. "Oh, come now. No excuses. I know you don't feel gay, but, after all, work's the best thing at a time like this. It helps you forget."

Ella May's lips quivered and were still.

Suddenly the heat in the shining white kitchen seemed unbearable. It bore down on Ruth, making her feel unable to cope with this latest

incident. She wanted to leave quickly, to forget the tears Ella May tried to hide, but her mind told her that each situation had to be squarely faced.

"You do understand, Ella May, don't you, that I must go to Bessie's funeral?"

"Yes'm." Ella May gathered the vegetables and started for the refrigerator, careful not to pass Ruth too closely.

"You see, I have certain convictions, and it wouldn't be right if I didn't live up to them. I think it would make for better relations between the races—your race and mine, Ella May—if I show my respects to Bessie."

"Yes'm," she answered unwillingly as she dumped the vegetables in the compartment and slammed it shut.

Ruth waited until she had finished. "I'm glad you see my point, for I wouldn't want you to think I was selfish. You could go, too, only there'd be no one left to watch the house."

With a weak show of rebellion, Ella May murmured, "House won't run away."

"Yes, I know," Ruth said, firmly reining her impatience, "but . . . ." She sighed. "You remember I said you could leave early this afternoon to go over to Bessie's parents. I'm going to finish the dinner myself."

Ella May mumbled her thanks. Ruth hesitated, frowned, then left the kitchen without saying more. If Ella May only really understood, she wouldn't mind missing the funeral. After all, there was the whole evening when she could join the others.

The small delay was annoying to her who was used to counting seconds, not wasting a minute. She hurried to the side porch. John had to be warned. He was always so slow about getting ready even when he had nothing to do. She found him tipped back in a chair with his feet on the railing and his shirt unbuttoned.

He looked up at her. "This damned heat."

"It may be a little worse today, but it should break soon." To avoid his complaints, she had to belittle the discomfort. "Besides, you don't have to work in it."

He wiped the sweat from his forehead with the back of his hand. "I'd rather work ten hours a day in New York than bake like this."

"Nonsense! This is a wonderful chance. A good job, more money. And money goes further here."

"Still . . . ."

"I can't talk about it now," she said quickly. "Ella May delayed me. I have only ten minutes to shower and dress. You'll be ready, won't you?"

"Sure."

She looked at him doubtfully. "In ten minutes," she repeated.

The shower, turned mostly on cold, drew the tension from her. She even suspected a cool wind was rising. By the time, though, that she'd put on fresh clothes, she was once more damp and uncomfortable. Checking her watch constantly, she applied make-up expertly, rejected the red earrings she usually wore with the black and white print for more conservative pearls. She nodded at her reflection in the mirror, gathered up bag and gloves and was back on the porch exactly on time.

"John," she said sharply.

"Oh, yes . . . yes," he said guiltily. "I only have to button up."

"And your coat."

"Today? In this heat?"

"You do have a position to uphold. It's not as though you were still a clerk."

He shrugged into his coat without answering and went round the corner of the house to get the car. Waiting for him gave Ruth time to reflect. She wanted to go back to the kitchen to see how the aspic was progressing, but she had said so often that a servant had a right to privacy as much as anyone else. As long as they stuck to the schedule, got the work done properly, she would treat them well. But still she worried about the aspic.

The car, skittering close on the gravel, blew hot air against her legs. She winced as her arm touched the hot metal.

"Look, Ruth, I'll go to that damned funeral with you."

"Oh, no."

"I don't like the idea of your going there alone. I don't like the idea, anyway."

"It's very important."

"If it's so important, I don't see why I shouldn't go."

"We've been over that, John," she said with conscious patience. "I told you if this isn't done properly, it won't have any effect at all. You know very well you'd act embarrassed or forget to shake hands or do something to make them feel bad. I want to prove that some white people think they're equals."

"Flowers would do the trick."

"It's not the same at all." She looked out the window at the increasingly shabby houses, at the children sitting limply in the meager shade of spindly trees. "What are you going to do this afternoon.?"

"There's some papers at the office to go over," he said. "But I'll call for you."

"Now, John." She turned to face him so that he would understand how strongly she felt about it. "I won't stand for your going to the office on a Saturday. It's too tiring. Besides, it doesn't look right. Why don't you go to the club and have a drink with some of the men?"

A smile quirked his mouth. "I can remember when I used to catch hell for having a drink with the boys."

"That was different."

The sidewalk was cleared in front of the small frame church. Ruth had expected small, curious children hanging about the entrance, but everything was quiet. John raced the motor. "Sure you don't want me to go in with you?"

"Of course," she said, still looking curiously about her. Then, turning her attention to him, "Now go to the club and have a good time. It's just as important to your job as going over a few papers."

Once out of the car, she didn't look back but mounted the steps and pulled open the door with resolution. Then she stopped. John, who had started to drive off, backed up the car and opened the door. Ruth waved him on and went inside.

This was not what she had expected. There were no gaudy decorations, no display of color. It wasn't even barren and shabby. It was simply a very ordinary church. Madge, when she wrote her, would never believe it. There were no lamentations or wail of spirituals, only the soft weeping of an old woman near the front of the church. Probably she was one of Mrs. Hopper's servants for Bessie's whole family worked there. That's why she had been so happy to get her. It was a little like infiltrating the rigid social line marked off by Mrs. Hopper.

From where she was standing she could see no other white person. For just a moment she hesitated, then remembered why she was there. She stepped forward briskly, and her heels clicked too loudly on the uncarpeted floor. Faces turned toward her. It had been still before, but now there was tension in the air, a questioning and a readiness.

It was obvious that the service had been about to begin. The minister was standing behind the flower-piled coffin with an open Bible in his hand. Ruth started to slip in the last pew, but the minister closed the Book and started down the aisle. She didn't know quite what to do so she stood where she was until he reached her side.

She extended her hand with a quick, determined gesture which he accepted with a dignity which did not hide the question in his eyes.

"Bessie worked for me," she murmured in explanation. She was uncomfortably aware of the eyes of the congregation turned on her.

"It's very kind of you to come," he answered. "You people have been very good. Those white flowers . . . ." He nodded toward the sheaf of lilies at the head of the coffin. "Mrs. Hopper sent them."

The respect with which he had spoken her name annoyed Ruth. "She's not here?" she asked, pointedly.

His face, so carefully expressionless, suddenly showed a shocked disbelief, an uncertainty. "No, ma'm." He looked over his shoulder at the faces watching them.

"I don't want to interrupt the service," she said coldly. She had noticed the slight hesitation, the hint of criticism. "Go right ahead," she added imperiously.

She felt as though a spotlight had picked her out. Everyone in the church, almost without exception, pivoted his gaze from the slowly moving figure of the minister back to her. Even when he had once more taken his place beside the coffin, eyes darted furtively in her direction. It seemed to her that ever since she had come South she had seen that look, its guardedness, the withheld judgment. She pressed her back against the cool wood of the pew and kept her chin high in the air.

She hadn't noticed while she was talking to the minister, but when he bowed his head to lead them in prayer, she was surprised that his voice was not deep and resonant, but high and almost squeaky. It was another false note in the composition she had so carefully prepared. But it was undoubtedly easier for her while he prayed, for no one dared look round at her.

The church, at first cool, seemed to fill with heat. The wood that touched her became humid from her body. Warily she moved slightly further in the pew. The service dragged on interminably. She felt a moist

worm of perspiration gather under her shoulder blade and crawl slowly down the irritated flesh of her back.

They didn't want her here. She was sure of that now. They made her feel like an outsider, a snooping outsider who had not learned to respect the conventions. But she'd make them understand. They had to know that her presence was more important than Mrs. Hopper's lilies.

None of them would have dared peer at Mrs. Hopper as they were at her. For a real friend they showed no respect. Heavens only knew, she had sacrificed enough for them. That afternoon at Mrs. Hopper's, for instance. It meant something in this town to be invited for tea in the big, brick house. That had been her opportunity, but she hadn't let her desire for friends lead her into ignoring prejudice. She'd spoken right out when one of the women had referred to "niggers." And that was why, she was certain, that she hadn't been asked again.

Mrs. Hopper had been nice enough about it, almost apologetic. When she was leaving, the old lady had said, "You Northerners are always so earnest. Wait until you've been here a while, dear, before you judge us." But she hadn't been asked again.

That was probably the reason, too, why she hadn't been appointed to the Library Committee although she knew more about the new books and what was going on in the literary world than any of these provincial women.

All that, and still they looked on her with suspicion. She let her glance roam over the church. Eyes that had been staring at her dropped or shifted to the slight figure of the minister. She tried to concentrate on what he was saying, but it sounded so dull that her thoughts kept wandering off.

Suddenly she saw, in the front pew with the family, another white person. A small feeling of joy touched her, but as she peered through the gloom, she recognized him. It was the violin teacher who lived back of his studio on one of the worst streets in town. She had heard that he was talented, an excellent teacher, but no one dared send children to him. About him there was always the smell of cheap corn whiskey, and she'd heard tales about the things that went on there at night. As she watched, she saw him nod encouragingly to one of the people sitting near him, and she saw the answering smile.

Her resentment flared high. It seemed that they had no criterion of judgment. A disreputable character like him was accepted, but a respon-

sible, mature woman was shut out. Mrs. Hopper's flowers were more important than her presence.

She tried to moisten her lips with the tip of her tongue and shifted once more to a slightly cooler spot in the pew. She might as well have stayed at home and written some letters. But no. This was the place where she should be. She knew her duty even if no one was grateful for her doing it.

She noticed the music teacher leave his seat and disappear in a room to the rear just before the minister closed the Bible and stepped back from the coffin. Very softly, from the room into which he had vanished, came the clear notes of a violin. It was not a hymn nor any other piece she recognized, but it was incredibly moving. She forgot the heat and her discomfort, the question that had been in the eyes of the people in front of her. The women were crying now, their emotion released by the music. Their sobs grew louder. An emotional orgy, she thought with horror. Surely Bessie couldn't mean that much to anyone. She hadn't thought of her once during the service.

The family filed from its pew and moved toward the coffin. All over the church was movement, people standing and shifting nearer the aisle for their turn to view the body. Ruth was in a panic. She couldn't walk in front of all of them. She wouldn't face the unfriendliness. Hurriedly, almost slyly, she slipped out of her seat and left the church.

Outside the sun was beating down in midafternoon force. The sidewalk burned through the soles of her shoes. She looked around helplessly. She couldn't very well ask one of those people in there to call a taxi, and in this part of town there were no cruising cabs. She hadn't thought of that. Grimly she started out to walk.

The heat held her in a vise. It seeped through the dusty, motionless leaves and curled around her in malevolent dampness. It was almost personal in its hatefulness. The scant dozen blocks stretched to endless miles, and each block was longer than the last. At every step those indrawn faces with their eyes always watching but never meeting hers taunted her.

The last two blocks were the worst. The women sitting on cool porches with iced drinks to ward off thirst made her discomfort more unbearable. Their safe, calm afternoon made her disappointment more keen. They would think she was crazy for walking in such heat, and

when the news of where she'd been had circulated, their greetings would be more reserved than ever, their faces more guarded.

She flung open the front door and started for her study, but voices at the back of the house stopped her. Anger flooded her in a harsh, violent wave of blood. In the kitchen a Negro, the one who tended lawns, was patting Ella May on the back while she wept and clutched his hand.

Ruth couldn't speak for a minute, the minute it took for the man to straighten up and edge toward the door, for Ella May to wipe her eyes with the back of her hand and stand up guiltily.

"I didn't know you were in the habit of entertaining while I was out of the house," she said icily. "Or perhaps there are many things I don't know."

Ella May made a slight gesture with one hand and nodded for the man to leave. He hesitated, then slid out the back door, closed it gently.

The girl had stopped crying, but her breasts were still moving in the gasping rhythm of weeping. "I didn't mean nothing. He just came in to make me feel better. Me and Bessie were friends."

Ruth walked to the refrigerator and opened it to see if the aspic were made. Its perfection did nothing to lessen her anger, increased it, rather, because her doubt had been proved wrong. She went to the schedule hanging near the sink.

All the items had been checked except for one which had no time set against it: wash bedroom windows. She picked up the pencil and wrote in hurriedly, 3:30 P.M.

Ella May watched her with fascinated horror. "But Mis' Goodwin, the sun's beating down on them windows like they was on fire."

"If you hadn't wasted so much time this morning, you could have done them while the sun was on the other side of the house."

"But Mis' Goodwin . . . ."

"I want them done immediately."

She left the kitchen and went to her study. She flung herself on the couch ready to weep with frustration but no tears came. She was choked with anger. Methodically, efficiently, she tried to think of something that would relieve her. A forgotten chore nagged at her. The letter to Madge. Quickly, to end the humiliation of the afternoon, she got up and went

to her desk. She was pulling stationery from a drawer when she heard Ella May's footsteps on the back stairs and the bumping of the pail against the wall.

Anger still needled her. She went to the front of the house and out on the lawn. Ella May was opening one of the windows in the front bedroom. Ruth watched her dip her cloth in the pail and sit on the windowsill to reach out. She moved slowly, as though mesmerized by the heat. It wrapped Ruth, too, in an uncomfortable cloak, but still she watched. The girl, she thought, was doing the job too quickly. It would be done before the lesson had been learned.

Her voice was sharp as she called, "Don't forget the corners as you usually do."

She could see Ella May's lips move, but she didn't hear her answer. She knew, with a touch of satisfaction, that Ella May would never again protest where she could hear. Grimly she smiled and went inside to write the letter to Madge.

THE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE

By FREEMAN CHAMPNEY

FEW THINGS are as clear in the philosophy of democracy as the right of popular revolt. Few things are as thorny in actual practice. American history contains examples of a variety of popular rebellions, starting with the Revolutionary War itself and its rapid progression from the rights of Englishmen to the Rights of Man. We find two general types of extra-legal uprising in our history[1]—the first is an attempt to halt, mitigate, or frustrate the weight of a specific tyranny or injustice; such a revolt is essentially negative and Shay's Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion are samples. The second type is a positive seizing of the powers of sovereignty —either in extension of the legal government or in opposition to it—for purposes which may have a greater or lesser content of real social need. It is this second type which concerns us here and the prime example is the work of the San Francisco Committee of Vigilance of 1856.

Vigilance committees were a common accompaniment of the settling of the West, especially in the mining towns, and few of them were fastidious about forms of procedure. Often they were merely alcoholic lynch mobs who might or might not get the right victim. When they did simulate legalism it was often in the spirit of the vigilantes in Bret Harte's story who told their "jury" that was having trouble reaching a decision, "Don't take too long, boys. We need this room to lay out the corpse in." In a country without any formal government of consequence, with life and riches here today and gone tomorrow, and with an international assemblage of adventurers and cutthroats milling around, such crude attempts to defend life and property are not surprising. But neither do they have any lasting significance. Dry Diggings was renamed Hangtown for good and sufficient reasons; later it became Placerville; its evolution is completely expressed in its successive names and no more need be said.

San Francisco, however, was a far more complex community than the mining camps. The social, economic, and cultural metropolis for the whole central coastal and Rocky Mountain area (until the through rail-

[1]Excluding, that is, the rebellion of 1861-1865, which is in a class by itself.

road arrived), was populated and built (and rebuilt several times) within a few months, it had a high percentage of men of talent and substance, and it had a solid plateau of civilization and culture that the inhabitants had brought with them. It also had a highly organized underworld that enjoyed very co-operative relations with what law enforcement agencies there were. The first of its underworld gangs was known as the Hounds —later they acquired dignity and called themselves The Regulators—and began with the remnants of a regiment of New York Volunteers which had been mustered out in 1847. They were joined by emigrants from Australia's penal colonies (the "Sydney Ducks") and they organized crimes petty and grand with considerable flourish.

It is interesting to note that the operation of the Hounds which brought the first vigilante reprisal was an attack on a wretched encampment of Chileans. Under Mormon elder Sam Brannan, a group of citizens organized to stand guard duty, round up Hounds, serve as a grand jury, and assist the alcalde in the trials. This first citizen uprising extended no further than a mass volunteer assistance to the police. Its effect, however, was only very limited and in a few months, homicide, robbery, and arson-for-loot were again alarming the merchants and solid citizens.

Seven months after the hunting of the Hounds, the daytime beating and robbery of a prominent merchant brought another and greater crisis. For most of a day, a crowd of more than ten thousand men milled around the building where two suspects in the robbery were being held. All the ingredients of a lynching seemed to be present and there were plenty of inciters offering ropes. But it seems to have been a crowd remarkably averse to taking the final step to violence. For the most part it appears to have been composed of solid, sober citizens who thought of themselves, quite properly, as aroused for the preservation of civilized securities and not their destruction. They had, however, no confidence whatever in the good faith or efficiency of the legal authorities. This stalemated situation was resolved by the appearance and the inspiration of one man. And since this man gave the imprint of his personality to the Vigilance Committee which followed, to its revival in 1856, and to its final appearance in 1877, this conjunction of individual and situation was a major event in the history of the West.

William Tell Coleman was then twenty-seven years old (ripe maturity for the Gold Rush country), had been on his own since the age of

fifteen after a boyhood in Kentucky, had been surveyor, law student, insurance man, plantation overseer, woodsman, and lumberman. He had come west in '49 by the overland route (organizing a probably unprecedented immigrant party dinner in honor of Brigham Young at Salt Lake City), done business briefly in Sacramento as a building contractor, and moved on to Hangtown to set up as a merchant (during a dull period he panned out seventy-two dollars in three days and decided he could do better as a businessman). Like everyone else in the gold fields, he looked to San Francisco as the place for really big doings and moved there in the spring of 1850. Coleman was a man of commanding height and appearance, with a powerful voice, and these attributes undoubtedly helped him to catch the attention of the crowd when he stepped out on the corner post of a second-story balcony. The mayor was appealing to the men to go home and leave everything to the regular authorities and he was having rough going of it. Coleman's proposal was to form a *people's court* on the spot, give the two suspects a fair and full trial, and, if they were found guilty, to hang them before the sun went down. He struck the exact balance between direct action and responsibility that the tensions and restraints of the crowd demanded. It was to serve as a pattern for the whole history of the San Francisco Vigilantes—extralegal action, ruthless action, but always disciplined and responsible to a sense of what was proper and honorable.

What followed was anticlimax. After a lengthy trial, with Coleman acting as prosecutor, the jury failed to agree (the suspects claimed mistaken identity; much later it was to turn out that they were right and the Vigilantes were to save one of them from being hung by the regular authorities) and the crowd had no hangings to finish off the day. There was some sentiment for hanging them anyway, with defense attorney and jury thrown in, but Coleman and others stood firm for following through with their illegal law and order, and after a slight flurry, the prisoners were spirited away and turned over to the regular authorities.

The Committee of Vigilance was formally organized a few weeks after the trial. It had a solemn written constitution, an executive committee of twenty, and a general membership of about seven hundred. Almost immediately the committee had a chance to hang someone when one of the more notorious of the "Sydney Ducks" was caught red-handed in a robbery. Not long after, they turned up the criminal for whom one

of the defendants in the first "people's court" trial had been mistaken. He was hung and his double rescued from the official hangman. In all, the committee hung four men, whipped one, and deported about thirty. This was out of a total of ninety-one trials; petty cases and "crimes of passion" were turned over to the regular authorities. A pretty restrained record for a group which had little but its own principles to keep it from becoming an all-out lynch mob.

The forces of "law and order" made a feeble counterattack but neither the newspapers nor the public gave them much support and a grand jury refused to return indictments (it turned out later that seven of its sixteen members were Vigilantes). The governor, the mayor, and the sheriff made one successful foray on committee headquarters and rescued two condemned men—but four days later the Vigilantes snatched them back and hung them within seventeen minutes.

The committee of '51, however, was only a warmup for the situation that arose in '56. By this latter date another ingredient had been added to the devil's brew of unpunished crime and official complaisance that aroused good citizens. The stuffing of ballot boxes had become a skilled technique and the boxes themselves were often of an ingenious type with false bottom and sides that enabled them to be stuffed in advance with safety and convenience. The classic example of the frauds that flourished was an election in San Mateo County in which about five hundred actual voters produced a total tally of almost nineteen hundred ballots. Obviously, such a situation guaranteed the corruption of government and increased the feeling of frustration that disposed the citizens to take matters into their own hands.

Another unique element in the 1856 upheaval was the part played by James King of William. This ex-banker-turned-journalist was a personality as unusual as his name (there were too many James Kings, so he added his father's given name to his own.) A crusader for righteousness, with more than a touch of paranoia, he made the *Evening Bulletin* a vehicle of denunciation and exposure, naming names (and calling names) in every issue. Public opinion in the city was still churning about the case of Charles Cora, a professional gambler who had shot and killed the United States Marshal. Money and influence were abundantly available for his defense, a seemingly inexhaustible supply of eyewitnesses turned up from the underworld, and a hung (only figuratively) jury

resulted. Cora went back to the county jail to pass the time until it would be safe to drop the whole case. But James King of William had no intention of letting Cora be forgotten and he kept the popular pulse racing. It was, however, what King doubtless regarded as a piece of minor editorial routine that brought on the blowoff. One Mr. Bagley had engaged in a brawl with James P. Casey (a notoriously crooked politician), and Editor King undertook to admonish Mr. Bagley in a typically left-handed defense of Casey's rights.

> The fact that Casey has been an inmate of Sing Sing prison in New York, is no offense against the laws of this State; nor is the fact of his having stuffed himself through the ballot-box as elected to the Board of Supervisors from a district where it is said he was not even a candidate, any justification for Mr. Bagley to shoot Casey, however richly the latter may deserve to have his neck stretched for such fraud on the people.

This sort of comment was typical of King's editorials and had been lavished on any number of important San Franciscans without reprisals. But Casey was touchy about his past; he hurried to the *Bulletin* office sputtering indignation and was ordered out by King. He then gathered with some of his cronies at a nearby bar; there was doubtless considerable informal egging-on of the excitable Mr. Casey—there is some reason to believe that there was a deliberate plot to get rid of King by means of Casey. In any event, Casey shortly waylaid King going home from the *Bulletin* office and shot him.

James King alive had been an irritant to the community conscience; but there had also been the normal tendency to regard him as a crank and a busybody. But James King fighting for his life after a deliberate assault by a notorious crook (who immediately sped to sanctuary in the hands of his friends the police) became a martyr who roused that community conscience to incandescence. Recalling the event years later, Josiah Royce (whose parents had lived in a tent near Hangtown and who had been born in Grass Valley) said that

> King's death did more than his life could possibly have done to regenerate the social order. Upon King's death, there followed for many a really new life. This crisis was a revelation to them, which they never forgot.

The streets swarmed with people—the jail being surrounded by several thousand. The sheriff called out all the deputies and militia he could get but his forces were never much over a hundred men. There

was an immediate clamor for the revival of the Committee of Vigilance and Coleman was persuaded to head it and given dictatorial powers. Within a few days the committee enrolled over six thousand members, about twenty-five hundred of whom were organized into companies, armed, and drilled. A brick building was fortified with sandbags and artillery (Fort Gunnybags) and used as committee headquarters. But this time there was also a strong minority opposed to the committee and its works. James King of William had made whole classes of enemies by his free-swinging journalism—southerners, Catholics, many of the other newspapers, and, of course, the entire "Law and Order" group of public officials, politicians, gamblers, and their hangers-on. William Tecumseh Sherman had just been appointed major-general in command of the militia by the governor (a product of the Know Nothing Party whose conduct in the crisis aroused little but contempt from either side).

The governor thought he had arranged a truce—by which the committee would hold its hand and give law and order a chance to show that they meant business—but he bungled the whole thing by announcing that the committee had given in. The Vigilantes acted. Twenty-five companies of armed men converged with clock-like precision on the jail, brought up a large field piece and placed it directly in front of the door, loaded the cannon and made ready to light the fuse. The sheriff, with his handful of deputies, surrendered Casey and Cora to the committee. (A sheriff who had paid a hundred thousand dollars for a twelve thousand dollar a year job could hardly be expected to prove a martyr to duty.) While this was going on, the governor, the mayor, and Sherman (a general with no army) watched from the roof of a hotel.

James King of William died during the trials and Cora and Casey were hanged within sight of his funeral procession. The committee proceeded with trials and deportations very much along the lines of '51 while Sherman engaged in a fruitless wrangle with United States General J. E. Wool in the effort to get federal arms for his militia. Sherman finally resigned in disgust and the committee might have finished its work and disbanded without further complications except for a series of unplanned events that led it to the commission of piracy (intercepting arms shipped to the government), and the jailing of the chief justice of the state (after he knifed a Vigilante captain). As a consequence of this new crisis, the committee commandeered all the militia arsenals in the city and made

careful plans to destroy the United States Sloop-of-War *John Adams* if she intervened from her moorings in the harbor. Fortunately, Captain Farragut, who was nearby, prevented his subordinate on the *John Adams* from opening a bombardment of the city as the law and order folks were urging, and President Franklin Pierce declined the federal armed aid that the governor urgently requested.

These ramifications were portentous because there was a strong Southern Secession movement within the state which hoped to turn the vigilance uprising to its own purposes. The committee commanded the only sizeable military force in the Far West and if it had taken the bait held out by the Secessionists (or if it had been forced to resist federal attack) the course of the rapidly-approaching Civil War might have been profoundly altered.

Coleman, however, rejected and denounced the secessionist propositions and the threatened brush with federal forces was averted. The committee proceeded with its work (again hanging four men and deporting about thirty), the governor's own Know Nothing Convention refused to censure the Vigilantes, and finally the governor had to revoke his academic proclamation of insurrection. The committee soon finished its direct action program, but this time it followed up with a sustained political reform campaign which resulted in about ten years of relatively good government.

II

The Committee of '56 has entered into American tradition—especially in the West—and enough has been summarized of its history to indicate that it served socially useful purposes. But its descendants in American history have been almost uniformly degenerate and loathesome—vigilantism today is a synonym for organized hoodlumism and outrage against racial or ideological minorities. The gap between Coleman's committee and the proceedings documented in the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee Report and dramatized in *Grapes of Wrath* is both wide and deep. In spite of this, it is undoubtedly the feeling of operating in the Coleman tradition that makes it possible for contemporary California clerks and real estate men to sally forth as night riders with a feeling of self-approval. Since a not unworthy part of our American heritage has gone so sour, it is worth trying to analyze why.

Coleman himself stated the propositions on which the Vigilance Committee was based and that governed his leadership of it:

> Who made the laws and set agents over them? The people.
>
> Who saw these laws neglected, disregarded, abused, trampled on? The people.
>
> Who had the right to protect these laws, and administer them when their servants had failed? The people.
>
> The people are the power; it is theirs by birthright, and when they delegate it, it is expressed and implied that upon wrong-doing the servants shall be pushed aside, formally or informally, and their places promptly filled by other and better agencies.

It is to be noted that this credo says nothing about going beyond the existing laws—it makes no pretense of exceeding the statutory definitions of crime and its punishments. And it was put into effect in a situation that had a relatively simple and fluid social and economic organization. The dangers to society lay in uncomplicated assaults on life and property —and later in election frauds which "polluted the spring" of government. The remedies employed were also simple. For extreme cases, the rope. For others against whom specific crimes could not be proved, the "Sydney Ducks" could be shipped back to Australia, the local talent run out of town. And in that simple society, the breaking up of the organized gangs and the deterrent effect of swift retribution seemed to do the job. It is obvious that, on the surface, there is nothing in common between Coleman's committee and today's western vigilantes.

Below the surface, however, there are similarities. Extralegal action rises out of fear—fear of a threat to society, or to a dominant part of it. The threat is usually to property rights or to strategic economic position but the issue is seldom clear and simple. Usually the underlying economic threat is overlaid and mixed with conflicts of religion, social mores, racial origin, or living customs. Vigilantism can also be an expression of social pathology—a society based on gross injustice, with a sharp dissociation between profession and practice, will often rise and destroy those who disturb the balance or who only point out the realities of the situation.

Coleman was once again called on to organize the good citizens of San Francisco, and this final appearance of the "Lion" (the title is from Robert Louis Stevenson, who said that Coleman "had but to rouse himself and shake his ears, and the whole brawling mob was silenced") is illustrative of the changes in California society between 1856 and 1877

and shows conclusively that the days of vigilantism as a simple expression of the will of "the people" were over. By 1877 the Central Pacific Railroad had completed the through line from the East; the "Big Four" who had built it were occupying their sprawling mansions on Nob Hill, and San Francisco was in the middle of a major depression. Too-optimistic overexpansion and overspeculation had preceded the opening of the through road, the East was in a turmoil of financial panic and labor warfare, and about 150,000 Chinese, many of whom the railroad had imported to man the building gangs, had been dumped on the already depressed San Francisco labor market. In this explosive situation, Denis Kearney began haranguing the unemployed in the sand lots. His line was a mixture of "Hang the Millionaires" (especially the Big Four on Nob Hill) and "The Chinese Must Go." It was a sufficiently incendiary appeal to cause riots, the burning of Chinese laundries, and attacks on Chinatown. This time the city administration and the governor urged Coleman to "rouse himself and shake his ears" and gave him sole command, not only of his volunteers but of the regular troops.

About 5500 volunteers were enrolled. Coleman at first began to arm and drill his men, then rounded up all supplies of arms in the city and substituted hickory pick handles for guns in the hands of his forces. This prevented what might otherwise have been a considerable loss of life, gave the '77 Committee the name of "The Pick-Handle Brigade," and left another tradition for later misuse. The committee confined itself to maintaining order and protecting the Chinese settlement. And it was well that it did; the situation it now faced was vastly different from that of '51 and '56. Most of the ingredients of the modern political-economic struggle were present: power- and money-bloated capitalists dominating the government and throwing their weight about to the detriment of the public interest, a dispossessed proletariat, and a political reform movement of farmer-labor origin. And although Coleman's pick-handle boys broke up the rioters and no gallows were erected on Nob Hill for the railroad builders, the state constitution of 1879 contained a series of reforms put there by Kearney's Workingmen's Party in alliance with the Grangers. No doubt there were those who would have liked to see the Pick-Handle Brigade used as a counterrevolutionary army, but even though Coleman had his house on Nob Hill, he was as immune to the blandishments of reaction as he had been to those of secession. According

to his biographer, Coleman approved of the reform measures of the new state constitution—which must have made him unique among his neighbors.

III

It is obvious that San Francisco's troubles in 1877 grew out of a complex of causes that couldn't be banished with pick-handles. Kearney's proposal for the hanging of millionaires wouldn't have righted the situation either but the direction of his animus had some sense to it. The social irresponsibility of the railroad builders set in motion a series of evils and counterforces which is still with us. The tendency to solve public crises by ringing the Vigilante Bell had become a dangerous regression.

It is worth noticing that antilabor vigilantism in recent years has seldom arisen where labor is an integral part of a community. It is in those areas where a migratory or segregated labor force functions that an attempt to organize or a strike can be such a threat to the dominant community as to invoke the vigilante tradition. California agriculture, for instance, requires large amounts of seasonal labor. In some areas, no better method has been worked out than to run the labor force out of the county once the season's work is finished. A period of depression and unemployment, of course, means a labor surplus, and gives the owners a chance to invoke the Iron Law of Wages in much more extreme form than Ricardo ever conceived it. (And California's agricultural giants have usually managed to conjure up a labor surplus even in prosperous times.) When labor is an accidental collection of migrants—usually of different racial groups from the settled community—when management is often merely a labor contractor acting for absentee owners, and when the settled community is economically dependent on the one industry, democracy and the civil liberties are apt to be academic abstractions and conflicts are to be settled by violence. Such violence, moreover, may be invoked against dissenters within the community as well as against the labor force.

California's agriculture has never been "farming" as the East and the Middle West understand the word—small and medium-sized units, owners farming their land themselves and with all the cultural attributes of settled rural communities. California went from feudalism to monopoly capitalism (with strong fascist overtones) at one jump—from the pre-conquest cattle ranches and the vast wheat ranches described by Frank Norris to today's highly capitalized fruit, nut, and truck farms, tied to-

gether by the "co-operative" marketing organizations, and dominated by the banks, the canners, and the large growers. The floating labor force required has never been allowed to acquire land, citizenship, or permanent status. A series of importations—Chinese, Japanese, Mexican, Filipino, and Okie—has done the seasonal work, always at a coolie wage level and always subject to forcible displacement as soon as signs of union organization and aspiration toward an American standard of living appeared.

The giants of California agriculture have, in effect, hoodwinked the solid citizenship of the state into not only assuming the larger part of the labor costs of the industry, but trading their democratic heritage for a psychopathology of fear and violence.

Lynchings in the South are a special case, and have their own traditions that antedate Western vigilantism. The cultural inheritance from the slave labor economy and its feudal social structure, and from the experience of being a conquered and occupied country, goes deep. Such profound pathology will not be easily cured. The importance, to both the South and the West, of keeping the federal Bill of Rights constantly invoked—or potentially invoked—cannot be overemphasized. A society with democratic forms and Christian commitments has a long-run self-corrective tendency if the channels of information, opinion, and communication are not completely blocked.

A society which is flexible and democratic has no need for vigilantes; the normal processes of democracy provide the means of orderly change and adaptation. But a society which denies the democratic heritage to part of its members is constantly forced to pervert that heritage in the effort to keep it exclusive. A rigid social structure that preserves its rigidity by maintaining a group of unorganized, propertyless, homeless, and voteless laborers in a state of subjection cannot long keep even the pretense of democracy. It must be constantly prepared to invoke total violence against its slaves, against "outside agitators," and against dissenters within its own ranks. The number of those who retain their "freedom" of thought and action becomes steadily smaller and the boundaries of that freedom narrower.

Vigilantism arose to protect life and property (anybody's life, and anybody's property—present or to be acquired). Except on the public highways, life is no longer seriously threatened by rampant lawlessness. Nor is property threatened, in the sense that the San Francisco committee

thought of it—the right of the individual to the peaceful use or occupancy of his legitimate realty or personality. What *is* sometimes threatened is the right irresponsibly to manipulate economic power so as to endanger the common welfare, or to defend an unstable and inequitable social-economic structure against necessary change. Today's would-be vigilantes should know their history better and they should ponder the words of William Tell Coleman, their patron saint:

> God forbid we should hereafter need vigilance or safety committees. . . . Those who organized and conducted these efforts appreciate the undesirability of all such proceedings as fully as any one else can, and they would never appeal to them nor encourage an appeal to them except as a last resort in dire necessity.

* * *

This article draws heavily for its historical data on James A. B. Scherer's *Lion of the Vigilantes* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1939), Stanton A. Coblentz' *Villains and Vigilantes* (Wilson-Erickson, 1936), and the indispensable products of H. H. Bancroft's western history factory—in this case the two volumes on *Popular Tribunals*. Carey McWilliams, of course, is the authority on California's "Factories in the Field." It should be noted, however, that Mr. McWilliams believes that the San Francisco committees of '51, '56, and '77 were of the same breed and stripe as today's vigilantes. This article argues, to the contrary, that the Coleman tradition is a worthy one and has been twisted to supply a moral sanction for a very different kind of vigilantism. Mr. McWilliams' references to vigilante history show several errors of fact. He identifies the Hounds of '51 exclusively with the Sydney Ducks, and he implies that the anti-Chinese followers of Denis Kearney in '77 were vigilantes, thereby supporting his thesis that vigilantism has been from the first an anti-alien movement. This ignores the native origin of the Hounds and the fact that the first vigilante action—under Sam Brannan—was provoked by the Hounds looting of the encampment of Chileans. It also distorts the history of the Committee of '77—which *protected* the Chinese against Kearney's followers. I suggest that Mr. McWilliams has projected the modern social-economic pattern of California life backward to a period before it had taken shape. The point is worth stressing because westerners are proud of the vigilante tradition. It should be easier to convince them that their pride is justified but that times have changed than that the whole thing was rotten from the start. And, easier or not, it seems to me more historically accurate.

HENRY JAMES AS A SOCIAL CRITIC

By CLINTON OLIVER

WE HAVE COME so often to consider social criticism in art as a form of incisive sociology, only vaguely fictionalized where the novel is concerned, that the subtlety of Henry James is likely to belie our appreciation of many aspects of his work which present him as a singularly penetrating social critic. Granville Hicks' treatment of James in *The Great Tradition* represents quite adequately, I think, the errors of the sociological attitude. Mr. Hicks says in part:

> There have been men who thought they understood James and tried to state the justification of his career. There has been a kind of James cult. But the majority of readers, however thoughtful and patient, have rejected him. Have they not been wise? No one can deny that considerable insight went into the writing of the early novels, and even in the later books there are moments when a subtle power of observation and understanding makes itself dazzlingly apparent; but for the most part James's novels and tales seem completely remote from the lives of the vast majority of men. And why should one read a novel if it does not give him a sense that he is moving with enhanced powers of perception and a greater certainty as to direction, through the strange world of which he is a part?

This view, which is by no means unique in Jamesian criticism, raises any number of fundamental problems in regard to the relation of art to society, the answers to which would call for, let us say, an *Art of Fiction,* if that work and many others like it were not already in existence.

Mr. Hicks is unquestionably sound in his insistence upon tendency and illumination as necessary components of great literary art. But in his conception of James as a leisure-class writer who failed somehow to "fully and convincingly recreate leisure class life," I am not sure that he has clearly demonstrated the absence of *Tendenz* in James, or that James does not enhance our perception of the world of which we are part. What I shall argue for here is the complexity of social criticism in art and the intricacy of the ways in which art may be said to reflect society.

For this purpose let us center our attention on *The Bostonians* and *The Princess Casamassima.* In doing so, we are not approaching the most subtle, and perhaps more typical, aspects of James's art. But everything Jamesian is distinctly Jamesian, and many of the observations to be made on these novels might with certain refinements be carried into an analysis of his later novels.

The Bostonians and *The Princess Casamassima* appeared in 1886. This was the year, as Newton Arvin has reminded us, of the Trafalgar Square riots in London and the Haymarket tragedy in Chicago. The objective circumstances which made for these open outbursts of class warfare were apparently not unknown to Henry James. Writing to Charles Eliot from Milan in 1886, the very year of *The Princess Casamassima,* James in a discussion of "the already damaged prestige of the English upper classes" remarks:

> The condition of that body seems to me in many ways to be the same rotten and collapsible one as that of the French aristocracy before the revolution—minus cleverness and conversation; or perhaps it is more like the heavy, congested and depraved Roman world upon which the barbarians came down. In England the Huns and Vandals will have to come up—from the black depths of the (in the people) enormous misery. . . .

What distinguishes *The Bostonians* and *The Princess Casamassima* among James's novels is their comparatively full and open handling of social themes. The first is essentially American, centering upon New England, principally Boston; the second is European, centering upon England and principally the social complexities that bared themselves in London toward the close of the nineteenth century. In social terms, *reform* and *revolution* are their respective themes.

II

The Bostonians is written in a highly satirical vein. It presents a penetrating and not always pleasant study of a strong-minded Boston woman who has left the superficial comforts of the Back Bay to devote herself to the cause of "the people," and the emancipation of her sex. At the opening of the book, Olive Chancellor, pale, intense, and "visibly morbid," discovers, or believes that she discovers, a kindred spirit in Verena Tarrant, daughter of a mesmeric healer, a beautiful and impressionable red-haired girl, who possesses a wonderful gift of eloquence, which under the proper circumstances seems destined to advance im-

measurably the cause to which Olive Chancellor has devoted her life. From the moment she is introduced, the novel centers around Verena Tarrant. A battle of ideologies ensues between Olive Chancellor and her cousin Basil Ransom, a southerner, ruined by the Civil War, who having settled in New York to practice law, meets the Tarrants and his cousin's circle of friends on his first visit to the "city of reform." The battleground is Verena Tarrant's soul.

The novel is written in the third person, in a rather straightforward manner, and James is responsible directly for much of the irony and humor that pervade the book. "There are women," we are told, "who are unmarried by accident, and others who are unmarried by option; but Olive Chancellor was unmarried by every implication of her being. She was a spinster as Shelley was a lyric poet, or as the month of August is sultry." In her first meeting with her cousin, Olive's smile is likened to "a thin ray of sunshine resting upon a prison wall." Again the author writes that there was a "lithographic smoothness" about Mrs. Farrinder, the powerful woman leader who has come to Boston to discuss "The Wrongs of Woman"; she is described as a "mixture of the American matron and the public character." The entire handling of Mrs. Farrinder is a masterpiece in the satirical treatment of a particular kind of personality in American life that obviously held few attractions for the author. However, much of Boston life, on its reforming side, is seen through the eyes of Basil Ransom, who is able to bring his altogether unusual perspective of a Mississippian to bear upon the more rigorous aspects of Boston life.

Ransom's insights into Boston life are always powerful. His is a stoical but easygoing nature. When asked by his cousin if he believes in human progress, he is amused; his answer is a quick "I don't know. I've never seen any." He is a young man of first-rate intelligence, painfully conscious of his provincialism, and the narrow range of his experience. Boston, he has always heard, was a city of culture, and he finds things very much as they should be in his cousin's home:

> . . . there was culture in Miss Chancellor's tables and sofas, and in the books that were everywhere, on little shelves like brackets (as if a book were a statuette), in the photographs and water colors that covered the walls, in the curtains that were festooned rather stiffly in the doorways.

There was comfort and security in this Boston, and in its presence Ransom was capable of feeling unhoused and underfed. Such feelings, however, were only momentary, for he was basically conscious "of a bigger stomach than all the culture of Charles Street could fill." In short, Basil Ransom is in every aspect the fitting foil for reforming tendencies of the "cultured" Olive Chancellor and her Bostonian circle.

His introduction to Miss Birdseye, at the meeting at her home which symbolized so much of Boston for Basil Ransom cannot be overlooked. For in this picture of the old abolitionist who sometimes felt that much of her occupation was gone since the Civil War, although heightened and treated ironically, taken as a whole, is certainly, I think, one of the most revealing and sympathetic characterizations in the novel.

> She [Miss Birdseye] always dressed in the same way: she wore a loose black jacket, with deep pockets, which were stuffed with papers, memoranda of a voluminous correspondence; and from beneath her jacket depended a short stuff dress. . . . She belonged to the Short-Skirts League as a matter of course, for she belonged to any and every league that had been founded for almost any purpose whatever. This did not prevent her being a confused, entangled, inconsequent, discursive old woman, whose charity began at home and ended nowhere, whose credulity kept pace with it, and who knew less about her fellow-creatures, if possible after fifty years of humanitarian zeal, than on the day that she had gone into the field to testify against the iniquity of most arrangements. Basil Ransom knew very little about such a life as hers, but she seemed to him a revelation of a class, and a multitude of socialistic figures, of names and figures that he had heard of grouped themselves behind her. She looked as if she had spent her life on platforms, in audiences, in conventions, in phalansteries, in seances; in her faded face there was a kind of ugly reflection of ugly lecture lamps; . . . She talked continually, in a voice of which the spring seemed broken, like that of an overworked bell-wire . . . she gave the young man a delicate, dirty, democratic little hand, looking at him kindly, as she could not help doing, but without the smallest discrimination as against others who might not have the good fortune (which involved, possibly, an injustice) to be present on such an occasion.

Basil Ransom, as a critic of certain aspects of New England life, is a character that has undergone a great deal of idealization: he unquestionably comes close to many of James's own views on social and political matters. He remains enough of a fiction, however, to warn us against the danger of accepting too literally the sentiments he expresses as those entirely of his author. His main purpose seems to be to throw a search-

light upon his age, and upon the New England reform movement—particularly the feminist movement—after the Civil War. This he does with telling effectiveness, and his final victory over Verena Tarrant, or one might more properly say over Olive Chancellor, is perhaps enough to describe the center of James's sympathies.

In the second book, which deals in great detail with Basil Ransom, we find him undergoing the painful experiences common to most young professionals. In his gloomy New York office, he does a great deal of thinking, reads omnivorously, studies De Tocqueville, and seriously considers moving his quarters permanently to the Astor Library. In his enforced leisure, he turns to writing articles on social and economic questions, forms of government, and the happiness of people, which are promptly returned to him. His doctrines, "on the nature of things," have no popularity. One editor has told him that they are three centuries behind the age. In Ransom's mind, "The disagreeable editor was right, about his being out of date; only he had got the time wrong. He had come too soon; he was not too old, but too new." "I suppose he was very conceited," James writes, "for he was much addicted to judging his age. He thought it talkative, querulous, hysterical, maudlin, full of false ideas, of unhealthy germs, of extravagant, dissipated habits for which a great reckoning was in store. He was an immense admirer of Thomas Carlyle, and was very suspicious of the encroachments of modern democracy."

When Verena Tarrant comes to New York to speak before a choice gathering in Mrs. Burrage's fashionable salon, Ransom has another opportunity to evaluate her charm and beauty, as well as her abilities as a public speaker, "her importance in the field of discussion, the cause of reform." "Her speech, in itself," says James, "had about the value of a pretty essay, committed to memory and delivered by a bright girl at an 'academy.' . . . And Basil Ransom made his reflections on the crazy character of the age in which such a performance as that was treated as an intellectual effort, a contribution to a question."

In an ensuing interview with Verena Tarrant, Ransom's opposition to Verena's activities and her movement reaches its fullest expression. Says Ransom (or James?):

> "I am so far from thinking, as you set forth the other night, that there is not enough woman in our life, that it has long been pressed home to me that there is a great deal too much. The whole generation is womanized; the

> masculine tone is passing out of the world; it is a feminine, a nervous, hysterical, chattering, canting age, an age of hollow phrases and false delicacy and exaggerated solicitudes and coddled sensibilities, which, if we don't soon look out, will usher in a reign of mediocrity; of the feeblest and flattest, the most pretentious that has ever been. The masculine character, the ability to dare and endure, to know and yet not fear reality, to look the world in the face and take it for what it is—a very queer and partly very base mixture—that is what I want to preserve or rather, as I may say recover; and I must say I don't in the least care what becomes of you ladies while I make the attempt."

The Bostonians did not add to James's prestige in America as a novelist; indeed, the book caused him no little anxiety, and seems to have been openly repudiated by many New Englanders as a kind of perjury against and gross distortion of, their way of life. James felt himself that the novel had never been given a chance in America, and from several references in his letters we gather that only the exigencies of space induced him to omit it from the New York edition of his works. In a letter to Edmund Gosse, late in his life, James wrote:

> Your good impression of the Bostonians greatly moves me—the thing was no success whatever on publication in the Century (where it came out) and the late R. W. Gilder, of that periodical, wrote me at the time they had never published anything that appeared so little to interest their readers. . . . All the same I *should* have liked to review it for the Edition—it would have come out a much truer and more curious thing (it was meant to be curious from the first); but there can be no question of that, or of the proportionate Preface to have been written with it, at present—or probably ever within my span of life.

This was in 1915. James did not live to write that preface. Such a preface, if it had come into existence, would unquestionably have shed a great deal of light on the purpose of the novel, and the critical material presented in it. There is, however, an important letter written in 1885 to William James, which discusses certain problems of composition, and contains certain material that James in all probability would have included in a preface to the novel. The letter was occasioned by the protest of Lowell and others, in which William joined, against his picture of Miss Birdseye as an unfair "portrait from life" of the well known Boston reformer, Miss Elizabeth Peabody. In denying this charge, James sheds light again on his method of composition as well as on the meaning of this portrait. James writes:

> Miss Birdseye was evolved entirely from my moral consciousness, like every other person I have ever drawn, and originated in my desire to make a figure who should embody in a sympathetic, pathetic, picturesque, and at the same time grotesque way, the humanitary and *ci-devant* transcendental tendencies which I thought it highly probable I should be accused of treating in a contemptuous manner in so far as they were otherwise represented in the tale. I wished to make this figure a woman because so it would be more touching, and an old, weary, battered, and simple minded woman because that deepened the same effect. I elaborated her in my mind's eye—and after I had got going reminded myself that my creation might be identified with Miss Peabody—that I freely admit. So I have in mind the sense of being careful, at the same time that I didn't see what I could do but go my way, according to my own fancy and make my image as living as I saw it. . . . If I have made my woman *live* it is my misfortune, and the thing is doubtless a rendering, a vivid rendering of my own idea. . . . in short I have the vanity to claim that Miss Birdseye is a creation. . . . But though subordinate, she is, I think, the best figure in the book; she is treated with respect throughout and every virtue of heroism and disinterestedness is attributed to her. . . .

James's remarks on Miss Birdseye are concretely supported, I think, by the novel as a whole. James, we can suppose, remembered the older New England humanitarianism, in the form of the abolition sentiment and utopian reform that prevailed in his youth and in which his father had such an abiding faith. Miss Birdseye, although treated for satirical effect, symbolizes nevertheless the "heroic age of New England reform." She is a pathetic figure who has lived beyond her usefulness, and has nothing now but her memories and the charity and adulation of a handful of admirers. What James clearly attacks is the decline of this old humanitarianism, its degeneration into a conglomerate of women's rights, spiritualism, inspirationism, and the mind cure. The eccentricities and the palpable selfishness of many of the new reformers, as represented by Selah Tarrant and his wife, by Mrs. Farrinder, and Olive Chancellor, are vehemently contrasted with the large disinterestedness of the matriarchal Miss Birdseye. The ironical way in which Miss Birdseye, without ever understanding him, gives her confidences and warm approbation to Basil Ransom is not the least significant subtlety in the novel. And in her final scene, Miss Birdseye, to Olive's consternation and Verena's dismay, recognizes the love between Basil and Verena, and encourages their union. At the same time, as I have tried to show, and the illustrations could be multiplied, James is entirely critical of the rigidity of conscience,

self-righteousness, complacency, in short, of the provincialism of many aspects of New England life as he knew it.

Many of Basil Ransom's quarrels with the New England reformers and with his age—I need only instance his insistence upon Carlyle, and upon the "newness" rather than the "oldness" of many of his ideas—have themselves to be taken critically. Many of his views are anti-democratic, and as James clearly states "reactionary" in their implications. But we cannot hesitate to recognize how many valid criticisms of America James raised through this spokesman, and how frequently James emerges as an important and astoundingly shrewd social critic.

III

James's attitude on social reform gathers its fullest expression, however, in *The Princess Casamassima*, a novel which presents, as I have suggested, many aspects of James's criticism of English society. In *Roderick Hudson*, the dazzling Christina Light is married by her parents to Prince Casamassima, member of an illustrious though decadent Italian family. Beautiful and enigmatic still, she appears nearly ten years later in the novel named for her as "the most remarkable woman in Europe." Sated with the banality of the great world of European society, and sick unto death with all that has produced her, she is plagued with the thought "that in the darkest hour of her life, she sold herself for a title and a fortune." This she has come to regard as such a horrible "piece of frivolity," that she can never in the rest of her life "be serious enough to make up for it." Separated from her husband, she comes to England accompanied by the sage and ancient duenna, Madame Grandoni, to plunge herself into the cause of "the lower orders and the rising democracy."

The Princess is a complex and highly intricate character, delineated with all the keenness and intellectual refinement that typifies James at his best. Madame Grandoni, who comprehends her more completely than anyone else in the novel, with the possible exception of Paul Muniment, calls her a *capricciosa*. Her passions are largely caprices, and her caprices have the force of great passion. Her interest in the "laboring classes" is motivated by ennui, if by anything at all, but she is also moved by a vague conception of the real state of modern Europe. In her new passion for the "awakening revolution," she symbolizes again the destructive force that she represented as Christina Light, in *Roderick Hudson*. The

person she helps to destroy, as the Princess Casamassima, is Hyacinth Robinson, a young Soho bookbinder, who having cast his lot with a group of revolutionary nihilists, pledges himself to the destruction of the old order, by an oath to commit an act of violence which may cost him his life.

The history of Hyacinth Robinson, James tells us in the preface to the novel, "sprang up for me out of the London pavements."

> The simplest account of the origin of "The Princess Casamassima," is, I think, that this fiction proceeded quite directly, during the first year of a long residence in London, from the habit and interest of walking the streets. . . .

The crucial passage of the preface for our immediate purposes, however, is to be found in the following formulation:

> There was a moment at any rate when they [the streets of London] offered me no image more vivid than that of some individual sensitive nature or fine mind, some small intelligent creature, whose education should have been almost wholly derived from them, capable of profiting by all the civilization, all the accumulations to which they testify, yet condemned to see those things only from the outside—in mere quickened consideration, mere wistfulness and envy and despair. . . . To find his possible adventure interesting I had only to conceive his watching the same public show, the same innumerable appearances, I had watched myself, and of his watching very much as I had watched; save indeed for one little difference. This difference would be that so far as all the swarming facts should speak of freedom and ease, knowledge and power, money, opportunity and satiety, he should be able to revolve round them but at the most respectful of distances and with every door of approach shut in his face. . . .

The result of this theme is a work of amazing vitality, curious in its scope and direction, and in many respects quite unlike anything that James was ever to do again. A motley collection of persons are brought together in the book, united mainly by their relation to the vaguely depicted revolutionary movement. The diversity of London life is presented in rich but impressionistic detail. There are the London theatre, and the music halls, Crokenden's bookbinding establishment, the East London slums, Lady Aurora's home in Belgrave Square, and the Princess' "wonderful" salon; there is the murky "Sun and Moon" with the intrigues and the interminable arguments of Paul Muniment, Eustache Poupin, the German revolutionary Schinkel, and their radical circle. Besides these figures, one meets many other persons hardly to be expected

in James's world: Amanda Pynsent, the futile, Dickensian little dressmaker who has brought Hyacinth up in her miserable shop in Lomax Place; Millicent Henning, the vibrantly vulgar "muse of cockneyism"; Mr. Vetch; Mrs. Bowerbank and her sister, the fantastic Rose Muniment. There are descriptions of poverty and strikes, of hunger and unemployment; and the people are described as "a sleeping lion, already breathing short, and beginning to stretch its limbs."

All this, however, as one soon discovers, is merely the background for the central drama of Hyacinth Robinson and the Princess Casamassima. As the pattern of the novel emerges, the book appears more and more as an elaborate experiment in autobiography, in which as the preface singularly attests, James has projected himself increasingly into the personality of Hyacinth Robinson, and has imaginatively undergone the experiences ascribed to his hero. The Princess exists in all her dazzling complexity primarily to open the doors of the great world, albeit temporarily, to Hyacinth Robinson, to excite his sensibility, to stimulate his wonder, and thus to numb his appetite for the revolutionary tasks in which he is involved. Hyacinth Robinson exists primarily, with great value for us, to express James's reaction to the great contrasts and misery in the world, and to expound his views on social reform.

Hyacinth Robinson, in the Princess' salon in London, or at Medley, her country home, is not unlike Eugene Rastignac, in the salon of the Viscountess de Beauseant on the Faubourg Saint-Germain, or that of the Baroness de Nucingen. In his original impulse to kill, to destroy, in order to achieve status and to break through a society that is personally stultifying, he is not unlike Dostoevsky's Rodion Raskolnikov, or Richard Wright's Bigger Thomas; but Hyacinth Robinson never attains the universality or the typicality of these characters. Cast so sharply in the author's intellectual image, regardless of all other differences, he remains entirely individual.

In his first interview with the Princess, in her box at the theater, Hyacinth says:

> . . . I am one of many thousands of young men of my class . . . in whose brains certain ideas are fermenting. There is nothing original about me at all. I am very young and very ignorant; it's only a few months since I began to talk about the possibility of a social revolution with men who have considered the whole ground much more than I have done. I'm a mere particle in the

immensity of the people. All I pretend to is my good faith, and a great desire that justice shall be done.

This is all very well, but it is only a matter of months, when the really exceptional nature of Hyacinth Robinson is made clear. He does not, like Eugene Rastignac, pledge eternal war against the inequities of his society, but from the first moment of his introduction to the great world of the Princess, he is plagued with doubts, and in his third and most extensive interview with her, this time at Medley, we have the following scene:

> . . . "I have watched you constantly since you have been here, [the Princess remarks] in every detail of your behaviour, and I am more and more *intriguée*. You haven't a vulgar intonation, you haven't a common gesture, you never make a mistake, you do say everything exactly in the right way. You come out of the hole you describe to me, and yet you might have stayed in country houses all your life. You are much better than if you had! . . ."
>
> "Do you mean I'm a gentleman?" asked Hyacinth, in a peculiar tone, looking out into the wet garden.
>
> She hesitated, and then she said, "It's I who make the mistakes!" Five minutes later she broke into an exclamation which touched him almost more than anything she had ever done, giving him the highest opinion of her delicacy and sympathy, and putting himself as vividly before himself as if the words were a little portrait. *"Fancy the strange, the bitter fate: to be constituted as you are constituted, to feel the capacity that you must feel, and yet to look at the good things of life only through the glass of the pastry-cook's window!"* (My emphasis.—C. O.)

Conceived in such terms, Hyacinth Robinson's career is inevitable. Travelling in Italy sometime later, with money from a legacy miraculously provided by Mr. Vetch's shrewd handling of Amanda Pynsent's meager savings, he writes the Princess of the deep demoralization that has been growing upon him. Venice is an "enchanted city," "a revelation of the exquisite," full of "ineffable impressions." It is not that he has lost sight of the human misery and suffering, of which he was once so keenly aware, for that perhaps, he writes, "is the clearest result of extending one's horizon—the sense, increasing as we go, that want and toil and suffering are the constant lot of the immense majority of the human race." But what has impressed him, almost to the exclusion of these things, are "the great achievements of which man has been capable of in spite of them—the splendid accumulations of the happier few, to which doubtless, the miserable many have also in their degree contributed." There has been

a strong reversal in attitude; the things he now feels "capable of fighting for," rather than the *rising democracy,* are:

> the monuments and treasures of art, the great palaces and properties, the conquests of learning and taste, the general fabric of civilization as we know it, based, if you will on all the despotisms, the cruelties, the exclusions, the monopolies and rapacities of the past, but thanks to which, all the same, the world is less impracticable and life more tolerable.

Quite apart from what I have called the autobiographical aspects of *The Princess Casamassima,* and its weaknesses on that side, it is interesting to note the influence of Emile Zola upon the novel, to discover how James attempts to rationalize the development of Hyacinth Robinson along the broad lines of biological determinism, fundamental to the naturalistic novel. James, of course, was not the careful student of society that the French novelist was, and strictly speaking, aside from the most superficial resemblances, no two novels could be more unlike than *The Princess Casamassima* and *Germinal,* which appeared in the same year. But it will be remembered that Hyacinth Robinson is presented as the illegitimate son of an aristocratic father, a certain Lord Frederick, and a plebeian mother, the French woman whom as a child he visits on her prison deathbed. This early history, which is so skillfully and painstakingly built up by James, was not accidental or merely melodramatic. This we discover when we find him writing in the most patently naturalistic terms:

> What was most in Hyacinth's mind was the idea, of which every pulsation of the general life of his time was a syllable, that the flood of democracy was rising over the world; that it would sweep all the traditions of the past before it; that whatever it might fail to bring, it would at least carry in its bosom a magnificent energy; and that it might be trusted to look after its own. . . . With his mixed, divided nature, his conflicting sympathies, his eternal habit of swinging from one view to another, Hyacinth regarded this prospect, in different moods, with different kinds of emotion. . . .
>
> The reader will doubtless smile at his mental debates and oscillations, and not understand why a little bastard bookbinder should attach importance to his conclusions. They were not important for either cause, but they were important for himself, if only because they would rescue him from the torment of his present life, the perpetual laceration of the rebound. There was no peace for him between the two currents that flowed in his nature, the blood of his passionate, plebeian mother, and that of his long descended, super-civilized sire.

Bringing the autobiographical and the naturalistic elements of the novel together, the history of Hyacinth Robinson moves to its appointed end. Unable to resolve the contradictions of his society, and the reflections of these contradictions as caught up in his own being, his only course is self-destruction. He is found in the end, not with truth in his heart, but with the bullet intended for some unidentified duke.

Stephen Spender has said that the theme of *The Princess Casamassima* is the death of a society. Although I do not completely agree with his interpretation of the novel, this observation, I think, is supported by the novel as a whole. *The Princess Casamassima* is not an historically accurate picture of social conflicts in the English society it depicts. Indeed, James defended its vagueness on this score when he wrote in the preface:

> My scheme called for the suggested nearness (to all our apparently ordered life) of some sinister, anarchic underworld, heaving in its pain, its power and its hate; a presentation, not of sharp particulars, but of loose appearances, vague motions and sounds and symptoms, just perceptible presences and general looming possibilities.

Still the novel does suggest the general economic unrest that characterized English society from the great depression of 1873, roughly to the rise of Cecil Rhodes' imperialism in the '90's. The vagueness of his revolutionary movement, which has been frequently commented on, similarly suggests the lack of any widespread revolutionary activity in England, in contrast to France and many European countries, and equally the lethargic state of English labor under the old craft unions, which was to move to the moderate militancy of the "New Unionism" only as a result of the great dockyard strikes of 1889. Moreover, Hyacinth Robinson, to say nothing of the Princess Casamassima, as the central figure of the book, is entirely atypical, as I have tried to show, as an historically believable revolutionary figure.

This brings us to a consideration of the problem of correctness to history in the aesthetic criticism of society. And here one has only to turn to Tolstoy to see how a writer, who is almost always wrong in his historical tendency, can at the same time present really profound insights into the direction of history. One cannot, of course, compare Hyacinth Robinson and a character like Constantin Levin too literally, but neither of these characters really satisfies the stringent demands of the social historian; they simply do not satisfy the facts of history. Yet in each of

these figures, taken in his own terms, self-consciousness is such a force in his reactions to his society that the broad realities of social phenomena do emerge.

It is the highly significant theme of *The Princess Casamassima* which raises it above the level of mediocrity, and which despite its lack of universality, and its outmoded determinism, presents Hyacinth Robinson as a significant reflection of the complexities of his society. This is accomplished through his remarkable and complete self-consciousness, and his thorough awareness of the antagonisms of this society. He knows the inequities of his society, he is aware of the "energetic flood of democracy that is rising over the world," but still he is drawn to the grandeur and tradition of the old order, decadent though it is, and founded on the misery of the great majority of the people. The important thing, however, is that Hyacinth Robinson is a *tragic figure;* there is no victory for him in his alliance with the old; and in his death, the old receives its condemnation. For Hyacinth Robinson's suicide signalizes not only the personal tragedy of his hero, but also, and in a very acute way, the complete futility of James's world picture. James in his conflicting inclinations toward the rising democracy, as he perceived it exemplified in America, and toward an aristocratic tradition, as exemplified in the saturated cultures of Europe, experienced throughout his own life what he called the "perpetual laceration of the rebound." Treating this problem imaginatively here, he could resolve it only in the death of his hero. This accomplished, his work as a social novelist, in the broader sense, was almost completed.

IV

Turgenev's alienation from nineteenth-century Russia always fascinated Henry James. They met in Paris and James had long considered him "the first novelist of the day." In his excellent study of Turgenev, James urged his Russian-ness, despite his separation from his homeland, as intensely as he would have urged his own American-ness, and there were parallels in their spiritual searchings that James could not avoid. Russia and America were similarly countries "in formation"; and when he spoke of Turgenev's having a "poet's quarrel" with his country, James was undoubtedly thinking in the most personal terms.

James's arguments against America were centered in an attack upon the rise of an aggressive middle class to social and political ascendency.

In Europe, he found, in the ruling circles, a quality of mind and body that spelled civilization for him and for which he could find no more convenient name than breeding. James did see—as I have shown—that all this was largely the result of a privileged existence through many centuries. What he did not see consistently is that this ineffable "civilization" is not to be confused with education, knowledge, intellectual development, which in an enlightened society may be acquired by a large majority of persons. Breeding for James, like beauty, becomes an inherent quality—one either has it or one does not—it manifests itself unconsciously in the manner of conversation, in poise, in all sorts of imperceptible nuances. The vigor of American democracy James recognized. But American democracy was largely synonymous with the crude pressure of profit that makes for a civilization that produces people as it does commodities according to a certain standard, and that tends to negate the artistic side of human personality and has no use for the art of living.

Having rejected *revolution* and *reform*—two major tendencies of his age—as means toward the solution of man's social and cultural dilemma, James came to a creative impasse. It is important to note that *The Bostonians* and *The Princess Casamassima* were the last of James's novels to be written in the great nineteenth-century realistic tradition. James came to doubt that he would ever write a long novel again and turned to the theater driven by financial necessity and, as he put it, in quest of popular recognition. There seems, however, to be more to the matter than this; and here we get a remarkable example of the relation of substance to structure in the novel. James's problem, perhaps not consciously recognized, seems to have been that, having exhausted the major themes of the nineteenth-century novel, he had also exhausted its forms. Turning from external means of social amelioration, he deepened the view always present in him that the moral renovation of the private individual through the civilizing agency of art must lie at the center of any hope for a better world. To enunciate this conviction, he was forced to a new technique, new forms had to be created, and in these forms James gave us the first of the twentieth-century novels. But there is no clear break, no absolute departure from his old preoccupations and awareness. The approach to society, to be sure, is more rarefied, more oblique; symbolism plays a larger part in the development of the whole, but a deep *social sensibility* remains which does not permit a distortion of reality. No less than Balzac

and Zola he saw the crucial role of money and property as central motivating forces in the modern world—*The Spoils of Poynton, The Wings of the Dove, The Ambassadors, The Golden Bowl.* Rapacity, greed, unbridled individualism are pivotal themes in the later novels, sources of evil and of human misery, all of which spring deep from a social fabric that James unremittingly denies.

Insisting upon art as a primary moralizing force, and suggesting its primacy in individual and social reform, James's world view can itself be criticized on grounds of incompleteness and one-sidedness in its approach to the complex phenomenon of human development. To say, however, that James is a writer who was largely oblivious to social problems, a writer, therefore, who does not enhance our understanding of the modern world seems to be totally unjustified. We may quarrel seriously with James's ultimate philosophy, but that precisely is one of the ways in which art brings us to a fuller understanding of the world, and does not deny a profoundly significant tendency in James's work. And to say, as has often been said, that James is a leisure-class writer, who left America to accept fully the English way of life, is to ignore the tensions in his experience and his art, and as Newton Arvin puts it, is a position to be taken only by those who in their reading of James have "skipped" with a vengeance.

THE MAGIC PORRIDGE MILL

By T. SWANN HARDING

NEARLY eighty-five years ago the first United States Commissioner of Agriculture, Isaac Newton, extolled science ecstatically, declaring with Sir Humphry Davy, "Nothing is impossible to labor aided by science." Openly advocating the doctrine of "making two blades of grass grow where one had grown before," he made obvious intimations that scientific investigation would accomplish this miracle. It did.

Sixty-five or seventy years after Newton went under the sod we had developed in the United States a vast, complex federal-state network of scientific institutions. This included the scientific agencies of the Department of Agriculture and its far-flung field stations, the state agricultural experiment stations and substations, four huge federal laboratories devoted to finding new industrial uses for farm crops, and nine smaller laboratories, co-operating with the states in seeking to render plant and animal breeding more efficient.

A suggestive and, above all, highly readable report, issued in August, 1940, by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, entitled, "Technology on the Farm," began with the tale of the boy who had a magic porridge mill he couldn't stop. It choked the whole village with gruel. Producing in fabulous abundance, it soon created more problems than it solved. The report then went on to discuss the very serious problems that had arisen as a result of advancing farm technology and suggested certain tentative solutions.

The opening paragraphs of this study aptly defined technology as: "Science, art, and invention. It is tractors, combines, corn pickers. It is the testing and breeding of animals and the conquest of diseases. It is hybrid corn, new kinds of wheat, soybeans, kudzu, and lespedeza. It is ways to feed cows, plants, men. It is road building and rural electrification. It is contour plowing, conservation of soil, management of forests, protection of wildlife.

"It is marketing and distribution. It is a race between insect pests and ways to kill them. Technology is in the workshop, in the laboratory,

barn, grove, field, and home. It is a social and economic force that challenges thought and ability to plan, because its many-sided nature combines the intricate influences of getting and spending, savings and debts, employed leisure and unemployed relief."

The report predicted trouble unless we sought to solve by scientific means the serious social and economic problems created by agricultural technology. It predicted that research and applied science would make further advances and still further complicate the problems. It envisaged the possibility of a European war but, even if that occurred, it offered no permanent solution to the problems arising because of abundance beyond the most seductive dreams of earlier days.

Today the agricultural revolution which even Newton foresaw is an accomplished fact. It came into its own during World War II. During these few years we felt the full impact of accumulated stores of knowledge as applied to farm production. Nothing had been forgotten. There were workers in the field of extension and information to spread this knowledge abroad, and the government made it profitable for farmers to adopt scientifically approved agricultural practices. Since 1933 this knowledge had been accumulating at an ever faster rate, but drought and depression prevented its full adoption. The war suddenly put it all to work.

During World War II the agricultural industry of this country produced vastly more for human use than it ever had before, though the farm population meanwhile had dropped from 30 to only 25 millions. Farm output for human use stood 27 per cent higher in 1942-44 than in 1935-39. If due allowance is made for the excellent weather that fostered farm production during this period, and we assume merely normal weather, the figure still stands 20 per cent above 1935-39.

Stated another way, we produced sufficient to feed 50 million more people than could have been fed with our 1935-39 production. Meanwhile agricultural economists and nutrition scientists showed that we could use the new knowledge of farm technology to produce enough food to give an adequate diet to twice as many people as there now are in the continental United States. This would involve a change in pattern of both farm-food production and diet, but would result in fully adequate nutrition for everyone.

In other words the production revolution down on the farm is an accomplished fact. Furthermore, this is an irreversible change. There is

no road back. Instead, still further increased production is predictable with certainty. People simply do not return to less efficient methods once they have used the more efficient. We can with the greatest ease produce more than enough to feed all our own people adequately, plus all we are likely to export. The specter of overproduction for effective consumer demand has come to stay.

How was this done? If there ever was a vindication of scientific research, this is it. For research in the natural and the social sciences has completely transformed agriculture, bringing a return to the industry of from 500 to 10,000 per cent on the original investment in salaries of and equipment for scientists, and in the laboratories or fields where they perform their investigations.

This huge World War II production was achieved without any undue plow-up of unsuitable soil, without accelerated erosion of cultivated acres, with no sensational increase in crop acreage, and while equipment, supplies, and labor were all abnormally scarce. The accumulated knowledge developed by research and spread abroad by federal and state information, extension, soil conservation, farm security, rural electrification, and other workers wrought this revolution.

There are those, of course, who point out that the increase in farm production was nothing compared to that in industrial production. This point of view has, for instance, been labored in leading financial journals which should know better. But those who insist upon citing the far greater increases in industrial production during the war must remember that manufacturing plant capacity was greatly enlarged, while the number of industrial workers expanded by one-fifth over prewar times. Agriculture did not appreciably increase plant capacity (acreage), while its workers declined both in numbers and in efficiency.

Such a tremendous increase in output constitutes an unprecedented and an absolute break with the past. But potential production capacity had been built up tremendously in the armistice between the two phases of the great global war. Fortunately progress in mechanization, an increased use of lime and fertilizer, of cover crops and other conservation practices, and of improved varieties of plants and livestock, better balanced livestock feeding, and improved control over insects and diseases all gained momentum during the armistice.

Their importance and current effects were obscured by the drought and depression of the '30's. But once the social sciences were called upon to put this knowledge to work by offering proper monetary incentive, the production of specifically needed crops increased by leaps and bounds, and a revolution in farm production took place right while we undertook the greatest military task in our history. Today our fear is no longer that we may produce insufficient for our needs, but that the porridge mill cannot be stopped and will choke the nation's economy.

Despite monetary and patriotic incentives nothing like this was accomplished in World War I. Need for food was just as urgent, but the volume of output for human use increased less than 10 per cent between 1910-14 and 1918-19. Yet there was twice as great an increase in harvested cropland during that period as occurred between 1935-39 and 1942-44. But mechanical power was still of minor importance then. In 1919, tractor power contributed only 2 per cent of the combined work-animal and tractor-power units on farms.

Today mechanical power is the factor of most importance in causing increased farm production, and horses and mules are definitely on the way out, turning over to the production of other crops more than 50 million acres formerly used to raise feed for and pasture them. The number of tractors on farms rose from twenty thousand in 1920 to over 2 million in 1945 and 2.6 million is the figure predicted for 1950. The shift to mechanical power made available for the production of other commodities an area equal to 15 per cent of our available cropland. Meanwhile the horse and mule population shrinks continually.

The shift to mechanical power and associated equipment of many kinds brings a large increased output per worker. For workers do the job faster and better with mechanical equipment. Power equipment covers more acres per hour and often makes possible the planting of a crop during a brief rainless period which would otherwise go unplanted if this had to be done slowly and by hand. Machines make production more certain. They can work a 24-hour schedule when need arises, doing a preparing and planting job seven times as fast as animal power.

Revolution in tractor design since 1920 has done much to increase the number of tractors on farms. The general-purpose tractor has been a boon to farmers. The introduction of rubber tires for tractors and other machines, and the design of special equipment for use with tractors has still

further enhanced production efficiency. At the same time the use of grain combines, corn pickers, milking machines, and other such equipment has rapidly increased.

Again, the rural use of central-station electric power has expanded rapidly. Whereas only 26 per cent of farms had central-station electric power in 1940, and but 9 per cent in 1930, over 45 per cent were so served in 1945. Moreover farm electrification will increase rapidly during the next five or ten years. The use of electricity on the farm not only renders farm living more pleasant and eliminates much household drudgery, but performs many farm chores, and contributes to the increased production of poultry, eggs, milk, hogs and other products.

No wonder so much could be produced with 10 per cent fewer workers on farms than in 1935-39, and these of inferior skill and effectiveness, for they did not rate more than 85 per cent of prewar in such qualities. But production per acre, per worker, and per animal unit on farms increased apace.

Then many changes in the use of cropland and permanent pasture took place during the interwar armistice. This involved the application of scientifically devised measures under the spur of special payments. The effect was cumulative; fertility was stored in the soil and the soil itself was protected. Cropping programs designed to maintain soil resources were introduced on many thousands of acres, and acreages of summer fallow greatly increased.

Co-operating farmers were paid for their conformity to the requirements of this program, but it was money well spent. The harvest came in greater wartime production. Co-operating farmers also carried out a wide variety of soil-building practices—contour tillage, strip cropping, terracing, the wise use of green manure and cover crops. More than half our farms are now included within the bounds of soil conservation districts. Long-time conservation plans are in operation on two hundred thousand of these farms covering more than 54 million acres.

Meanwhile the use of lime and commercial fertilizer rapidly increased. During the war many farmers learned for the first time how to use commercial fertilizers to increase crop production. As measured in plant nutrients, the total consumption of commercial fertilizer in 1944 was 85 per cent above the quantity used in 1935-39.

The adoption of improved crop varieties and the growing of new crops was another important wartime source of increased output. The use of hybrid seed increased the 1944 crop by 400 million bushels, which it would otherwise have required 16 million more acres to grow. In general, such corn yields 20 per cent more than open-pollinated varieties and makes 3-billion-bushel corn crops permanently possible. Whereas the corn acreage harvested in 1944 was only 5 per cent greater than for 1935-39, the yields per acre were 32 per cent greater.

Many crops that had been of minor importance or which were scarcely grown here at all, sprang into prominence and huge output during the war—soybeans, peanuts, flaxseed, dry beans, dry peas, hemp. This we owe to skilled use of scientific means of educating farmers about the newer crops and providing them with financial incentive and patriotic resolve to grow them. The annual production of sorghums for grain increased 235, the soybean-for-bean acreage 241, and the peanut crop 100 per cent.

New varieties of oats began to give increases in yield as remarkable as those previously chalked up for hybrid corn. Wheat production was one-fourth higher in 1942-44 than in 1935-39, with a planted acreage only four-fifths as large. The 1945 yield of 150.6 bushels of potatoes harvested per acre was the highest on record, attributable to higher-yielding varieties, heavier fertilization, more effective disease and insect control. The acreage of vegetables for processing was maintained consistently at about 40 per cent above the 1935-39 average.

The potato glut afflicting the country as these lines are written, offers an excellent example of what the farm technological revolution can accomplish. Potatoes are a nonbasic commodity protected under the Steagall Amendment, until December 31, 1948, at 90 per cent of the parity, or a comparable price. A minimum support price was announced for 1946 and the acreage was the smallest since 1892, and one-fifth smaller than in 1928.

But production shifted to high-yielding areas which had good weather and where growers made use of more fertilizer and improved cultural practices. Per-acre yields jumped to 184 bushels, the previous high having been 155, the 1934-43 average only 124. Result: A 475-million-bushel potato crop on which the government lost $80 millions protecting prices and of which despite desperate efforts to use all, 20 million bushels had to be dumped.

Decrease in horse and mule numbers increased the acreage available to grow feed for an equivalent number of productive livestock. The saving in grain alone amounted to enough to feed 26 million hogs in 1944! Production per unit of livestock increased markedly, meaning more meat, milk, and eggs per steer, hog, cow, or chicken. There was a larger calf crop, a reduction in death loss, more effective prevention of disease.

Research had also taught us how to increase livestock produced per unit of feed consumed. Animals and poultry are being deliberately bred now, by a marked speed-up of nature's slow processes, which will give more meat, milk, and eggs per pound of feed consumed. There was a reduction of 10 to 15 per cent in the quantity of feed used to make a pound of pork between the '20's and the '30's, and great progress has been made since then. Meanwhile pigs are saved, breeds improved, diseases prevented, and balanced rations are quite generally used.

Dairy cattle yearly produce more milk per animal and per pound of feed consumed. Artificial insemination makes possible rapid development of higher milk-producing strains. On many farms the herd bull disappears, permitting his feed to go to productive cows. Progress in animal disease control continues unabated. Improvements in hog breeding are already under way which will increase efficiency in the use of feed and consistently produce a higher quality carcass.

Fortunately there were no major outbreaks of either plant or animal disease, or of insect damage, during the war years. But that was not mere good luck. It indicates amazing improvement in the effectiveness of modern scientific control methods, and of the intelligence and vigilance of farmers and technicians in dealing with sporadic outbreaks. Insect damage was held to low levels, despite shortages of important insecticides while agricultural research, undertaken for other purposes during war, developed DDT—not to mention penicillin, weed-killing chemicals, and numerous new industrial uses for farm crops.

No sounder, more resounding, and overwhelming vindication of research in the natural sciences could possibly be adduced than the great war production of the American agricultural industry. Much derided and often underpaid, quiet, patient, unavaricious and unassuming men of the very highest integrity, the scientists, thus well served the public weal, and provided for it a pool of invaluable information which enabled us to tide

over the wartime emergency well-fed. But let not the social sciences be forgotten.

For it proved possible for groups of economists and other social scientists to gather together, to establish feasible goals or production objectives for farmers all over the country, and to handle price incentives and other factors with such skill that we unerringly got the crops we wanted when we wanted them. We were much inclined to spoof the long-haired social scientists of other days who were said to be paying farmers not to produce.

But let us not forget that the experimentation of the '30's produced knowledge and methods which enabled us to plan the agricultural industry with great wisdom during the most recent outbreak of what is quite likely a 50- or 100-year war. Fertility was stored in the soil, the processes of erosion were stayed, new crops were introduced, and abundant harvests were brought in when and as needed. This is also a tribute to economists, sociologists, specialists in information, and the educational zeal of extension and farm security workers in each state of the Union.

As was indicated earlier, this reservoir of knowledge and methodology which had not been released during the '30's, due to droughts and depression, flooded the country with food in wartime. Stupendous shifts were made in production. We began to produce huge quantities of meat, eggs, milk, and oil crops—commodities we had not been in the habit of raising for export. Production goals were formulated and announced, support prices and production payments were geared to specific needs as emergencies arose, and the job was done.

Prospective needs were carefully examined in relation to facilities and resources available for production. Each product was then considered in relation to all other farm commodities required for a balanced production program. Production capacity for individual products was investigated. Prices and payments were balanced in relation to the desired production of each product. These and patriotism supplied the driving force needed to encourage many farmers to fly in the face of tradition in changing production patterns and raising crops altogether novel for them.

As a result, farm income doubled also; it rose faster than did prices paid by farmers. The ethereal parity concept was achieved and surpassed. Greatly increased production per farm meant relatively lower expenses per unit produced. For a higher output per farm and per worker means

lower costs per unit, and higher net incomes per farm and per worker, even if there is no rise in farm prices. So much for the war. What shall we do with the porridge mill now? Where will it go next?

We may look forward to 2.6 million tractors, and much related equipment, on farms by 1950. The number may attain 3 million. Machines and power will be still further adapted to specific farm uses. Mechanical cotton pickers will come in; they, with flame cultivators, will reduce labor on this crop by 800,000 man-years. The use of lime, fertilizer, soil erosion practices, better plant varieties, improved strains of livestock, more efficient methods to control pests and diseases, better feeding, cultivation, irrigation, draining, and clearing methods will all progress.

These changes will tend to push the output of farm products for human use ever higher. Some marginal land will be abandoned, but the better land will be cultivated much more intensively. And there is no road back. Total volume of farm output can only be reduced by shifting capital, land, or labor resources out of agriculture. Is that likely? Farm work days could be shortened. Workers could be shifted from farming to other occupations. But no forces now operating look sufficiently strong to offset the effect of factors pushing agriculture in the direction of high-level production.

What shall we do about that? In simple language it means that the wolf of overproduction of farm commodities for effective consumer demand has come right into the house to have pups and live. A condition supposedly sporadic has become chronic. Can we again adjust production to market demands? Not with this fabulous porridge machine we have developed now, and farmers are very unlikely to go back to hand and horse power, lack of electricity, low-yielding strains of plants and animals, ravages of uncontrolled plant and animal pests and insects that cut crop yields, soil erosion rampant.

The old slogan will have to be reversed. We shall have to tailor the market to farm production. That means first of all providing the entire population of the United States, regardless of economic status, with all the food it requires to eat an adequate diet. That means finding out what people would eat if they were prosperous and providing them nutritional adequacy in those terms. Give them all a high-level prosperity diet. Then utilize as large a volume of the farm output industrially as research makes possible. Finally, utilize membership in the Food and Agriculture Organ-

ization and other devices to permit a large volume of agricultural exports.

If production is reduced, average costs per unit of product will increase, and the farmer will not like that. He will be working harder for less return. True, some improvements like hybrid corn need not necessarily increase output, because acreages planted can be reduced. But in general that is the picture.

The stark fact is that in 1944 we used 3 billion fewer man-hours to achieve our farm production as we should have used under 1939 production conditions. That means a saving of 1½ million years of work. It breaks down into lower labor requirements per unit of product resulting from increased yields per acre; greater mechanization; some shifting out of high-labor crops like cotton (which may soon go low-labor); improved livestock which produces better; and the spreading of overhead and miscellaneous labor over a larger volume of production.

But changes that would enable agriculture to take full advantage of its potentialities after development of the new technology, would probably be so sweeping that a hag-ridden tradition-bound people such as we have become will perhaps not permit it to be realized. In any case farmers can seek to retain some of the benefits of agricultural improvements for themselves. They can slacken the pace of farm work, increase the leisure time of their entire family, invest increased earnings in education, health, and home conveniences, and refrain from overcapitalizing their enterprise.

In any case remember that the magic porridge mill is running full blast.[1] It can no more be stopped than the sorcerer's apprentice could stop the water flow from the magic pump. There is no road back from new heights achieved by scientific progress, and the break of agricultural technology with its own immediate past has been absolute, irrevocable, and final during the war years.

[1]Readers who would like to trace this farm technological revolution out in more detail are referred to the following publications of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, not all of which are still available for distribution, but all of which can be found in good libraries: *Technology on the Farm, A Special Report* by an interbureau committee of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, printed, August 1940; *Using Resources to Meet Food Needs,* by Raymond P. Christensen, mimeographed, May 1943; *Farm Production in War and Peace,* Glen T. Barton and Martin R. Cooper, mimeographed, December 1945; *Changes in Farming in War and Peace,* Sherman E. Johnson, processed, June 1946.

FREEDOM TAKES TIME

By PAUL BIXLER

THREE YEARS HAVE PASSED since the day I visited A——, a young Negro writer of more than promise, in his home. Although we were meeting for the first time, we had corresponded previously and I already knew something of his work. To my pleasure, we hit it off very well together, and I stayed past my intended time.

It was a winter's day. As I prepared to leave, without conscious thought I held out my overcoat that he might help me on with it. He hesitated a fraction of a moment, then with an almost comic gesture of deprecation, accepted it and held it up for me. I knew instantly, though I am not overly quick at such insight, that he saw himself thrust back into an ancient, hateful role. Holding my coat was a symbol of bondage —of the Negro slave or manservant ministering, as he had for generations—to his white master.

The curious air of self-conscious detachment with which he handled the situation robbed it of possible embarrassment. Yet I have often thought of the incident since—perhaps more often than he intended. It not only seemed a symbol of his bondage, but for me at least, it fixed clearly some of the inhibitions and frustrations which only too frequently beset the writer in a minority group.

He had told me something of his work and his aspirations. Once when I mentioned a midwestern city, he said, "I know that town. My mother died there. When she was dying I went there to be with her." And he described the bizarre way in which he was forced to support himself and his mother during that period. "There's a short story in that material," he went on. "I've tried to write it several times. But it never comes to anything. Somehow I can't disentangle it."

Most white writers, I am sure, have known this kind of frustration at some time or other. But I doubt that any of them have met it so frequently or on occasion been swallowed up in it so completely as those who have intimately known discrimination. This young writer was as "emancipated" as it is possible for an American Negro to become today.

He lived in Harlem—which probably gave him as much freedom from the grosser intimidations as he could find in the United States. He had steeped himself in general literary and social history as well as in Negro history. He was self-conscious in the best sense of the word. He had, I believe, been psychoanalyzed.

Much of his writing was brilliant, but at times it showed strains of unintelligibility and incompleteness. I remember in particular one manuscript which subtly examined the "friendly" attitude of a certain school of sociologists toward the Negro. It divided into seven or eight parts, and in each part the key idea, though given a fairly adequate introduction and build-up, never became explicit. This gave the article an elliptical air thoroughly baffling to the ordinary understanding. I urged him to reorganize and expand it, putting into words what he had hardly even implied. Apparently he found himself unable to do so, for I never saw the manuscript again (though he sent me others) and it has never to my knowledge been published.

Until now it has not been possible to weigh the meaning of such intimidations. Until recently no substantial part of the white reading public has been interested in the work of Negro writers. It was an event in the 1880's when the light-hued Charles W. Chestnut was first received into the pages of a respectable white journal, *The Atlantic Monthly,* but it did not mean that Negro literature was to get a hearing. Chestnut's attitude toward his own work added its testimony to that apprehension. To those literary-minded folk who made their way to his home in Cleveland so late as 1930, he was never articulate about his Negro characters nor did he attempt to be. What he took pains to emphasize were the classical Greek patterns in his stories.

The indirection of later Negro writers simply took other forms. Never by any chance could they be realistic or approach directly the fundamental Negro-white relationship. The small section of the white audience on whom they were largely dependent would not have expected or stood for anything else. Negro writers often could do little more than elaborate on the stereotypes which had already come to partial or full acceptance: the sentimental, warm-hearted mammy; the happy-go-lucky clown; the amoral ne'er-do-well; the vital, uninhibited "native" (blood brother, across more than a century to Rousseau's happy savage and the noble redskin).

Exceptions to these patterns, even between the world wars, were few, and none had even small popularity.

Today much of this seems changed. During the war many a white American became suddenly conscious of the colored man's social bondage, and there was greater progress on this point among readers than among nonreaders. Lillian Smith wrote *Strange Fruit* and it became a best seller. Richard Wright followed Langston Hughes, and received a progressively greater hearing. A fair proportion of the white reading public are now willing to hear the Negro story or to hear what the Negro really has to say about America. In some quarters the change has almost assumed the proportions of a cult. And a cult it would have been if all the publishers recently seeking a Negro novelist to give their list "balance," distinction, or a chance for fame had succeeded in finding one.

They have not. There is not going to be any spate of Negro poetry or fiction in the immediate future. Not that the basic potentiality does not exist. But you cannot be indifferent to the thought and expression of a group of people for more than a hundred years, then reverse yourselves, and expect to find their art upon the bookstalls overnight. The potential Negro writer now coming of age still bears the cross of frustration which has been with him from childhood and even before. If it is melodramatic to call him a mute inglorious Milton, it is still true that he finds it doubly difficult to speak his mind. And when he has set down his words, they may seem strange, contorted, or simply unintelligible.

Richard Wright is himself an example of this phenomenon, though perhaps not the most pertinent one. In Wright's work there occur two miracles. The first miracle is that of his genius or his imagination, which obviously is beyond race or color. The second, implicitly clear in the pages of *Black Boy,* is the miracle of how he maintained his youthful integrity of mind and managed to escape in possession of it to the North without suffering serious bodily harm. (Of course, the story does not stop after crossing the border.)

From *Black Boy* we also learn that in certain situations Wright became literally speechless. (Such a "block" can be taken even more seriously when it strikes the writer dumb at his desk.) Nor does the phenomenon end with wordlessness. Enough readers have told me that Wright is strictly unpleasant reading for me to believe that this is probably a majority impression. His work does not often give me that sensation but I

think I know what they refer to. They feel like a well fed American meeting for the first time a starving European or Asiatic. They feel guilty, but they don't know what to do about it except to give the fellow a handout, and they know that doesn't really help the situation or meet the issue.

Readers who find Wright unpleasant feel that they are being blamed for something they didn't start and never have had a hand in (well, hardly ever). They find him unnecessarily antagonistic.

The extravert (no literary critic) may comment thoughtlessly, "O.K., so Wright wants to show white people how their system affects black people so something can be done about it. How does he think he's going to persuade them if he always has a chip on his shoulder?" But the reader with a literary or artistic background (or with plain common sense) will know that an artist models his approach according to his own logic—which means out of his own experience and background. It seems likely that if Wright speaks belligerently or antagonistically, it is because that is the best—or even the only—way he can make the words he wants to say come forth. And let us put beside this observation the fact that parts of his work, notably the latter pages of *Native Son,* are cloudy or at best difficult to understand.

The struggle for expression is not always so plain. I know, by a peculiar circumstance, of another Negro writer whose private distinguishing characteristic it is that he writes on three separate levels. So sharp is the cleavage in his mind that it would appear his thinking takes place within compartments, each one completely isolated from the others. On one level he writes a lively but not very cool or objective reportage; this makes up his books and articles, which have been popular. On another level—in a style that is cold and bare and sometimes insolent—he writes to his white acquaintances. The third level is reserved for his Negro cronies, and there he writes in a strange language of which the closest approximation is to be found in some of the work of Zora Hurston; no white person could understand it unless he had first been initiated into the code.

I would not belittle this separation of mental powers; it seems to me a remarkable feat or phenomenon. But it also seems to bespeak a balance easily disturbed or destroyed. So uneasy a foundation seems unlikely for long to sustain a vigorous literary accomplishment.

Or let us consider an obverse example. The most important novel by a Negro in the past year was surely Ann Petry's *The Street*. Reviewers, by and large, gave it high praise but left a general impression that it was simply a story of Harlem. Thus without anyone's actively willing it so, the novel by reputation took on a semblance of segregation, and the unwitting white reader seemed most likely to be attracted to it if he had a yen for slumming.

There is more reward to reading *The Street* than that. No more forthright attempt at naturalism has appeared recently in our fiction.[1] With Zolaistic detail and an economic determinism reminiscent of Flaubert, Miss Petry's characters are fashioned by their environment. (You might say that the material plays into her hands, but that's begging the question.) Lutie Johnson, Mrs. Hedges, Boots Smith, the Super, the white man Junto—these people and their actions spring inevitably out of the filth, the fear, the fighting of "the street." There is even a touch of mysticism, that historical counterpoise to naturalism, in the person of Min—whose visit to the root doctor and the subsequent foiling of the Super is one of the book's minor triumphs.

Parenthetically, it must be said that the novel is not an unqualified success. Toward the end Miss Petry's typewriter gets in a hurry. In the telling Lutie's climactic murder of Boots, for example, seems unconvincing. This seems the more surprising since the first three-fourths of the book prepare logically for murder or violence on Lutie's part. The pace and style of the earlier pages are superior to similar elements in Dreiser or Farrell.

How did the novel come to be written?

Miss Petry is of a New England family that has specialized in some branch of chemistry for three generations. Her grandfather was a chemist; her father, an aunt, and an uncle are druggists. She herself is a graduate

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[1]In recent weeks the reviews have hailed another naturalistic talent in Willard Motley's *Knock On Any Door* (Appleton-Century. $3). I do not know much of Motley's background beyond the facts that he is a Negro and that his home is Chicago, the principal scene of his novel. His hero is a white boy, Nick Romano, and his descriptive passages are successfully naturalistic with an energy and a detail that have hardly been matched in American fiction. His difficulties, if they may be called that, seem to lie elsewhere than in sheer expression or communication.

of a Connecticut college of pharmacy, and she wrote her first short stories while working as a registered pharmacist in her family's drugstore in Connecticut. In her childhood and youth she knew considerable security.

For a member of a minority group who has attained relative security the temptation to keep it at all costs and in the same form and quantity is usually overwhelming. But because of her marriage and possibly a greater personal inclination than she realized, Miss Petry left Connecticut for New York City where for six years she worked at a variety of jobs that filled her full of an intimate knowledge of how the great majority of her people lived.

What she saw in Harlem horrified her. But because she had not been subjected to that way of living all her life, she saw it "straight" and was able to translate her horror into terms which are instantly recognized and widely understood.

Seeing the Negro men standing outside a poolroom at night and later their women coming home from Eighth Avenue, their shoulders sagging from the weight of the heavy shopping bags they carry, Lutie Johnson translates economic discrimination this way: "That's what's wrong. We don't have time enough or money enough to live like other people because the women have to work until they become drudges and the men stand by idle." Miss Petry's conclusions are simple and few but they are plain —plainer than those of any novelist who to date has written about the Negro in America.

The Negro remains at present the most arresting (because the most changing) figure in our civilization. His group is largest among distinct minorities, and he has been enslaved much the longest and the most rigorously. Many of us have now awakened to the fact that his culture is American and that his contribution to our cultural stream is to be one of the most substantial in our history. But it is not enough for us to say that we are willing to read his books. The books will not come freely and plainly until most white men know their secret sense of shame for what it is and act upon their knowledge.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER PERON

By WILLIAM L. MUNGER

THE DICTATORSHIP set up in Argentina since the military *coup d'état* of June, 1943, whose guiding genius was Juan D. Perón, has almost completely destroyed free democratic education. The Perón dictatorship, compared by some misguided Americans with the Roosevelt New Deal, systematically undermines every one of Argentina's democratic institutions. It has imposed centralized control over economic and political life. It has used force and corruption to take over the labor movement, which is now little different from the "labor fronts" of Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco. It has destroyed one basic liberty and civil right after another. Perón is erecting a super-state of a semi-totalitarian character which, in spite of the recent elections, is moving steadily away from any resemblance to democratic government. The educational system of Argentina is being integrated into this despotic state.

Perón has shown a keen awareness of the strategic role of the educational system in his plans for extending control over all aspects of Argentine life and thought. He is aware of the potential threat exerted by a free educational system against his totalitarian ambitions. The devastation his government has wrought in the university and school system is without historical parallel in the western hemisphere.

II

In order fully to appreciate the significance of what has happened in the Argentine schools it is necessary to go back to the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the universities of Argentina first gained real status under the great liberal statesman and educator Domingo Sarmiento. In 1884 there was enacted Law 1420 which established standards for a democratic public school system. A basic concept of the law was the complete autonomy of the school system in all matters of administration and academic policy. In addition, it was clearly specified that the schools were

to be completely neutral in their teaching of religious matters. The Catholic Church as such had no place of authority in the school system.

In Argentina the schools from primary grades to universities are tax-supported. There are no private universities in Argentina and relatively few private secondary schools, the latter being chiefly sectarian or maintained by colonies of resident Europeans. The financial dependence of the universities on the government, however, did not result in government interference in administration or teaching. Autonomy was a privilege jealously guarded by educators and intellectual leaders. The dominant intellectual tendency in university administration remained for many years what might be called "liberal-conservative."

During the early years of the twentieth century, as the tide of political liberalism rose steadily higher, irresistible pressures began to develop for reform in the general administrative and academic policies of the universities and a so-called university reform movement got under way. The first objective of the increasingly militant student organizations was liberalization of the administrative structure. Students began to demand direct representation in university government. Up to that time universities were controlled by Boards of Regents, composed of fifteen men who were appointed for life to their positions; should one of them die or resign a replacement was selected by the remaining fourteen. In 1905 the students of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Buenos Aires carried out a strike to force the university administration to submit to an arrangement whereby a group of teachers would be elected by the faculty as a consulting board to the Regents. The strike lasted for two years. Among the leaders of the strike movement were Tamborini, anti-Perón candidate in 1946, who was at that time a student; Juan B. Justo, who had only recently become a professor; and also Dr. José Arce, present head of the Argentine UN delegation who was also a professor, but who later went over to Perón. The strike was successful at the Universities of Buenos Aires and Cordoba and resulted in the creation of administrative councils elected by the professors. Justo paid a price for his participation, being expelled from the university.

This first victory failed to satisfy the advocates of university reform, however, and in 1918 the students at Cordoba issued a manifesto calling for a broad revision of the curriculum. The universities were traditionally concerned with the classical type of humanistic education and were less

concerned with the problem of training students in the various professions demanded by the shift toward an urban industrial economy. The manifesto declared that the universities should seek fundamental social objectives and should proceed on the theory that culture was the privilege of all and not merely the property of the ruling classes.

Repercussions of the university reform movement were felt throughout Latin America, especially in Cuba and Peru, where Haya de La Torre of Peru and Grau San Martín of Cuba identified themselves with it. The influence of the movement also extended to Paraguay and Uruguay.

The movement gave impetus to the creation of the Federación Universitaria Argentina. This organization, nationwide in scope, comprised a union of the student federations of all of the six universities in Argentina. The basic principles of the FUA were opposition to militarism and a positive concern for the democratization and liberalization of the universities in the broadest sense. Their manifestoes and declarations called for an academic bill of rights which included:

1. *Freedom of teaching*—free access to teaching positions for every man of ability irrespective of his particular political ideas or economic class.

2. *Freedom of learning*—voluntary attendance at classes and freedom of selection of professors by the students.

3. *Autonomous university government*—participation by the faculty and students in the selection of the university governing boards.

4. *University extension*—providing all elementary educational instruction for people at large through a program of extension courses in various parts of the country.

5. *Experimental teaching*—the adoption of progressive teaching techniques, constant development of new approaches and new media of education with the objective of minimizing the purely academic approach to education, and a greater emphasis on correlation between teaching methods and social requirements of the country.

The FUA coupled its program for university reform with a series of demands for broad social and economic reform in the country as a whole, calling for the enactment of social and labor legislation.

During the term of President Irigoyen, many of the educational reforms sought by the FUA were achieved without, however, altering the basic law of 1884. The students were permitted to participate in university

government by electing certain representatives on the council of the faculties, the remainder being elected by the professors. There was also a great improvement brought about in teaching methods and a weeding out of incompetent professors.

In 1930 the first major threat of active political reaction appeared in the universities. The rumbles of reaction paralleled the rise of intense nationalism in European countries such as Italy and Germany and reflected rising concern by the rulers of Argentina over the radicalism of student movements. The reactionary influence of the military developed to the point that the government attempted to intervene in the affairs of the universities of Buenos Aires. The result was restriction on student participation in university government as well as a narrowing of the curriculum. In September, 1930 there were strikes in the university against the government and against President Uriburu, who had yielded to the influence of the militarists. Most of the leaders of the student movement at this time were socialists.

By the time the Perón movement got under way the FUA represented all university student organizations in Argentina. Each faculty or school in a university had a student center. For example, the University of Littoral had five schools and five student centers. These centers were the basic unit organizations of the student movement. They assisted in the local application of the general reform program and assisted students with university extension courses. Each university had its own student federation and each federation had two representatives on the FUA. Each federation had the right to elect two students on the administrative council of its university, and the students had full voting rights and participated jointly with the faculty members in all decisions, even in the selection of the top governing boards of the universities and heads of departments.

All of the student groups participated actively in the political struggles surrounding the seizure of power by the Perón clique in June, 1943. They were the first group in Argentina openly to protest the *coup d'état.*

III

The University of Buenos Aires was the first of the student centers to protest the military's seizure of power. Its manifesto declared in effect, "While we recognize that the Castillo government was pro-Axis and antidemocratic, nevertheless we view with great fear the presence of the mili-

tarists in the government, which is contrary to the Argentine liberal tradition. We have no confidence in the present military government."

These verbal protests were followed by a series of student strikes against the government. These strikes were provoked by action of General Ramirez, who intervened in all of the Argentine universities in October, 1943 ordering the disbanding of all student centers and all student organizations as illegal. The first university to go on strike was Cordoba. The government met the strike by arresting approximately 2,000 students at Cordoba, while in Buenos Aires it made another 300 arrests.

These efforts to destroy the student movements were unsuccessful. All the student centers, while formally dissolved, maintained an underground existence. No public meetings were held but propaganda was passed around during classes and small nuclei continued to function. At the height of the government persecution there were 5,000 students in the prisons of Martín Garcia, Neuquén, and Villa DeVoto.

The universities remained under government intervention throughout 1944 and up until May, 1945. So vigorous were the protests of the student organizations, however, that the *de facto* government was forced to retreat in April, 1945 and move to restore the autonomy of the universities and the legality of the student centers and the FUA. In May new elections were held in the various faculties to choose new administrative councils. Without exception the elections returned to office administrations in opposition to the government.

Immediately following the restoration of university autonomy the student organizations renewed their vigorous open campaign for the full restoration of constitutional government. By this time the professors showed increasing militancy and a willingness to join actively in the defense of academic freedom and university democracy. In October, 1945 a junta comprised of the rectors of the six universities and the heads of the FUA brought out resolutions demanding the restoration of full constitutional government. Mass meetings were arranged in support of these demands. As a result General Farrell, who had succeeded Ramirez as head of the *de facto* government, warned the universities that unless such activities were immediately halted the government would again intervene and take over all of the universities.

This threat of intervention caused the student organizations to launch a stay-in strike on October 2, 1945. About 2,500 students occupied the

University of Buenos Aires and about 600 barricaded themselves inside the buildings at the University of La Plata. After four days the police appeared in force and drove the students out of the buildings, with a considerable number of student casualties. The students, irrespective of sex, were forced to run a gauntlet where they were clubbed unmercifully. Over 200 girls were arrested. Since many of them were from cultured middle- or upper-class families the Chief of Police showed his sense of humor by locking them up in the special cells for prostitutes.

So great was the public outcry that the government did not carry out its threat to take over the universities. The students, however, continued to campaign vigorously in the forthcoming federal elections against the candidacy of General Perón and formed one of the strongest supports of the democratic candidate Tamborini.

IV

In February, 1946 the elections were held and Perón was elected by a rather small majority. Even before he was inaugurated he renewed the attack against the universities. In an effort to give the impression of wide popular support Perón's government had the Labor Party, which was based on the Confederation of Labor, "adopt" a resolution demanding that the government intervene again in the universities; the manifesto was signed by Luis F. Gay as head of the Labor Party and General Secretary of the Telephone Workers Union. (Both "Labor Party" and "Union" were under Perón's control.) On May 4 a decree was signed in which the government "yielded" to this demand.

After the appointment of government interventors to administer the universities Perón launched a vigorous campaign of terror against the faculties and the student organizations. Teacher after teacher was forced to resign or was discharged outright by arbitrary demand of the government. In but few cases were formal charges made against them; no impartial investigations into the facts were permitted and no opportunity for defense presented to the teachers. Almost all of the interventors have been appointed either from the military or the Catholic Church—both safely nationalistic.

In its efforts to destroy once and for all the effectiveness of the universities as a bulwark of democratic thought and action in the country the government has gone far beyond the question of whether or not the

teachers participated actively in any anti-Perón political campaigns. Professors whose only ambition was to be left to teach their courses without interference have been ruthlessly ousted. In the last six months approximately 1,200 professors in the six Argentine universities have been removed; many of them are scholars of international reputation.

Bernardo Houssay, who is a physiologist of world renown and recipient of many awards for his contributions to learning, was summarily dismissed. Houssay was founder of the Institute of Physiology in the School of Medicine at Buenos Aires. In addition, many of his assistants and staff have been dismissed. . . . Professor Raphael Greenfield, director of the Institute of Physics in the University of La Plata, was removed on a flimsy pretext. He is virtually the only Argentine physicist who is a recognized authority in the field of atomic energy, a member of the group of atomic physicists headed by Einstein. Greenfield, who had a small budget under his direction to be used for minor carpentry work around the laboratory, was accused of using some of this money for other kinds of work than strictly carpentry repairs. . . . Professor Amado Alonzo, founder of the Institute of Philology in the University of Buenos Aires faculty of Philosophy and Letters, was awarded a scholarship to study in the United States and accordingly went to the United States on leave of absence. He was fired for "abandoning" his job. . . . Dr. Alfredo Palacios, professor of labor legislation in the University of Buenos Aires and a former socialist member of Parliament, was discharged for signing a petition asking for restoration of constitutional government in Argentina. . . . Professors José Gabriel and R. Martinez were discharged under a 1906 law which gives the government the right to deport persons of Spanish citizenship back to Spain. It is believed that both of these professors sought refuge outside of Argentina, not daring to return because it would mean immediate deportation to Spain, where their almost certain fate would be a concentration camp or execution.

These are only a few examples among the hundreds of prominent doctors, lawyers, engineers, artists and scholars driven from their posts. Many of them upon their ouster immediately received invitations to lecture and teach in colleges and universities in other countries. The great bulk of them, however, have been forced to find other means of livelihood.

The devastation which these actions of the government have wrought in the educational system can be measured in some degree when it is pointed out that in the case of the School of Medicine of the University of Littoral over ninety per cent of the regular faculty and staff of 400 have been fired. As a result, recent reports indicate that there were not enough teachers left to continue classes or even to give examinations to the students ready to graduate. Physicians on the hospital staff of the school's hospital resigned in protest against the firing of their colleagues on the faculty. However, the physicians were reported to be still taking care of their patients on a voluntary basis.

So thorough has been the disruption of teaching in the universities that it is claimed it is now impossible for students to take courses in criminal law in any of the six universities, since all of the professors qualified to teach this subject have been removed from their posts and the government is unable to find qualified replacements.

V

In addition to the purge of all democratic teachers from university faculties, there has also been a systematic attempt to modify the curricula so as to eliminate courses in political economy, sociology, economics, and allied subjects.

The government has experienced considerable difficulty in finding replacements for many of the teachers that have been dismissed. In some cases no attempt has been made to continue the courses halted by the dismissals. However, in other cases the government has filled the vacancies with ardent Perónistas and nationalist-minded clergy. This is particularly true in the departments of philosophy and related subjects, where the objective is to place these fields of instruction in the hands of safely reactionary teachers steeped in the philosophy of clerical fascism and militaristic nationalism. For example, the chair of philosophy at the University of La Plata is now occupied by Father Castellani, generally regarded as an intense nationalist. This points to a rapidly strengthening grip of totalitarianism after the pattern of Spain under Franco and Italy under Mussolini. In fact, a number of the priests who now occupy educational posts are falangists who emigrated from Franco Spain.

Wholesale stripping of the faculties of all progressive and liberal elements and the junking of the best brains in the country has virtually

destroyed culture and intellectual life in the universities. Remaining members of the faculties are demoralized, a demoralization accentuated by the calibre of some of the replacements. The interventor appointed by the government to administer the School of Fine Arts in the University of La Plata is a dentist without any musical education. He replaced Guilardo Guilardi, a musician of high reputation. The interventor who now rules the Law School in Buenos Aires University is a former administrative employee of the postal service.

The danger to the educational system represented by the instrusion of the Catholic hierarchy is not confined to the universities. On December 31, 1943, after the *de facto* government seized power and the Parliament was dissolved, a decree was issued calling for the compulsory teaching of Catholicism in all Argentine schools. This arrangement grew out of earlier discussions between the Perón group and the Church concerning the political role of the Church. In return for powerful political support from the Church Perón campaigned openly before his election on the platform, "Christ in the Schools."

This, as we have pointed out, runs counter to the whole tradition of Argentine education. Since the Argentine population is overwhelmingly Catholic it in effect becomes a means of isolating and holding up to scorn Jewish students and students of other religious faiths who, while technically free to retain their own religious identity, find that any practical step taken to do so quickly serves to arouse antagonism and only tends to emphasize diversities of national origin and creed. The most rabidly nationalistic sections of the clergy are also actively anti-Semitic. Under the new policy anti-Semitism in the schools is bound to increase.

There are sections among the Catholic clergy of Argentina, however, who view with alarm this close alignment between the Church and the educational system under Perón. These liberal Catholic elements, led by Monsignor De Andrea, protested openly against the decree when it was issued and attempted to make their opposition felt against the Parliament's ratification of the decree. As a result of their opposition periodicals issued by the liberal groups suddenly ceased publication and there is little doubt that this action was taken at the orders of the hierarchy with the full support of Perón.

The basis of the opposition of liberal Catholic elements to this close and official embrace of Perón by the Church lay in their fear that in the

long run the Church would become the object of the same hatreds inevitably engendered in the minds of the Argentine people as a consequence of the brutal oppression and repression of all democratic groups by Perón's government. Should any future political movement arise which would restore democracy and rid the people of the military clique which now rules, it is feared that along with it there would develop anticlericalism among the common people, who would feel that by its identification with the Perón regime the Church forfeited its moral right to their support.

However, Perón's firm grip over the parliamentary majority made it a foregone conclusion that when the issue came to a vote a few weeks ago his pledge to the Church would be sustained. The degree has now become law, although there is no constitutional basis for it. The only requirement relating to the Catholic Church in the constitution is the provision making it mandatory for the President and Vice-President of the country to be members of the Catholic Church. Perón's legal giants have performed the miracle of citing this provision as adequate constitutional basis for the decree on the ground that, since every Argentine school child is a potential candidate for President or Vice-President, it is necessary for all school children to be instructed in the Catholic creed in order to insure that none of them will be disqualified in the event of possible election.

There is little that Perón can do to overcome the general democratic opposition in the minds of the present generation of university students. But a few years of indoctrination in the primary and secondary schools, where the pupils are more immature, will almost certainly insure that the next crop of university students will be thoroughly saturated with the antidemocratic ideologies of which Perónism is the Argentine expression.

Up to the present time the Perón movement has had no "intellectual" base; it has had few theoreticians of Perónism. Apparently aware of this defect in his system, Perón is taking rapid steps to insure that the youth of the nation will be properly saturated at an early age with his "mystique."

VI

Perón's depredations on the faculties of the universities and the educational system have their counterpart in the vigorous war he has waged against the democratic elements among the university students comprising, as we have pointed out, the vast bulk of the student population.

Early in his regime Perón made a number of overtures to the student organizations, bidding openly for their support and co-operation. In 1944 Tesaire, a former Navy officer and Perónist Minister of the Interior, invited the heads of the student organizations to confer with him relative to the establishment of a new political party, based on the Reformista movement. The students refused to accept the invitation unless it was agreed that the proceedings of the conference were to be made public. The invitation was promptly withdrawn. Other offers coming directly from Perón seeking the co-operation of the students in support of his program were rebuffed.

This student intransigence accounts in large measure for the brutality and violence utilized by the Nazi-minded police in dealing with student strikes. Student meetings of all kinds are banned by the police. Homes of students are searched whenever the police suspect a clandestine meeting. These searches are made under authority of a decree dealing with "security of the State." Police chiefs can issue their own warrants for this type of raid.

Jailing and torture are among methods resorted to by the federal and provincial police in an effort to weaken and destroy the student organizations. While the truth of these accusations against government use of torture has never been admitted by the police, the writer had an opportunity to confirm at first hand while in Argentina a number of instances of police brutality.

A group of students at the University of La Plata were jailed for the alleged crime of promoting a student strike. They were held incommunicado for two weeks, during which time the police denied all knowledge of their arrest or whereabouts. Later, after their arrest was admitted by the police, it was discovered that they had been subjected to torture by means of the *picana electrica,* or electric goad. This refined technique involves the use of a strong electric current which is applied while the victim is wired to a table. The goad, carrying a charged wire, is supplied to the sensitive portions of the body such as the eyelids, the roof of the mouth and the genital organs. Earlier and clumsier methods of administering this type of torture resulted in leaving scars on the victims' bodies. A new refinement, however, is the use of a wet sheet, through which the current may be applied to the victim without leaving telltale marks.

The writer visited the La Plata prison in January, 1947 and verified for himself the presence of these scars on the bodies of several of the students. What happened to this particular group of students is only one of numerous examples of how Perón's nazified police have waged violent war against democratic elements in the university student movement.

In the purge of the universities the government has also used all manner of penalties. Large numbers of students who participated in the strikes have been suspended from the universities and have had cancelled all degrees and examinations which they have already received or passed. So complete was Perón's purge in the universities that even where students are taking their examinations he has appointed "observers" over the examiners, whose job it is to see that the examiners show no sympathy or bias for students who have been on strike.

The dominant political tendency within the leadership of the democratic student organizations has been socialist, not necessarily in terms of organizational membership but in general point of view. In Buenos Aires, where the Socialist Party has had considerable mass support, it is probable that the leadership has been identified more closely with the official socialist movement. The party, of course, has been consistently anti-Perón.

The Communist movement in Argentina has been small, with little if any influence within the leadership of the student federations, although Communists participated fully as individual members in the local units of the federations. However, in the early part of 1946 the Soviet Union and Argentina initiated a series of negotiations which were concluded in June with certain trade pacts between the two countries and an agreement to exchange diplomatic representatives. Up to June, 1946 the Communist movement in Argentina (and elsewhere) denounced the Perón government as the "first openly fascist regime in the Western Hemisphere." Since then the Communist movement has defended the Perón dictatorship as a "peace loving democracy" worthy of "progressive support" by Argentine Communists.

From this point on it was noted that student-Communists began to show a coolness toward further struggle and activity against Perón's destruction of all democratic institutions and liberties in Argentina. Whenever a specified issue required some sort of stand to be taken against the government or some action to be carried out, the Communists would argue that such moves were not "timely" or were "tactically inadvisable."

Consistent appeasement of Perón's actions has been the Communist line within the student organizations as well as within the trade unions and elsewhere since the Russian-Argentine agreements of 1946. This has nowhere been more vigorously applied than in the complete support given by the Communist Party of Argentina to Perón's bitter attacks against the unfavorable report issued by the AFL labor delegation in February, 1947 after a complete first-hand survey of labor, economic, and political conditions in Argentina. Both the Perón government and the Communists attacked the delegation and the report in almost identical terms—as "calumnious," "reactionary" and "the work of agents of American imperialism."

VII

Unable to corrupt or destroy the student federations, Perón formed a rival nationalist student organization called the Syndicate Universitaria Argentina. The main strength of the nationalist student organization is in the University of Buenos Aires, where it is estimated that around twenty per cent of the students support Perón. The SUA is openly sponsored by the government and receives financial support from it, some of the leaders being on the government payroll. The sole function of the SUA is to conduct nationalist propaganda and combat the democratic FUA. Whenever fights break out between the democratic and nationalist students the police invariably come to the support of the Perónistas.

The SUA includes not only students who are nationalist, falangist or Rosista (Rosas was a tyrant who ruled Argentina during the middle of the nineteenth century) but also graduates of the universities who have similar political beliefs. Nearly all appointments to university posts vacated by the democratic elements Perón purged are made from members of the SUA. The SUA is headed by a Dr. Guardo, president of the National Chamber of Deputies. In other universities outside of Buenos Aires the nationalist support is still very small.

VIII

The government has made much of the claim that under its new university program, outlined in the Five Year Plan, it has "democratized" the school system in Argentina by now making it possible for sons and daughters of ordinary workers to attend the universities, a privilege which formerly, it is said, had been denied them.

Opposition spokesmen, however, deny that Perón has done anything to make the universities more accessible to lower-income students. They cite the fact that traditionally attendance at classes was not compulsory, which made it possible for large numbers of students to work part-time and attend school part-time and in this way finally achieve an education even though it might take additional years to carry out their objective. Now, it is said, the government has made full-time attendance the rule for all classes, and this will make it impossible for students to support themselves in school by part-time work; thus, if anything, making it impossible for anyone who is not wealthy or who is not subsidized by the government to receive a university education. Scholarships will be given only to loyal Perónistas.

The government has justified its purge of 1,200 professors on the ground that most of them were part-time teachers and were engaged in carrying on professional activities when they were not lecturing at the universities. Under its new plan, the government claims, teaching will be made a full-time profession, with no more part-time teachers, thus improving the standards of teaching and enabling teachers to make an adequate living. In addition, government spokesmen point out that in the past numerous persons have got on the lists of university faculties as professors purely for prestige purposes; they did not do any but the barest minimum of teaching but reaped all the political benefits which go with the reputation of being a university professor. The government claims that all such persons have been weeded out.

In reply to these arguments the democratic leaders point to the fact that it is not true that most of the teachers who were discharged were part-time teachers. They say that while teachers may have been on a part-time salary, in fact they gave full time to their teaching. They admit, however, that there have been traditionally large numbers of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and scientists who did carry on part-time teaching and spent part of their time in carrying out their professional duties. They point to this as an asset to teaching rather than a liability. A doctor, for example, who is actively practicing his profession will make a better teacher than a doctor who is out of contact with the application of recent advances in medical science. An engineer who is actively pursuing his profession part of the time acquires a keener insight into the efficacy of engineering techniques than a pure academician. It is said that practicing doctors, lawyers,

and engineers who are purged are being replaced with politicians who could not practice if they would. The democratic spokesmen clinch their argument by pointing to the fact that in hundreds of instances the government has been unable to find qualified replacements for those whom it fired.

The teachers and students counter the government's claim that only incompetents have been purged from the faculties by making clear that many of those discharged have been scholars of world renown and have since been offered teaching posts in universities in other countries.

Government spokesmen have argued that the trouble with the universities was that the students gave too much time to politics and neglected their studies, and that requiring full-time attendance at classes will eliminate this preoccupation with political matters. The students reply that the real objecion of the government is not with the political activities but because they are not directed in support of Perón's antidemocratic government. They point out that Perón has never objected to the activities of nationalist student groups and he even subsidizes them from government funds. The students also emphasize that the basic purpose of a liberal education is to make better citizens and that rising to the defense of democratic principles and institutions when they are threatened by the enemies of democracy is the very highest type of citizenship. They suggest that the political history of Argentina reveals the fallacy of leaving politics to the politically illiterate.

IX

The basic aim of the Perón government in taking over the universities and the rest of the school system was to centralize all of the institutions of the country in Perón's hands. It has proceeded in similar fashion with the labor unions, agricultural societies, manufacturers' groups and all semipublic institutions. Perón is using this centralized control to alter the entire spirit and role of the universities and the public schools.

While previously the general university spirit and orientation were liberal and democratic with an eminently civilian outlook, Perón has supplanted this with clerical fascism and a strong militaristic orientation. The universities now exalt nationalism and military power. Academic freedom no longer exists and the qualifications of teachers are now determined purely by political considerations rather than by ability, experience, and academic training. Teachers who refuse to teach "religion"

are dismissed without any hearing. Teachers of foreign extraction, particularly Jews, are also dismissed. Physical education in the schools has been taken over by the army. The libraries have been purged of books which express points of view contrary to the government; for example, the reading of most of the works of Domingo Sarmiento, the father of liberal public education in Argentina, is forbidden in the schools. High school students have been punished for publishing democratic papers. There are even reports that children in the primary schools during the election campaign were chastised for expressing opinions in favor of the democratic candidates. Preconscription for children from twelve years of age on has been established under military control. This plan was outlined in a speech of General Perón at the University of La Plata in 1944 in which he praised Nazi methods of giving military training to the youth of the nation.

Under the new Five Year Plan the entire educational system will be centralized under the immediate control of a Perón-appointed Council of Education. This politically oriented council will have absolute power over all appointments or dismissals of teachers and will determine the exact curricula for all schools. The destruction of educational freedom, together with the destruction of political and civil liberties and the moves to make Argentina a potent economic factor in South America, are basic aspects of Perón's systematic cultivation of his own brand of authoritarianism and statism.

TOWARD A LIBERAL PROGRAM FOR PROSPERITY AND PEACE

By LEWIS COREY

AMERICAN PROSPERITY, the full use of our economic resources, is now one of the basic elements in the future of world peace and so of liberal democracy throughout the world.

Any serious recession—or, much worse, a depression—would cripple American capacity to help world economic reconstruction. Our continuing economic collaboration and aid is indispensable for world recovery. This is interlocked with a liberal American policy in foreign affairs, which, liberals increasingly agree, must have a big economic core to sustain and promote liberal democracy in a world bedevilled by totalitarian challenges. And this, in turn, interlocks with domestic politics.

ADA Emergency Economic Proposals

An economic program for prosperity and peace has a short-term emergency aspect and a long-term reconstruction aspect. We need *at once* emergency measures to prevent a recession that might become a depression. This calls for action to prevent a deflationary spiral and to promote consumer purchasing power. The needed emergency measures, of a minimum character, are set forth in an economic program proposed by Americans for Democratic Action, a recently organized group of noncommunist liberals whose chairman is Wilson W. Wyatt, former federal Expediter of Housing. This program was drawn up by an ADA-sponsored Committee for Economic Stability. The committee's chairman is Chester Bowles, former Price Administrator and Director of Economic Stabilization; members include Leon Henderson and Paul A. Porter, former Price Administrators; William H. Davis, former chairman of the War Labor Board; Lauchlin Currie, special economic advisor to the late President Roosevelt, and Seymour Harris, professor of economics at Harvard University. The program of Americans for Democratic Action includes:

1. *A prompt average reduction of 10 per cent in prices.* "Reductions should be made voluntarily *before* markets contract seriously. They should

not be delayed until they are *forced* by a market collapse, which has been our unfortunate experience in the past. We should set as an immediate goal reductions which wipe out about one-half of the increases which have occurred since June, 1946. This in our judgment is about as much deflation as the economy can stand without precipitating a downward spiral. At the retail level it would mean an average decline of 10 per cent. In some cases, of course, prices cannot be cut this much. In other cases, however, they can and should be reduced much more. At the wholesale and manufacturing levels prices must be reduced in conformity with reductions at retail. . . . We cannot agree, however, with those extremists who argue that the whole job can be done by price reductions. The price cuts which would now have to be made to wash out the distortion between the present level of prices and our total purchasing power would be so great as to preclude an orderly readjustment. . . . We must avoid, above all, a series of spiraling price cuts leading to panicky competition to undercut the other fellow. To achieve orderly price adjustments and avoid a collapse of prices will require assurance that markets will be sustained at the reduced price levels planned."

2. *Increase consumer purchasing power through general acceptance of the 15¢-an-hour wage boost, with a raise to 65¢ an hour in the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act.* "A second approach to the prompt increase in purchasing power lies through increased wages and salaries. We cannot agree, however, with those who urge that the imbalance must be corrected primarily through broad and substantial wage increases. . . . Increases of such magnitude would seriously distort the wage structure, might disrupt the excellent management-labor relations which now prevail over a wide area, would preclude many price adjustments which are badly required, and might even feed further the inflation which has led us to our present difficulties. Furthermore, many consumers, such as white-collar workers, pensioners and others living on fixed incomes, would benefit too little and too late, or not at all. . . . In one form or another wage increases should add up to a package constituting 15¢ an hour. We recommend that management and labor promptly adjust themselves to this new level. Not every firm and not every industry can or should increase wages by this amount. Where wage increases approximating the 15¢ package have already been granted, contracts should not be reopened. In other cases the financial position of the

firm or industry will not permit such an increase. All the more reason, therefore, that the firms and industries which can afford to raise wages should do so. . . . These wage increases will prevent a collapse of prices, such as in the past has gone so far as to wipe out profits altogether." The ADA program calls for a similar increase in the wages of unorganized workers and in the salaries of government employes.

3. *Continue present rent control to June 30, 1948, with enough money for administration and enforcement.* "It is idle to talk of price reductions or wage increases as a means of increasing consumer purchasing power if, at the same time, rents, the largest single item on the family budget, are to be increased. . . . Undoubtedly, rent control has imposed hardships upon individual landlords. Where such hardship exists it should be alleviated promptly. But that is no reason for a general increase in rents, and it is no excuse for undermining effective control."

4. *Strengthen the housing program through a cut of 20 per cent in building costs, revival and promotion of prefabrication, the provision of federal guarantees for 1,500,000 housing units a year for ten years, and a public housing program of 500,000 rental units yearly at modest rents.* "The abandonment of controls over prices and the allocation of materials has had its most serious consequences in housing. . . . There is every reason to believe that a housing slump similar to that of 1920-21 has already begun. If this slump is to be checked a new housing program is imperative. The government should assume strong leadership to secure vigorous efforts by producers and distributors of building materials, by home builders, and by construction labor to effect a prompt cut of at least 20 per cent in the cost of construction. This program should involve the active collaboration of the National Housing Agency, the Housing Expediter, the Price Adjustment Board, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of Justice, and all labor and management groups within the housing industry. . . . Congress must face up to the fact that America needs at least 1½ million houses a year for the next ten years. The most effective action to insure maximum fulfillment of this goal by private enterprise would be an unconditional commitment by Congress and the administration to underwrite this level of production. The government should undertake to produce, through the medium of local public housing authorities, whatever number of houses may be necessary, in addition to the volume produced by private builders, to bring the annual total up

to 1½ million units. [Monopolistic practice contributing to high costs] grew up largely as protective measures against depressed conditions and can be eliminated only if there is assurance by government against the recurrence of such conditions. . . . At least one-third of the national housing goal of 1½ million units per annum should be in the form of rental units available to families of low and moderate incomes. This is the kind of housing most desperately needed at this time, by veterans' families particularly, but by many others as well. . . . Experience shows that such housing, even if costs of construction are reduced sharply, cannot be provided by private builders. . . . The government should be prepared to cover the difference between the economic cost of providing these rental facilities and the rentals. The subsidy should be paid to local public housing authorities." The Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill, "while a bold step in the right direction, does not go far enough."

5. *Relief for lower-income taxpayers by raising individual exemptions from $500 to $700, and by lowering excise taxes.* "The Knutson tax bill provides $3,768 million of tax relief. Of this less than half would go to taxpayers having net incomes of less than $3,000." Under the Knutson bill taxpayers with incomes over $10,000 get 32 per cent of the tax relief; under the ADA proposal they would get only 4 per cent, while taxpayers with incomes below $3,000 would get more than two-thirds of the tax relief. "Canada has recently decreased taxes on low-income groups by over 50 per cent, while cutting taxes on high incomes by only 6 per cent." Excise taxes should be cut from $7 billion yearly to $5 billion.

6. *Continuation of a farm program that would extend wartime price supports, expand a school-lunch program under the Aiken Food Allotment Plan, curb excessive speculation in farm products, broaden crop insurance, and plan buying for foreign relief in a way to stabilize markets.* "Prevent a collapse of consumers' buying power such as developed after World War I and it will assure farmers of markets for their products at good prices. . . . Farm prices today stand on the average approximately 35 per cent above support levels. . . . There are several respects in which the price support program should be amended. . . . We recommend that the Department of Agriculture be authorized to carry out the support commitment in ways which do not injure the farmer but which avoid waste and stimulate high consumption. The department should be permitted to resell surpluses at less than the support level. It should, in addi-

tion, be permitted in some cases to abandon supports and permit farm prices to reach their own level, with the department making up, by direct payment to the farmer, for the difference between the market price and the support price. Furthermore, greater flexibility is needed in determining the actual support level. These supports should help rather than hinder desirable shifts in production. This can be done by raising or lowering the support level for any commodity, depending upon recent experience with deficits or surpluses. . . . The main emphasis of a long-range program must be based upon building up the consumption of farm products rather than by limiting farm production. . . . The entire farm program requires basic revision. The parity price concept is today badly outmoded. These prices bear no relation to current costs of production or to the currently required pattern of farm production. While some of these prices are too high, others are too low. Furthermore, income is badly distributed on the farm as it is in the city. Distribution of income must be improved. This will require encouragement and assistance to the family farm, both to increase its acreage and to facilitate its mechanization; [also] expansion of rural electrification, provision of adequate schools and hospitals, and extension of social security to farm families."

7. *Extension of unemployment compensation to cover 14,000,000 workers not now covered, with an increase in the amount and duration of the payments.* "At the present time 14,000,000 workers (domestic workers, farm workers, government workers and other groups) get no unemployment protection whatever. Furthermore, the compensation payments for those who do are seriously inadequate. In three states the maximum compensation is only $15 a week and in only three states can an unemployed worker receive as much as $25 a week, and that only if he previously has earned $50 or more a week. Some increase of unemployment is now unavoidable. Adequate unemployment compensation is essential both as a matter of fairness to workers upon whom the impact of adjustment falls and as a means of cushioning the decline of consumer markets."

8. *Greater federal expenditures for world reconstruction work, with the co-operation and advice of the United Nations' Social and Economic Council, and an increase of $5,000 million in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank.* "The world today desperately needs every kind of material that the United States can produce. . . . It would be nothing short of criminal to permit unemployment of men and factories to develop

in the face of desperate needs abroad. The high rate of exports in recent months has meant a rapid depletion of the supply of dollars available to other countries for the purchase of American goods. If the volume of exports is to be sustained the supply of dollars must be replenished. The logical agency to assume this responsibility is of course the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was established to perform precisely such functions. The International Bank was conceived of as the agency through which the nations of the world would collaborate in financing world reconstruction. . . . It is imperative that the directors of the bank never lose sight of its original purposes, and pursue those purposes with imagination, boldness and vigor. But these new international bodies are extremely slow moving. While the American government should use its enormous influence and prestige to shift the operations of the International Bank out of low gear, immediate action is necessary to replenish the supply of dollars available to other countries. For this purpose we recommend that the Congress authorize an increase of $5,000 million in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank. . . . To insure that the use of American credits to foreign countries is in harmony with the objectives of the United Nations for rehabilitating foreign nations and providing the foundation for enduring peace, we recommend that the Export-Import Bank seek the views of the United Nations Economic and Social Council in determining its own policies."

The ADA emergency economic program is altogether feasible and workable. General acceptance of it is possible, since it expresses and appeals to the self-interests and responsibility of labor, management and farmers, and of government. Adoption of the program would easily prevent a recession that might become a depression. After which, all the factors present for a substantial upswing of prosperity can get to work. "If accepted by Congress and the administration," says the ADA committee, "the program should provide an economic breathing spell." During the breathing spell we can work out a larger program of economic reconstruction to prevent a depression that might breed the violent extremisms of "right" and "left" that drive toward dictatorship.

Much of the ADA emergency economic program is also the program of President Truman. That is encouraging, for it means an effort to work with and through the administration, to influence government policy: the only course that can bring immediate emergency action. The program,

moreover, calls for the co-operation of responsible business and management as well as for the co-operation of workers and farmers. This is sound realism, for any program of emergency economic action needs to recognize and work with the existing balance of class-economic and political forces (while preparing for larger future action).

Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics

In foreign policy, too, the ADA program ties in with much of President Truman's policy, which, along with its new stop-expansionism attitude toward Soviet Russia, is increasing its support of the United Nations and its call for greater American economic aid to the world. The ADA gives general critical support to the Truman Doctrine, but it urges emphasis on the economic and liberal-democratic aspects. It also supports the political aspects, however, for if Russian expansionism continues to provoke uncertainty, turmoil and "right-left" extremism the economic-aid program will prove futile or collapse.

On one issue the ADA statement of "general purposes" says: "We believe that the essential issue is not between capitalism and socialism, but between those who believe in the inalienable rights of the individual and those who do not. In our dealings with foreign nations, therefore, we must not insist that capitalism as we know it is a prerequisite of democracy, nor equate democratic socialism with dictatorship."

American foreign policy *must* work with liberal-socialist governments. For in Europe and Asia today there can be no reconstruction, economic progress and democracy without a large measure of socialization, or public enterprise, in large-scale industry and planning. This is inescapable; the question is whether socialization will assume democratic or antidemocratic forms. Increasingly large numbers of liberal moderates are convinced of the necessity for socialization of large-scale industry, and this proposal appears in the programs of the three Catholic parties of France, Austria, and Italy. To insist upon the old economics of a competitive capitalism that is now largely gone means to drive Europe and Asia toward the economic chaos upon which totalitarian reaction thrives.

American foreign policy *can,* moreover, work with liberal-socialist governments, as it does with the Labor Government of Great Britain. This is being broadened, slowly but surely, to include liberal-socialist governments and measures in the making. When the Austrian parlia-

ment, with a coalition government of Christian Democrats and Socialists, adopted a law for the socialization of large-scale industry, General Mark Clark, American occupation commander, approved the law on the ground that, while departing from "free enterprise," it was adopted under a democratic government by due process. A dispute between the British and American commanders in Germany, regarding the power of the new bi-zonal German Economic Council to carry out socialization measures, was settled on what amounts to acceptance of the British insistence that the power to socialize must be granted. In Japan the American occupation authority has interposed no objection to a coalition government set up and dominated by socialists. And it is reported that our Secretary of Commerce, Averell Harriman, admits that "the best the United States can hope for out of Europe is a form of moderate socialism." It is a grudging admission, but still an admission. Another "straw in the wind" appears in a column by Mark Sullivan, a liberal-conservative (New York *Tribune,* June 8, 1947). In it Sullivan describes our developing foreign economic policy as one "to restore the world as a going economic concern," and that while "we will proceed on the basis of free enterprise and democratic government . . . *we will cooperate with countries which have to some degree modified their economic system while retaining free democratic government.*" A bit negative? Yes, but clear. We must work to make it more positive.

There are, of course, interests and groups, including shortsighted small businessmen and farmers, that oppose American foreign policy cooperation with liberal-socialist governments. But the opposition need not carry the day. For only a small part of it consists of die-hard reactionaries, and their power can be broken. Most of the opposition comes from well-meaning people who misunderstand the issue, which is not one of capitalism but of *the economic conditions under which liberal democracy can live and grow.* It is true that a majority of Americans identify democracy with the free enterprise of unrestrained capitalism. Their emphasis, however, is on *democracy.* If they are convinced that free enterprise, as unrestrained capitalism in the monopoly age, can bring neither economic freedom nor liberal democracy to Europe and Asia, but that liberal socialism can and will, a majority of Americans will plump for support of democracy regardless of economic forms. For inseparable from the liberal-

democratic procedures and values is the freedom to choose the economic forms that most fully promote human welfare and liberty.

The realism of the ADA program on economic and foreign policy broadens to include realism on the American political front. (Economics cannot be separated from politics; this is especially true in times of crisis.)

In its policy, domestic and foreign, the ADA opposes another new organization formed at the same time, the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA). The parents of PCA are the National Citizens Political Action Committee and the Citizens Committee of the Arts and Sciences; both organizations, especially on the national level, were under varying degrees of communist influence and control. They merged and reappeared, in December, 1946 as Progressive Citizens of America, with a board of directors dominated by communist-party-liners. (This is not altogether true on the local level, where many liberals join who are unaware of the "front" nature of PCA. But now, for the first time in years, noncommunist liberals can unite in an organization of their own, the Americans for Democratic Action.) Unlike the ADA economic program, the "statement of domestic policy" issued by PCA directors on March 22, 1947, is agitational criticism of monopoly, antilabor legislation, and military expenditures, with specific proposals that envisage only rent control, tax relief for the needy, and no budget cuts for essential services. One-fifth of the statement is devoted to "the attack on civil liberties," but no distinction is drawn between illiberal witch hunts and liberal opposition to and identification of communists—a distinction that liberals must make or perish. The PCA emphasis is not on economic but on foreign policy. Here, like its parents (one of whom, the Citizens Committee for the Arts and Sciences, opposed the American loan to Labor Britain while it clamored for a loan to Soviet Russia), the PCA is all-against American foreign policy and all-for Russian policy, whatever the Russian twists and turns are. It completely, for the wrong reasons, repudiates the Truman Doctrine, where ADA gives the Doctrine critical conditional support as *one* instrument of liberal foreign policy. PCA rejects the American proposal for an Atomic Development Authority, which is world government and world socialism, while it glorifies the dangerously one-sided attacks of Henry Wallace. Some time ago the inner group of the Communist Party decided to set up a "third party" in 1948, if at all possible, as a

"front" to defeat Truman, and PCA seems driving in that direction. Such a "new party" can only help isolationism and reaction.

Elements of Long-Term Economic Policy

But politics are inseparable from economics. Any liberal coalition or new party must offer a long-term comprehensive economic policy that can end the crisis of our age and so set the stage for a new upswing of social-economic and cultural progress. Emergency action must suggest and move toward larger action to solve inescapable problems. Only if the deep-going economic crisis is overcome on a permanent basis can liberal domestic policy and liberal foreign policy do their job: build a world of prosperity, liberal democracy and peace. The ADA emergency economic program is, emphasize the sponsors, "one for the immediate situation; it is not intended to meet the long-term problems of the American economy. Sometime within the next three to six years—economists disagree on the exact timing—our system will face its real crisis. Before that time comes, if our system is to survive, we must have prepared to deal with that crisis." The ADA does not offer a specific long-term program but it does offer an outline for later filling in:

"We shall require a complete overhauling of our anti-monopoly machinery. Fifty years of experience demonstrate that that machinery has not worked and cannot work. We must find some way, without impairing the scale and productiveness of American industry, to insure responsible management in the public interest.

"We shall require a complete overhauling of our social security system. Social security must be made a matter of right for everyone, just as public education is today. The regressive and deflationary features of its present financing must be eliminated.

"We shall require a complete overhauling and streamlining of our tax system. If we are to maintain full employment and at the same time achieve a balanced budget, our tax structure must be made more progressive than it is today . . . more adapted to changing economic conditions.

"We shall require a broad program of river valley development which will apply the TVA principle to every major river in the United States, with all this means in flood control, irrigation, cheap power, and industrial expansion.

"We must revamp our farm program upon the principles of full production and adequate diets for everyone. There must be a fair distribution of income within the farm community as well as between the farm and non-farm population.

"We must greatly broaden our national educational program to provide modern schools, staffed by trained and well-paid teachers, for every community in America. Every boy and girl who has the will and the ability to go to college must be given the opportunity to do so.

"We must develop a national health program to provide modern hospitals, complete with the latest medical equipment and staffed by well-trained and well-paid doctors, nurses, technicians, in every community.

"Our housing program must be expanded to eliminate our slums. Beyond this, our cities must be rebuilt to provide light and air, parks and playgrounds, and to make certain no area again becomes a slum.

"And finally, we must never forget that we cannot build a sound and prosperous America in a sick and poverty-stricken world. We must develop a program to use our gigantic strength and technological wizardry in raising the productivity of other peoples, to help them help themselves in raising their standards of living."

This ADA "long-term economic program" is an outline; one must, accordingly, wait to see how the program is filled in before passing final judgment upon it. However, the outline is sufficiently clear to draw, at least for preliminary purposes of discussion, the conclusion that it seems to be, essentially, the "long-term" *emergency* program of the New Deal to salvage the depression of the 1930's.

The New Deal, undoubtedly, did a good salvage job. But it must be remembered that the New Deal never ended the depression, which was still on in 1939 (with around 9,000,000 unemployed) when war came to bring full production. No basic answers to the economic crisis were given by the New Deal. The forces that generate recurring economic breakdown and depression still exist, nay, they have grown stronger. With all its legislation and all its agencies the New Deal brought no change in economic policy and no new balance between investment and production, between production and consumption. Fiscal policy, compensatory spending are important for economic balance, and they provide usable techniques for government in a crisis; but alone they cannot solve the economic crisis because they deal with effects, not causes. Compensatory

spending wants to "compensate" for defects in the economic order—why not get rid of the defects? A new economic policy is called for.

Social security, a more progressive tax system, more TVA's for river valley development, an adequate farm, educational, health and housing program—all these are highly desirable objectives. But they cannot, alone, solve the deep-going economic crisis of our age; in fact, their fulfillment depends upon solving the crisis. We must work to fulfill them as much as they can be; even partial fulfillment will ease the developing economic forces of a new depression, and so give us time for larger action. But alone, I repeat, the proposed "New Deal" policy can neither prevent depression nor solve the crisis.

Not only are its economics far from enough, but the New Deal is a spent force: it is now history. The New Deal did a good job of improvisation in an emergency situation where no other immediate course was feasible (liberals were bewildered, socialists and communists impotent), and by the economic relief it provided averted the complete chaos that might have given reaction the chance to seize political power. In addition, the New Deal invigorated the liberal-democratic consciousness and aspirations of the American people, achieved many long overdue reforms, and broadened the social horizons of government. The New Deal belongs in the American tradition with the Jacksonianism of the 1820's-30's, the Populism of the 1880's-90's, and the progressivism of the 1900's. But no more than these earlier movements did the New Deal (except for its liberal-democratic emphasis) give answers beyond the needs of its times.

One may ask—again at least for purposes of discussion—the pertinent question: Is the ADA, in its larger economic policy and politics, to pick up the scattered bits-and-pieces of the New Deal for a new try?

All the indications are that it cannot be done. The New Deal was a crisis-government. It was the negative expression of a revolution that must become positive in terms of new economic institutions and policy. The New Deal did not eliminate the forces that generate recurrent depression. In five years, or thereabouts, we may have another depression, and depressions in our age become crises. Shall we go from one crisis-government to another? We cannot do so without moving toward totalitarian dictatorship. What Franklin Roosevelt did was unique: he saved us with his faith in liberal democracy, his humanitarian spirit, and, above all, his canny sense of how to play crisis-politics in a perpetual balancing of one

interest against another, of playing "right" and "left" against one another. We may not get a Franklin Roosevelt again, nor might a new Roosevelt succeed as recurrent depression undermines economics, politics and democracy. We need an economic policy and political action to end the crisis, not merely to ease it.

The New Deal's basic weakness was its monopoly policy. This is also the weakness of the ADA's "long-term" economic program (at least on the basis of its preliminary general formulation). The "death sentence" act to break up public-utility holding companies, the SEC powers over corporate financing, all the other New Deal anti-monopoly measures irritated monopoly but did not break it. New Deal confusion was most dangerously manifested in the NRA, which moved toward a monopoly economic state that used the sanctions and powers of government. Already monopoly power was overwhelming in the prewar years, with 1,500 giant corporations in control of up to 70 per cent of the American industrial economy. Monopoly became stronger during the war, it exploited the government's need for war production and the government's expenditure of over $15,000,000,000 on war plants. (Only a handful of liberals during the war raised the issue of making TVA's out of the war plants; nor do they raise the issue now, heaven alone knows why not.) Today, the Department of Justice warns of a new era of monopoly mergers. Anti-trust suits may multiply; the results will be nil.

Monopoly is a private oligarchy that constitutes an authoritarian economic government incompatible with economic freedom and democracy. It is not free enterprise but a destruction of free enterprise as economic freedom. It restricts production, creates economic unbalance through its policy of low production with high prices for higher profits, is the basic force that generates recurrent depression. Monopoly, moreover, wields a political influence in national and international affairs, that stands athwart liberal social progress. Hence our generation must tackle the monopoly problem. Experience is ample that neither regulation nor control of monopoly works. Its power must be broken. It can be broken only by converting monopoly corporations into public enterprises as new-type TVA's.

This anti-monopoly policy is "too radical"? But that is immaterial if it is the only policy that *will* work. This approach is inescapable, for "radical" measures are inescapable in an age of deep-going crisis. We are

being forced, moreover, in the "radical" direction by compulsive social-economic drives. No responsible person has urged that exploitation of atomic energy be left to "free private enterprise"—what is our national Atomic Energy Commission but a new-type TVA? The American government proposes and fights for an Atomic Development Authority that shall own and operate all the world's uranium mines and uranium plants. This is more radical than any proposal made by Communist Russia, for the Authority means world socialism and world government in the field of atomic energy. Radical? Yes, definitely: but do you prefer atomic destruction of the human race?

Doctrinaires of the "right" and "left" make the touchstone of acceptance or rejection of a new proposal whether it is "radical" or not. The touchstone, on the contrary, should be whether a proposal is necessary to solve the crisis of our age and *to solve it within the liberal-democratic framework*. Hence the need for a combination of the conservative and radical approach: the conservative to conserve the contributions of liberal democracy to civilization, the radical to make the institutional changes to save those contributions from destruction by monopoly reaction.

So, too, with monopoly. Whether radical or not, monopoly power can be broken, and the stage set for a new upsurge of social-economic and cultural progress, only by converting monopoly corporations into TVA's in a socialist mixed economy of public enterprise, free private enterprise and co-operative enterprise. No matter if the proposal is "radical" or not; for it means security *and* freedom in a liberating synthesis of liberal democracy and liberal socialism: as in Labor Britain.

We need today an emergency economic program and emergency political action with a new sound realism. This realism needs to include a new liberal understanding of necessary changes in economic institutions and policy. The new understanding must reject what is outworn in the institutional economic arrangements within liberal democracy while it clings steadfastly to the liberal emphasis on human liberty and dignity. The new understanding must also reject the "left" abstractions and dogmas; and it must avoid the "front" traps baited with confusion in order to prepare totalitarian destruction of freedom. Liberals must come down to economic and political earth, yet still keep their eyes fixed upon the stars of essential libertarian values. We should not worry about being "too radical," for radical is the spirit of the American tradition.

IDEAS FOR A NEW PARTY

A SYMPOSIUM — III

AN INTEGRATED SYNTHESIS

By Sidney Hook

Professor of Philosophy, New York University

As a whole the Declaration represents an integrated synthesis of the best traditions of democratic socialism and American pragmatism. It takes note of the psychological realities of the American situation. It does not base itself on high a priori dogmas about what the future *must* be. Following the lead of scientific method, the Declaration recognizes that although not all alternatives are possible, historical alternatives do exist between which we must choose and for which we become responsible. This is excellent.

On the domestic scene the suggestions made seem to be sound as an initial approach. They reflect what we have learned from other countries as well as from our own experiences of the last decade.

I have some question about the section on foreign policy although my differences are probably only a matter of emphasis. Of course we should be opposed to all imperialism. But the differences between the decaying imperialism of the West and the imperialist expansionism of Russia should be more strongly emphasized. I very much doubt that "if left alone to decide, Europe will move toward a liberal democratic socialism and toward a federal United States of Europe." Unless we give a most powerful *economic* and moral aid to the weakened European democracies, they will be taken over by the Communist totalitarians. Russia can *officially* keep her hands off and her fifth columnists still do her work. We cannot therefore merely propose that all sides let Europe alone. We must actively help all democratic elements.

Second, there should be greater emphasis upon the organization of international collective security as well as on national disarmament. So long as a free public opinion does not exist in any country, inspection will be inadequate because the discovery of violations of any disarmament code depend upon the co-operation of the nationals in that country. Unless democratic safeguards are provided, citizens of a country violating the disarmament convention will be too terrorized to report violations. Consequently, at least until all countries are political democracies, no country is safe from secret preparations and sudden attack. The only safeguard is the concentration of all destructive power in the hands of a *democratic* international authority. The logic of this proposal points to the wisdom of Clarence Streit's position—the *voluntary* union of democratic powers until it embraces the entire world.

* * *

AN INTELLIGENT START

By Morris H. Rubin

Editor, The Progressive

"Ideas For A New Party" strikes me as being one of the most authentically American statements of progressive goals to emerge on paper in a long time. Its ideas are far more closely akin

to, and a further development of, the best of the indigenous American radicalism in the Progressive movement of Wisconsin, the Farmer-Labor movement in Minnesota, and the Non-Partisan movement in North Dakota than the more European-minded platforms and statements of the host of liberal, progressive, and radical committees which have had their brief hour in the headlines since World War I.

The great attraction for me in "Ideas For A New Party" is the recurring recognition of the basic fact that the goal of American progressivism must be to demonstrate that political freedom and economic security are not contradictory goals, as the totalitarians tell us, but that, affirmatively, we can have bread *and* the ballot, security *and* significance, food *and* freedom.

The time is rotten-ripe for an American progressivism to take the field against both American reaction and old-world versions of radicalism. I am not harping on "American" in any narrow nationalist sense. I am convinced that the TVA idea, as an example, with its concept of national planning, regional administration, and democratic local participation, is the kind of native American creation that is as different from a Marxist-inspired agency as democratic planning is different from total state regimentation. The TVA concept of democratic planning can take root and flower among a people who have rightly shown a traditional resistance to regimentation. The acceptance of the TVA idea by once hostile businessmen, manufacturers, and editors is ample confirmation of my view that *democratic* planning and *practical* idealism can win their way in this country.

The views on foreign policy expressed by the National Educational Committee for a New Party seem to me to be excellent, so much so, in fact, that they read even better today—in the light of what has happened in the past few months—than they did when they were first written.

"Ideas For A New Party" add up to an intelligent start. You can't fit them snugly into any of the traditional compartments, and this is part of their strength. What is needed now is a first-class job of hammering the twenty-three printed pages of the Declaration into a summary of twenty-three crisp sentences that will be readily intelligible to the people whose interest and support must be won if anything like a popular movement is to be built.

* * *

A FEW SOBER CONSIDERATIONS

By William L. Munger

Executive Secretary
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International Union, AFL

The "Ideas For A New Party" constitute an excellent statement of political objectives, and the logic of many of the commentators to the effect that the Democratic Party shows little evidence of becoming a rallying point for political progressivism is overwhelming.

A much-needed and fruitful re-examination of radical ideas is made by the Declaration. It offers a general policy around which progressives, liberals, and laborites can unite.

American liberals must study previous attempts to form "progressive" political parties and to re-examine all of the political concepts they have usually regarded as axiomatic. This re-examination and study should go be-

yond consideration of principles and programs to include the traditional techniques and methods that have been applied.

Liberals and political progressives are notable for their tendency to become emotionally attached to a certain set of concepts or to a certain pattern of political clichés. They develop a set of conditioned reflexes and the rest of their political life is merely a series of stimuli and responses which are as mechanical in their manifestation as were the responses of Pavlov's dogs in the laboratory.

The basic problem for the development of a new liberal political movement is that of achieving a program and methodology which is flexible and dynamic and yet at the same time achieves the necessary degree of stability and coherence. Sensitivity to the fluid character of the problems and needs of our own country as part of an equally rapidly changing world does not mean opportunism, rather avoidance of the introspective preoccupation with a set of fixed concepts and methods which is an outstanding trait of most Marxist political groups. No set of principles true for all time is likely to be discovered. In fact, if any one lesson can be learned from the experience of various "radical" political parties in the past it is that they have been too preoccupied with discovering the one answer which would furnish the hidden key to the secrets of the universe. There almost inevitably followed the development of a rigid, sectarian approach. All failures were explained as the "work of the devil" or as due to the ignorance and stupidity of the masses.

Most parties of this type represent a grafting of European political movements on the American body politic. They represent a mechanical transplantation of movements and ideologies growing out of European traditions and historical developments, but bearing little or no necessary relation to political actualities in our own country. All of the quarrels and factional divisions that have beset European political movements have likewise been transferred to this country on the implicit assumption that the structure of society is universally the same and that "progressive" political movements the world over must have identical programs, identical techniques and end up at identical goals.

Not only must we face the practical obstacle which the presence of this politically indigestible factor represents, but it is a sad fact that the communist movement in the last twenty years has elaborated numerous outgrowths and poisonous substances which have had a corroding effect on most noncommunist liberals. An atmosphere of intellectual intimidation and fear has been created in the minds of large numbers of noncommunist political progressives in which virtually every thought and action is judged by the touchstone of "left" vs. "right" or progressive vs. reactionary. Liberals have developed a set of political co-ordinates which constitute as archaic and inflexible a system of political geometry as was Ptolemy's theory of the solar system. There is a constant overhanging fear of being labelled as red baiter, imperialist agent, fascist or whatever the latest epithet happens to be. Thus their political judgments too often tend to be a priori and purely mechanical. While there are

indications that liberals and progressives are increasingly able to throw off this albatross from around their necks, nevertheless we find that too many are still intellectually tied up in a hodgepodge of classical infantile leftist political slogans and terminology which makes clear and independent thinking on political issues extremely difficult.

Any new party movement must naturally base itself in large measure upon labor. However, it is virtually impossible, in my opinion, to expect that any real political movement can be developed as long as the split in the labor movement continues on its present basis.

The "Ideas For A New Party" constitute, I repeat, an excellent statement of objectives. And the National Educational Committee for a New Party is soundly realistic when it places the emphasis on *education for agreement on a policy* rather than a new party now. For no amount of proof that the present situation urgently requires a realignment of liberal political forces will in itself lay the basis for the actual creation of an appropriate political instrument for meeting the need. No doubt there are particular areas in the country where the development of new-party movements is practical and will happen. But I think that until there is unity in the labor movement, until the fester of the communist movement and its satellite movements have been treated with the proper type of political penicillin, until there is larger understanding and agreement on policy and ideas, the atmosphere favorable to the formation and growth of a nationwide popular new party movement does not exist.

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WORLD SIGNIFICANCE?

By Feliks Gross

Professor of Political Science, New York University

As a guest in this country who enjoys the everyday freedoms that are a part of American culture, I do not feel I can discuss whether or not a new party is desirable. But I can express myself on the merits of the Provisional Declaration of Principles as a programmatic statement of ideas, directions, and values.

The Declaration is a dynamic, pragmatic statement of principles which may easily have an international significance. I wish that the general ideas in this declaration could become a platform for the progressive democratic movements of Europe and Asia, for their workers, peasants and intellectuals, for their middle class. What we need today is a dynamic, militant social democracy, a liberal democratic world movement with the *will* to tackle our social-economic and international problems and the *knowledge* to do the job. Knowledge and practical progressive solutions for democratic values are needed — not the pipe-dreams of dogmatic doctrinaires and malignant totalitarians. The Declaration has the will and the knowledge for action.

A new International is needed. An International of all liberal, progressive movements based on the principles of humanist democracy and of individual liberty. A Labor International alone is not sufficient today. To resist all forms of totalitarianism, and to spread libertarian democracy throughout the world it is necessary to form a new International that will include progressive workers, farmers, and intellectuals, the middle class. For only the progressive

unity and action of all useful functional groups can build a new free world.

What, for me, is a distinguishing feature of the Declaration of Principles is its recognition, from the standpoint of both theory and practice, of the change the social structure has been undergoing throughout the world by the rise of the technical-managerial, white-collar and professional groups—the new middle class, or what in Europe is called the "intelligentsia." This new middle class must be fitted into action for progressive social change, it must be included in the co-operation of all useful functional groups to build a new world of greater economic, political and social justice.

In Central Eastern Europe, as well as in Italy, the intelligentsia in the 1920's and 1930's became largely a vanguard of fascist and other reactionary movements. This can happen in other nations. The new middle class, the intelligentsia, has to be won over to the struggle for libertarian democracy throughout the world. It can be done on the basis of the ideas and approach presented in the Declaration of Principles.

World democracy, and its struggle for democratic social change, can be strengthened by a new Democratic International. This new International, with full respect for the liberating principle of social-economic, political and cultural pluralism so masterfully and convincingly presented in the Declaration, would support libertarian democratic movements and encourage the development of social, economic and political democracy. Every nation has the right to choose the form of government it prefers, as long as this does not interfere with the freedom of other nations and with basic human rights. International support of libertarian democratic movements will, moreover, strengthen political pluralism, as international political pluralism is an essential principle of international democracy.

A Democratic International does not preclude Labor and Peasant Internationals. On the contrary, a strong Social Democratic International and a parallel peasant international (a "Green International" as the Bulgarian peasant leader Stamboliski suggested) would only strengthen an over-all Democratic International.

As the Declaration emphasizes, we are at the beginning of a new technological age, which forces new types of social organization and co-operation. The American proposal for an Atomic Development Authority, which, as the Declaration points out, is world socialism and world government, clearly shows the road toward international economic and political co-operation. This kind of co-operation is essential for lasting peace. Plans of international co-operation based only on diplomatic strategy and formal agreements have failed so far. This was true of the League of Nations and also of the smaller international organizations like the "Little Entente." It must not become true of the United Nations.

A truly efficient international organization can be based only on the universal popular support of workers, farmers and the new middle class. Their support is necessary for all efforts to maintain peace, for the principles of an organized peaceful world, for a really efficient and constructive United Nations working to promote peace and social progress. A Democratic International can become an important instrument for the replacement of power

politics with peace. The Declaration offers the ideas for the platform of a Democratic International. Time is short —we need action.

* * *

A NEW PARTY?

By Seba Eldridge
Professor of Sociology, University of Kansas

Any new-party or non-party approach to the problems of American life must take account of certain deep-seated trends in our social system. This will perhaps disallow the idea of a new party itself, if expected to displace one of the existing major parties in our two-party system.

Not since the 1850's has there been a major realignment in American politics, so far as the party *names* are concerned. Perhaps the leading factor is the large, active personnel continually recruited by the party machines through the promise of patronage or preferment. Active, interested workers are necessary in "getting out the vote," and no new party has successfully challenged either of the old parties in this matter. This together with the family-conditioned partisan loyalties of a great majority of voters is likely to assure the continued predominance of those parties. With the exception noted all "third" parties have been propaganda organizations, for their electoral successes have been local or, at most, regional and, even so, more or less ephemeral.

The political implementation of liberal policies has been effected in other ways. The methods of CIO-PAC are of course the most conspicuous recent instances. Loss of the Congressional elections in November does not disprove the soundness of these methods. A like approach can be extended to other mass elements of the electorate, particularly where organizations already established might lend themselves to political purposes. Here will come farmers of the class represented by the Farmers' Union, the large Negro minorities of the northern cities, and, with growing organization, wage earners in the Southern states.

To these possibilities should be added nonpartisan study-and-action groups interested in public affairs. The best examples are found among women's organizations, notably the League of Women Voters and the American Association of University Women. More specialized groups are illustrated by the National Consumers' League and the American Association for Social Security. A good many organizations of this nature can be co-ordinated with labor and farm organizations for publicity and pressure purposes. A good start in this direction has already been made in the "lobby on the left" at Washington.

Whatever the approach taken, two trends in our politico-economic system are of crucial importance. First, as recent researchers have shown, public ownership and other forms of collective enterprise have steadily developed throughout our history and now constitute a large sector of the economy. But this has been a gradual growth and, although the tempo is accelerating, all indications point to a like gradual growth in the future. This trend seems likely to culminate in a predominantly collective economy; but because it is gradual it offers no solution to many pressing problems in the years immediately ahead. The researches in ques-

tion also showed that collective developments in this country have been due primarily to the pressure of consumer and related public interests, not to pressure by labor in its role of producer. The implications for practical programs are obvious.

The second trend is complementary to this one, but is of much greater importance for the immediate future. It is the growth of nonownership controls through government, especially the federal government. In large measure the economy of the country now operates as *one* producing plant. And so radical is the interdependence of industries, of regions, of producers and consumers that serious dislocation of any important phase of the economy affects all other phases. This makes imperative a stable, closely articulated, nation-wide co-ordination of all major phases of the economy. This need not mean inflexibility and overcentralization.

The thought and effort of progressives must be largely concentrated in this area for years to come. Here will come, among others, problems of regionalism, of representative government in industry, of fiscal, wage, and price policies essential to growing production and full employment, of the widest feasible sharing in the nation-wide controls.

* * *

THE MORAL BASIS

By Daniel Hoffman

Student, Columbia University

What impresses me particularly in the Declaration is its vigorous affirmation of the moral basis of economic and political activity.

I think one way of phrasing the great contradiction in our culture is that our morality is based on the unchanging words written in ancient Greece and Palestine while most of the other influences in our culture have fostered aggression, acquisitiveness and, in recent American history, the wrong kind of individualism. So we are faced with the old traditions of justice, communal responsibility, brotherly love, etc., on the one hand; and, on the other, what the urge for survival in our culture seems to demand of us.

Our society, as envisaged in the Declaration, can move in a more unified, more humane direction. John Donne's concept that "No man is an island," that we are all bound up in one another, can become institutional and alive in actual economic institutions, in those proposed by the Declaration, and thus become the basic imperative that moves human lives. It will be difficult to attain, for people are jealous of every insignificant prerogative they may enjoy, no matter at what cost in great injustice to others! Yet if any liberal program has any chance of being adopted it is that which the Declaration urges. I know of no other rival system to capitalism, that would create economic security and at the same time preserve political independence and freedom, than the "liberal economic democracy" proposed by the Declaration of Principles.

In the clear and dynamic writing of the Declaration are many phrases that could be pulled out and used as slogans to publicize its ideas. Party of the American Dream . . . production for human welfare . . . constitutional democracy in industry . . . liberal democratic planning for freedom . . . make

this century end up as the century of freedom and peace . . . the future is not frozen, it comes alive for free men and women. But it is hardly a matter of slogans; the arguments themselves are very persuasive, and these eye-catching words just spill out of them.

The crucial thing is to get a new party, or at very least the idea of and support for a new party, out of the limited circulation and backing of a few. A tremendous job of educational public relations lies ahead. The Principles should be reprinted and distributed through every available channel. Popularizations of each section should be written as articles and as pamphlets. I see possibilities for pictorial dramatization of some of the Ideas.

It will not take a lot of "selling" to make a lot of people believe that the socialization proposed by the Declaration will not deprive them of freedom. The public must be made aware that (1) the present economic organization of the country is in its very nature unstable and operates against the people's welfare; (2) neither of the major parties are going to do anything about it; (3) a new party based on the American idea of economic freedom, political liberty, peaceful progress and security with liberty can make the American dream a reality.

Even before any formal political organization is set up, such a long-range educational public relation campaign should be mapped and put into operation.

This party has to be well organized and strong by the next depression; in fact it could prevent the depression. But if the party is still an abstraction when the depression comes, I fear that no moderate democratic measures will seem sufficient to a bitter disillusioned nation.

WE NOTE . . .

Debate on the Doctrine

To read the debates on the Truman Doctrine in the *Congressional Record* is to gain an insight not only into the depths of the Congressional soul but also into some of the issues at stake. In more than 150,000 words given out on the subject by more than 250 men there was bound to be some repetition, some banality. Yet the tone of the debates was relatively sober and contained. Prejudices got battered and old lines were broken. One gathers an impression that a number of congressmen, having lost sight of their old signposts, were groping about in search of a policy they could honestly support. Not all of them, of course, but some. Newspapers reported a general impression that proponents of the Greek-Turkish aid bill voted without great enthusiasm. The papers may have recorded only the general sobriety of the occasion or simply the fact that thinking is not a hilarious occupation. The bill's opponents were not happy either.

Early in the debates Senator Vandenberg divided enemies of the bill into two groups—"those who hope it will not work but are afraid it will" and "those who hope it will work but are afraid it will not." As to the latter group the senator went a little easy in describing his one-time isolationist associates. Actually their motivation lay deeper than simple hope, and in some cases it was so overladen with the conventional virtues as to be practically unrecognizable. Twenty-three Senators voted against the bill. Two of these, Pepper and Taylor ("those who hope it will not work but are afraid it will") could be described as procommunist. At least two more, Byrd and Williams, are best described from their remarks as economizers (Where is the money coming from?). The rest made up the isolationists, described by the senior senator from Michigan in his second category. A few, like Wherry, showed themselves successively as isolationists, economizers, and haters of the New Deal. A part of Wherry's argument, repeated both in the Senate and House, went like this: I've been giving communism hell for years but the administration has been giving it comfort (at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam), so why try to stop the darn thing now? Which as an argument closely resembles pretzel bending. It has a slick political surface and a deceptive curve but in the end it turns back upon itself. Wherry and the followers of Col. Robert McCormick's *Tribune,* in spite of their windy protests, showed themselves uninterested in communism as a current phenomenon; what they have been interested in all these years is the use of the word "communist" to smear their political and economic enemies. The proof was laid on the line. There was no more interesting by-product of the whole debate.

As was to be expected, discussion in the House took a more unbuttoned form than that in the Senate. Tempers were shorter and reactions more uncertain.

Illustrating the opposition lineup on the bill was the colloquy between isola-

tionist Alvin Edward O'Konski of Wisconsin and procommunist Vito Marcantonio of New York. Questioned about their newly formed association by another member of the House, O'Konski, head of the Anti-Communist Association, protested his innocence of communism! "I will say this to the distinguished gentleman from New York," he said directly to Marcantonio. "He and I have voted in opposite directions for the last hundred votes that have been cast. This is the first time we are together. . . . I think the gentleman from New York is right once, for the first time out of a hundred, and I am going to follow him."

To which Marcantonio sardonically replied that he was overwhelmed by the attention he was receiving. "The gentleman says sometimes there are a hundred with me or a hundred against me; and at last the gentleman is with me. I do not know what is going on anymore."

But if anyone didn't know what was going on it must have been O'Konski. (He was first elected to the House in 1942.) For Marcantonio could remember back to 1940 and the first half of 1941 when procommunists and isolationists regularly teamed up to slap down the administration on issues of foreign policy. Others, like the unreconstructed isolationist Clarence Brown of Ohio, had similar memories. But unlike O'Konski, they did not feel it necessary to explain their "No" publicly or to welcome back old political bedfellows of the days when the Yanks were not coming.

And the liberals? The only thoroughgoing liberal in either house to oppose the bill was Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas. As for the others, some protested that they saw in the legislation before them not so much a new doctrine as an emergency requiring immediate action, but such reservations kept no one from voting affirmatively. Overwhelming was the conclusion that we must not go down the road to war as in 1920-1941.

Doing his cause most proud was one of the newer liberals in the House, Walter Huber of Ohio. He explained that five communist veterans from his district had asked him why, as one who in the past had "to some extent believed in the principles of Henry Wallace," he could possibly support the new doctrine. To them he had replied that he had visited the countries of eastern Europe and talked "to the average people—the little people"—and that everywhere he found them fearful of Russia and of the future. And he added that he wanted to insure freedom to that part of the world.

This immediately set off a flurry of red baiting in the House. To which Huber promptly answered: ". . . we must not condemn all the young exsoldiers who came down with this group [Communists]. They are looking for a better way of life. . . . If they could be assured of security in the future it would go a long way in changing their outlook toward our great form of government. . . ."

In the midst of the exchange he was also set upon by an isolationist member from California who asked him to explain why "these questions" could not be handled through the United Nations.

I quote his answer verbatim from the *Record* (May 9, page 3991): "Mr. Huber. I may say to the gentleman from California that if he will explain why Russia cannot handle similar matters through the United Nations then

I will be satisfied. This thing is not one-sided."

It took Huber a bare eight minutes, including interruptions, to make clear the chief reasons for support of the bill and to answer what turned out to be the opposition's most misleading issue. During several days of debate no one else in either house put the case more succinctly.

The Truman doctrine was projected in an atmosphere already heavily charged with anticommunism because of Russia's increasing lack of international co-operation. It dealt perforce with Greece and Turkey — specific countries and conditions in which Russia and communism were playing an important part. In spite of these handicaps, the tone of the debate was relatively high. It might have been even higher, of course, had it been possible to emphasize the broader aspect of the new policy (as will be possible in coming months). All of which suggests not that the present Congress is a distinguished one *sui generis* (many would agree that it is not) but that legislative stature may increase with the significance of the issues under consideration.

P. B.

James Burnham Rides Again

War with Russia is inevitable and the United States must wage it, predicts James Burnham in a new book, *The Struggle for the World*. So let us make war while Russia is relatively unprepared, which is the only logical policy, Burnham argues, since the war is *inevitable*.

If inevitable, the prospect is horrifying. But one must remember that James Burnham is a master-artist in the use of the word "inevitable"—it is his chief stock in trade. There were quite a number of "inevitables" in Burnham's earlier writings that never came off. From the record it is clear that whatever Burnham, at any particular moment, *thinks* will happen is "inevitable," but if he changes his mind the old "inevitable" disappears and a new "inevitable" replaces it. Here are several items in proof:

Item. For seven or eight years during the 1930's James Burnham was a Trotzkyite-communist. He wrote with all the messianic passion of the doctrinaire that "the Trotzkyite revolution is inevitable."

Item. Then came a change of mind and a new "inevitable." In 1941 Burnham published a book, *The Managerial Revolution*, which argued with all his earlier doctrinaire passion that socialism is impossible and that a new type of revolution, "the managerial revolution," is inevitable. Within that cosmic inevitable, which cannot be discussed in this space, were a number of minor "inevitables"—and not one of them has come off:

1. The Axis will win the war, said Burnham, their victory in inevitable. He predicted an inevitable division of the world among three super-states. "The nuclei of these super-states are, whatever may be their future names, the previously existing nations, Japan, Germany and the United States." (*The Managerial Revolution*, p. 178.) Sad for Burnham, but true: it didn't come

off his "inevitable" way.

2. Burnham predicted the "inevitable" break-up of Soviet Russia and its swallowing up by a victorious Germany and Japan: "During the course of the next few years Russia will split apart into an eastern and a western section gravitating toward one of the key areas [Germany and Japan] which constitute the strategic bases of the superstates of the future. Indeed, the process has already begun. Siberia is so far away from Moscow and so badly connected that it naturally swings toward the East as it has for some years been conspicuously doing. . . . And similarly, at an increased rate since the Nazi-Soviet Pact, European Russia swings toward the central European area. The Russian boundaries advance toward the West. At the same time, economic and social relations with Germany increase. . . . Infiltration of German managers into Russian industrial enterprises is a large step on the road toward fusion of European Russia with the European center. We may be sure that the completion of the fusion, under whatever nominal auspices it comes, will find Russia subordinated to the European center, not, as the spinners of Bolshevik nightmares tell us, the other way around." And why this "inevitable" subordination of European Russia to Germany in control of Europe? Because Germany is the most efficient "managerial state" (hence it must win the war) while Soviet Russia is a "managerial state" of a lower order. (*The Managerial Revolution,* pp. 224-26.) Russia defies Burnham's "inevitability." It works to bring a "fusion" by forcible and ideological means, but with the European center subordinated to Slav-Communist-Russian domination. Another Burnham "inevitable" that hasn't come off.

3. The United States was undergoing an "inevitable managerial revolution" carried on through the New Deal. Since "managerialism" is antidemocratic, Burnham brought forth another "inevitable"—an early end of free elections. He wrote: "The 1940 presidential election — which may well have been the last presidential election in the history of this country, or, at most, the next to last — was a symbolical landmark, a guarantee of the course of the future." (*The Managerial Revolution,* p. 261.) But there was a presidential election in 1944 and, despite the "inevitability" in Burnham's "at most, the next to last," we are now in the midst of preparations for a presidential election in 1948, with nothing to indicate it will not be held on schedule.

Life exploded in Burnham's face and made mish-mash of his "inevitables." But was Burnham abashed? Not at all —he comes forth, in all his doctrinaire determinism, and unashamedly, with another "prediction"—this time of an "inevitable" war with Russia.

James Burnham is a pathological determinist. His whole mental bent is toward determinism. The bent was confirmed by the vulgar Marxism that he learned while a Trotzkyite-communist. The personal aspect of this is unimportant, of course. What is important is that Burnham's determinism works to give aid-and-comfort to reaction. His *Managerial Revolution* gave aid-and-comfort to the totalitarian elites, for he insisted with what he called "scientific objectivity" that their victory was inevitable. His *Struggle for the World* gives aid-and-comfort to the people and policies that may bring a Russian-American war, a war that Burnham

insists is "inevitable." If the war is inevitable, why try to avert it?

Determinism is only a small factor in history and there are few inevitables. War may come, liberal democracy may go, man may destroy his world. Those disasters *may* come, but they are not inevitable. For, in final analysis, man makes his own history. There are alternatives that man may make come true if he works to make them come true.

L. C.

THE READER WRITES

WORLD GOVERNMENT

Dear Sir:

Mr. Emile Benoit-Smullyan ("Control of the Atom," *The Antioch Review*, Winter 1946-47) is apparently a psychoanalyst at heart. He has searched deeply into the American proposal for the international control of atomic energy, and into Mr. Baruch's arguments for the proposal. In these he has found a frustration born of the weaknesses in the structure of the United Nations, and a hidden longing to convert that organization into a world government capable of preventing war.

Mr. Benoit-Smullyan wants such a world government, and so do I. His analysis of what is necessary to accomplish this change is, on the whole, accurate. He advocates an enforceable law prohibiting war, a true legislature and judiciary, and an executive branch with power to enforce law. It is not clear whether his law is to be enforced against nations, which may be by war, or against individuals, which would be by arrest and trial.

But the primary difficulty seems to be that he has found a desire for world government where he wishes it existed, but where, in fact, it is denied. First, although one interpretation of the American plan for the control of atomic energy would seem to reveal numerous hints that a world government is its objective, it is significant that these "hints" include all of the vital requirements for a world government. Why are the important matters left entirely to our influence? Second, the American proposal is a part of the American policy. This policy has consistently included strong opposition to world government.

China wanted world government at San Francisco, and we opposed her. At last winter's meeting of the General Assembly, while in another room we were proposing our atomic control plan to the Security Council, the Cuban and Philippine representatives persistently made themselves objectionable to the larger powers, including the United States, when they asked that we do what we seemed to be hinting we wanted to do. They asked that we revise the charter to provide for a world government with power adequate to prevent war. They asked for the exact changes Mr. Benoit-Smullyan sees implied in our plan.

They, too, saw that all of these implications required far more than the mere acceptance of the plan. They saw that the plan would remain no more than a hint until supplemented by extensive structural changes in the United Nations charter. To convert a treaty into a government is a large order. It must be done systematically and carefully. Yet the United States opposed their suggestions!

It would be encouraging to believe that our American foreign policy is based on a plan for the conversion of the United Nations into a government. Such a belief is not encouraged by the words or actions of the State Department, or by any other section of our government. Until we have more than vague hints, we must assume that our policy is based on the attempt, once again, to find a substitute for war in the framework of a treaty.

Unlike Cuba, the Philippines, China, and impressive groups in many other countries, we have not yet seen that a world without war can come only when we substitute law for the absence of law. We still refuse to recognize that a world without war has never been assured by treaties that must in the end be enforced by war.

When we reorient our thinking from treaties to law, from armies and navies to police, from conferences to government, from national units to the world as a union —when we can envision a world in which there is no fear of war—then will we see the inevitable futility of attempting to find peace without altering the nationalistic foundation of the United Nations.

Sincerely,

New York, N.Y. ROBERT M. VOGEL

Note by the Editors: The foreign policy of the United States is not for World Government (in capital letters). But two observations are in order: 1) No government, except for the British Labor government has made more proposals for multiplying the co-operative functions and agencies of the UN than that of the United States; 2) The American proposal for an Atomic Development Authority, if adopted by the UN, *would constitute world government* (spelled without capitals) *in the field of atomic energy.*

CONTRIBUTORS

Leo Gruliow's knowledge of Russia and of her people is grounded in his experience as American Representative for Russian War Relief (1943-1945). Originally he established residence in Russia as a newspaper correspondent. Previously he had been Washington correspondent of Transradio Press Service.

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William G. Carleton is professor of political science in the University of Florida and chairman of the social sciences in the University College of the university. He has published very widely in the magazine and newspaper press. At present he is working on a book which will deal with "the great decision of 1899 and 1900, the decision which involved our ratification of the peace treaty of 1899 and our abandoning the old policy of American Continentalism."

Alfred A. Skerpan, who obtained his Ph.D. in Modern Russian History at Yale University, is at present assistant professor of history at Kent State University. During the war he served as an analyst with the OSS and later with the State Department.

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William L. Munger is executive secretary of the United Hatters, Cap Makers, and Millinery Workers Union, AFL. He was a member of the American trade union delegation, made up of representatives from the AFL and Railway Brotherhoods, which in January of this year investigated labor conditions in Argentina.